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ABSTRACT 
 
This study seeks to analyse the historical performance of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in sub-
Saharan Africa, and to investigate and explain factors that combine to influence SOE performance 
with the aim of proposing an SOE-specific administrative framework. The thesis is structured as a 
collection of four essays.  
In the first essay, performance trends of 23 SOEs selected from 10 countries across sub- Saharan 
Africa are analysed. The analysis covers a 12-year period from 2001 to 2012, performing 
comparisons across six different industries.  From the results, the telecommunications industry 
comes out as the best performer compared to all other sectors in the study, with an above average 
financial and productivity performance. This result is attributable to the competition induced 
efficiencies common in this sector. The high levels of independent regulation of the industry across 
Africa are credited for reduced direct political interference which is often blamed for diminished 
productivity and general performance in other SOE dominated industries. Conversely, the power 
and postal industries are below average performers when performance is measured in both 
financial and productivity terms. These two industries in particular have often been identified as 
being burdened with diverse stakeholder needs and massive political pressures, both with a 
noticeable negative impact on firm performance. 
The second essay examines the empirical evidence on factors that influence performance of State 
Owned Enterprises. With a focus on power utilities, the essay investigates how such several 
factors interact with each other to influence ultimate performance. The study takes liquidity, board 
strength, extent of stakeholder representation on the board of directors and government’s 
involvement in pricing as proxy variables for resource-based, agency, stakeholder and public 
choice theories respectively.  Using performance as the dependent variable, the study variables 
are modelled in a regression model empirically estimated using a linear mixed model within the 
framework of longitudinal data analysis. The analysis reflect that good SOE performance could be 
explained in terms of the agency and resource-based theories, with a positive correlation between 
good performance and strong boards as well as good liquidity profiles. A wider stakeholder 
representation on SOE boards correlates negatively with performance.  Similarly, the higher the 
level of government involvement in the tariff setting process, the weaker the performance results. 
Based on the results, the essay concludes that the performance of SOEs is underpinned by a 
plethora of organisational issues: agency, public policy, stakeholder and resource-based issues. 
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The third essay selects an SOE, the Botswana Power Corporation which has gone through 
checkered performance trends over a 15-year period up to 2014. Using a case analysis approach, 
the essay takes a broader view in interrogating and explaining how several factors interact with 
each other to influence performance, focusing mainly on governance, resource availability, and 
political and stakeholder interactions. It does so in a context of organisational theories which, when 
applied to an SOE setting tend to display some degree of tension amongst each other. The essay 
concludes that much of the good organisational performance is explained by tenets underpinning 
the agency, stewardship and resource-based theories while a blanket pursuit of the stakeholder 
theory undermined the sustainable performance of BPC. A number of factors with an overriding 
and negative effect on BPC’s performance are consistent with postulations based on the public 
choice theory, but the essay exposes the lack of rigour in the generalised views which suggest 
that politicians always act in self-interest.  
In the fourth and final essay, the Botswana Telecommunications Corporation, being an SOE that 
has maintained a long history of impressive performance is chosen for a case analysis. The 
analysis covers an 18-year period to 2012 and also focuses on governance, resource availability, 
political and stakeholder interactions, all considered in the context of organisational theories.  The 
findings support the widely held view that agency and resource-based theories explain good 
performance, but they challenge the popular view that political influence is always driven by self-
interests. A concept of positive public choice, under which such influence is driven by stakeholder 
interests and sustainability emerges. The case reveals that a selective approach to stakeholders 
defined how BTC crafted its good performance in a politically conducive environment.    
 
In summary, the following points emerge from the four essays: 1) African SOEs in the 
telecommunications industry perform better than those in other industries, typically due to 
competition induced efficiencies, whilst those in the power and postal sectors display below 
average performance; 2) the agency and resource-based theories can best explain good 
performance in SOEs, whilst slow to negative performance can be explained in terms of the public 
choice theory; 3) an indiscriminate pursuit of stakeholder interest contributes to poor SOE 
performance, and with this there emerges a counterproductive external influence best explained 
in terms of both the stakeholder and public choice theories.    
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Background 
 
The history of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) spans over decades, and they have evolved 
over time to serve different purposes in various economic sectors across the world, even 
more so in less developed territories.  Despite their proven importance in sub-Saharan 
Africa, where they operate in virtually all sectors (Kikeri and Kolo, 2006), SOEs in this region 
have a long history of poor performance dating back to the 1970s (Nellis, 2005). The 
reasons for such poor performance are only vaguely documented and are often argued 
along the lines of inefficiencies inherent in government’s involvement. This study seeks to 
contribute to the SOE literature by examining the factors to be considered if SOE 
performance is to be improved.  
Compelling statistics reflect the continuing relevance of SOEs; by the late 2000s they still 
accounted for 20% and 5% of global investments and total employment respectively and up 
to 40% of total output in some countries (World Bank, 2007). The relevance of SOEs in 
China, whose economy is expected to surpass that of the United States of America by the 
end of 2016 (Elwel and Labonte, 2007),  is emphasised in (Ralston et al., 2006) where the 
role of the economically dominant SOEs is pitched at the nucleus of the nation’s economic 
advancement. China’s SOE reforms (with no privatisation) have been generally regarded 
as a vital social experiment providing a key reference to policy alternatives that seek no 
change in ownership (Aivazian et al., 2005). In Singapore, a country widely recognised for 
productivity, Wicaksono (2009) establishes a heavy reliance on SOEs for driving public 
policy. The author also notes that the country’s SOEs do not merely survive competition, 
but surpass private companies in profit generation and wealth creation within the 
Singaporean economy.    
Despite the widely held negative view on SOE performance, which unfortunately is often 
tied to the ownership structure, there exist a considerable number of examples of SOEs that 
have sustained good performance over long periods of time. The multi-award winning 
Singapore Airlines, the Indian Bombay Transport Authority, Brazil’s EMBAER, the French 
GROUPE Renault and Korean POSCO are few of such examples (Cheng, 2007).  Qatar 
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Airlines, voted the world’s best airline of 20111,  plays a major role in the country’s economy 
with a majority shareholding by the Government. SOEs in many Organisation of Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries have for some time represented a 
substantial part of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), employment and market 
capitalisation. Such entities have been prevalent in key sectors such as energy, transport 
and telecommunications (OECD, 2005). 
Amongst other regions of the world, sub-Sahara Africa is one of those presenting a 
compelling case for the continuing existence of SOEs. For a start, up to 63% of the world’s 
Fragile States2 are in the sub-Saharan Africa region (World Bank, 2011) where state support 
remains the main critical factor in infrastructure and service delivery (see Foster, 2008). 
Privatisation in this region, as an alternative to the SOE model has faced significant public 
resistance, possible influenced by lack of empirical evidence supporting its success within 
Africa in general (Fritz and Menocal, 2006). In fact, authors such as Aivazian et al., (2005) 
and   Moushibahou (2010) have found no real evidence of organisational success which 
can be seen as a direct outcome of privatisation. The same goes for Cayón-Costa and 
Vergés-Jaime (2011) who argue that corporatisation, and not necessarily privatisation is 
what has been empirically found to introduce improved performance in SOEs.  
In addition to this, infrastructure sectors in particular require significant capital outlay which 
can not necessarily be recovered through commercial operations mainly due to the 
economic conditions prevailing in sub-Sahara Africa, see (Buchs, 2003). Such a dynamic 
renders the infrastructure sectors less attractive for private investors, while at the same time 
underscoring the importance of continued state participation.  
A further, and equally central consideration is the strategic importance of infrastructural 
sectors like airlines, bulk water distribution, power transmission, among others to 
governments, (Bozec et al., 2002). This is so particularly in a sub- Saharan context where 
majority of countries are at different levels of socio-political and economic conditions. This 
implies a deliberately prolonged state participation in these sectors going into the future. 
                                                          
1 Skytrax 2011 awards, (www.worldairlineawards.com)  
2 The World Bank defines a Fragile State as a low income country or territory with a Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessment (CPIA) score of 3.2 or below.  
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These considerations epitomise the importance of improving organisational performance of 
SOEs, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa were they are expected to lead in the requisite 
state intervention (Sturesson et al., 2015). This thesis examines the fundamental drivers of 
SOE performance in selected Sub Saharan African countries. The thesis brings clarity to 
the seemingly contradicting theories that have for years been used to explain and predict 
organizational behavior and sets the tone for future policy direction. 
Operations of State Owned Enterprises are influenced by many different factors, however 
the inherent link between their administration and country level political cycles is one that 
cannot be ignored (Xu et al., 2001; Mwaura, 2007). This is because such a link has some 
obvious implications on their performance (Carney et al., 2011).  The precise impact of 
political influence on SOE performance depends on its nature and vary case by case 
(Hellman and Schankerman, 2001), but SOEs in less politically stable regions tend to 
display more strain, possibly with performance trends that become almost inexplicable 
unless addressed in a dedicated study beyond the focus of this study.    
Various organisational theories have been relied on in explaining and predicting 
organisational performance. However, the extent to which such theoretical underpinnings 
can aid the understanding of firm performance in the context of SOEs remains an 
unexplored area (Bozec et al., 2002). In addition, the interplay of the various theories in 
explaining the performance of SOEs is a unique phenomenon often overlooked in research. 
Consequently, most studies have relied on single theories in interrogating organisational 
performance. However, the complexity of SOEs demands a broader based approach; by 
their nature they are unique businesses often modelled around political cycles. The inherent 
influence imposed by politics often exposes such enterprises to a myriad of competing 
stakeholder needs. The agency problem and its impact on SOE performance is not as well 
understood from an SOE perspective. The problem is fraught with issues that make it difficult 
to comprehend and manage, including flawed governance structures (World Bank, 2006), 
ill-defined property rights, ambiguous objectives (Shirley, 2008), and weak managerial 
incentives (Bolton, 1995). Beyond placing blame for poor SOE performance and 
inefficiencies on political interference, existing studies have not provided consensus on what 
could be the fundamental drivers of performance in these enterprises and this is an area 
towards which this study seeks to contribute.  
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1.2. The context of sub- Saharan Africa 
 
As at 2011, the sub -Saharan Africa region accounted for just 2% of the world nominal GDP 
despite a 12% stake in the world population (Population Reference Bureau, 2013). This 
compares unfavourably with other regions of the world, for instance Latin America and the 
Caribbean, which account for 8% of both the world GDP and population3. Some historic 
reasons have been presented as accounting for this phenomenon; sub -Saharan Africa 
lagged behind in economic advancement mainly due to the brief nature of the ‘import 
substitution’ phase of economic structural adjustments compared to other regions 
(Mkandawire, 1988).  This phase lasted for just over a decade (post-colonial) from the 
1960s, whereas such adjustments were already underway as early as the 1930s in Latin 
America (Sundaram et al., 2011). Such structural adjustments brought with them a boost in 
local economic production, aided in part by deliberate measures to support public 
investments and SOE subsidies. SOEs thus became very instrumental in the infrastructural 
developments which in turn provided environments conducive to business operation. In 
contrast to this, today the SOEs in sub-Saharan Africa are still faced with the same 
responsibilities of filling in the gaps were the private sector cannot intervene.  
SOEs in sub-Sahara Africa face significant challenges. In fact, it was on account of 
persistent problems facing SOEs that the South African president, in 2012 appointed a 
special ‘Presidential Review Committee’ (PRC) on South African State Owned Entities to 
consider a range of aspects including SOEs’ strategic importance and value creation, 
governance, performance measurers and most importantly compliance with government’s 
development and transformation agenda. From the onset, the PRC pointed out a significant 
problem concerning the proliferation of SOEs and their subsidiaries all which were estimated 
to be no less than 715 at the inception of the commission. The problem of proliferating 
SOEs, often operating with overlapping mandates and responsibilities was noted earlier in 
Botswana, where it prompted a wide ranging SOE rationalisation program (The Economist, 
2012).  This program is still on-going.  
                                                          
3 2012 World Development Indicators Database, World Bank  
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Amongst the many findings of the PRC, issues of poor performance, lack of defined 
government relations, lack of accountability over performance outcomes as well as lack of 
adherence to government’s development agenda came out as glaring issues that need 
urgent attention. The committee identified the following key challenges as key for South 
African SOEs; 1) lack of a common/national agenda for SOEs, 2) lack of commonly agreed 
priority areas and sectors for SOEs, 3) difficulties regarding the balancing of commercial 
and non-commercial objectives of SOEs, 4) under capitalisation which partly result from 
blurred mandate (economic vs social) and, 5) lack of appropriate leadership. Out of the 
review, which by far remains the most comprehensive and targeted to date, the PRC made 
a set of recommendation with a three- phase timeline spanning 2012 to 2025. Key amongst 
the recommendations are SOE categorization framework, defined oversight structures 
(SOE council of ministers and SOE authorities), introduction of a common management 
system, capacity building for SOEs, review of SOE mandates, a common remuneration 
landscape and a new and focused SOE legislation. Progress in implementation of those 
adopted remains at its infancy.    
Outside South Africa, challenges such as inappropriate remuneration packs, excessive 
state interference, corruption and looting and blurred operational mandate add to the 
challenges the PRC observed as prevalent in the South African case (Mutanda, 2014).  
 
1.3. Problem statement 
 
The case of SOEs presents a unique case and as discussed previously, there are SOEs 
that have really performed well (Singapore Airline, Bombay Transport Authority, Botswana 
Development Corporation, Qatar Airlines etc.). On the other hand, many SOEs have failed, 
and continue to do so. Of a particular interest as well is the fact that some SOEs have 
performed extremely well in some years and not so well in other years (Botswana 
Telecommunications Corporation, Botswana Power Corporation are good examples in this 
regard). However, all these dimensions have not, and still do not take away the vital role of 
SOEs: providing key infrastructure and services where it makes no business sense for the 
private sector to invest. This calls for a need to introspect on areas of focus if maximum 
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value is to be derived from SOEs. Despite a chequered history of poor performance, SOEs 
remain very central to the economic advancement agenda in many sub-Saharan African 
countries. Nevertheless, there remains insufficient understanding of what fundamentally 
influences performance in SOEs, given their unique nature; SOEs operate in politically 
exposed environments, serving wide ranging stakeholder interests whilst simultaneously 
pursuing vague objectives.  
Various theories exist that can be used to predict and explain the behavior of organizations. 
However, when applied to SOEs, the theories tend to inter and intra contradict them. Five 
of such theories are the Agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976, Eisenhardt, 1989), Public 
Choice Theory (Niskanen, 1971; Tullock, 1976; Krueger 1990), Stewardship theory 
(Donaldson ,1990; Barney ,1990), the Stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1994) and the 
Resource based theory (Hamel & Prahalad, 1994) 
Whilst under the Agency theory, Corporate Governance measures have over the years 
developed to guard the actions of the supposedly self-centered managers [agents] against 
relegating the principals interest, the Agency problem continues to exist in the SOE scene 
mainly because it is rarely clear who precisely represents the Principal [state]. There has 
however been some cases where the state, acting as the principal has exerted enough 
pressure on SOEs and put in place enough incentives and policies that fully supported 
agents to act in the principal’s interest. On the other hand, there are many cases, typically 
in African countries where SOE failures have been blamed on a lapse in managerial controls 
resulting in corrupt managerial actions, that is, some SOE failure cases have been attributed 
to the Agency Problem itself.  
Under the Public choice theory, SOEs have been thought to fail as a result of excessive 
influence of politicians on the decision making and operations of such enterprises, such 
political figures having been appointed to office by the voting public which in turn does not 
have any motive to monitor their decisions and performance. This theory therefore, tends to 
imply that SOEs will operate in line with the interest of the politicians and not necessarily on 
management’s self-interest as posited by the Agency theory.  
Whilst the Stakeholder theory holds that in an organizational set up, interests of all 
stakeholders should be reconciled and managed in a manner that brings about optimal firm 
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performance, it has been established that in an SOE set up such interest can be difficult to 
reconcile as the stakeholders are diverse in nature and possess very divergent interests. 
The Public Choice theory on the other hand seems to be in conflict with the view that 
stakeholder interests can be reconciled as it clearly views political interests as detrimental 
to firm performance when let to rule the firms.  
Whilst the Stewardship theory views managers as good wardens of the Principals who will 
always act in the best interest of such Principals, the Agency Problem (under the Agency 
theory) has been proven in a good number of cases, with managers acting not in the best 
interest of the enterprise owners but rather on those of their own. The cases of corruption 
that continue to be reported worldwide, to a large extent affecting SOEs, bears testimony to 
many cases of managerial self-interest.  
The quest in literature to explain organisational performance through certain theoretical 
underpinnings has not yielded much consensus from an SOE perspective, with certain 
theories often displaying some level of tension amongst themselves. For instance, the 
agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) is founded on non-aligned interests between 
the agents and the principals, whereas the stewardship theory (Donaldson,1990; 
Barney,1990) is premised on the opposite. Whilst some level of complementarity is 
observed between the stewardship and the resource-based theory (Wernerfelt, 1984), a 
public choice based argument is often presented asserting that highly resourced public 
enterprises tend to attract political manipulation for personal gain (Mwaura, 2007).  Similarly, 
an indiscriminate attempt to satisfy all stakeholder needs may, as suggested by the 
Stakeholder theory undermine good performance due to the heterogeneous nature of SOE 
stakeholders.     
Clearly, factors affecting and influencing SOE performance are diverse and no single theory 
has been conclusively found to explain them most effectively. Thus, this clear gap in the 
literature is not assisting the policy conundrum insofar as improving SOE performance is 
concerned, hence this study.  
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1.4. Objectives and research questions of the study 
 
1.4.1. Specific objectives 
This study seeks to examine factors that explain SOE performance. Specifically, the 
objectives of the study are: 
i. to analyse the performance of SOEs in sub-Saharan Africa;   
ii. to examine factors driving SOE performance 
iii. to examine what combination of variables, taken in the context of organisational 
theories, combine to influence SOE performance; and  
iv. to propose a governance framework specific to SOEs.   
 
1.4.2. Research Questions 
The research questions are listed below. 
1. What are performance trends of SOEs in sub-Saharan Africa? 
2. What are the significant performance drivers of SOE performance? 
3. Which combination of competing theories of organisational performance best 
explains SOE performance?   
 
1.5. Significance of the study 
 
SOEs operate in a unique situation often exposing them to a wider range of variables with 
the potential to influence performance more than in other business types. This uniqueness 
stems from the fact that, in addition to the economic objectives, SOEs always have certain 
ill-defined social objectives that tend to expose them to political interference. The 
stakeholder interests SOEs have to deal with are typically vast and conflicting. Arising from 
this scenario, SOE performance becomes a function of a combination of factors that vary 
from those expected from other types of enterprises, and such a combination is only vaguely 
appreciated in literature, hence the need for this study.   
Despite the existence of theories that predict and explain organisational performance, the 
application of such theories to an SOE structure tends to display tension amongst some of 
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these theories, an issue that has thus far been overlooked in previous research work, which 
has taken a single factor/ theory approach in attempting to explain SOE performance. This 
study introduces a new perspective by considering how a range of variables, taken in the 
context of organisational theories, interplay with each other to influence SOE performance. 
The findings of this study provide an important insight to policy makers by proposing an 
SOE management framework that supports better performance.   
 
1.6.  Chapter Organization  
 
The thesis is a collection of four standalone essays structured around themes which are in 
line with the objectives and research questions. The first chapter introduces the thesis; 
chapter two addresses all relevant methodological issues, and gives a detailed account of 
approaches taken. The rest of the chapters presents the four standalone essays. Chapter 
three is an empirical essay on the performance of SOEs in Sub Saharan Africa. Chapter 
four empirically examines the drivers of organization performance in Sub Saharan Africa. 
The fifth and sixth chapters are in-depth case studies focusing on two individual SOEs, with 
the aim of investigating performance drivers through qualitative analyses.  A summary of 
study conclusions and contribution is presented in Chapter seven, along with the study 
limitations.  
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CHAPTER TWO: METHODOLOGY 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter outlines the methodological issues relating to the study and provides a detailed 
account of the approaches adopted.  
2.2. Research Methods 
 
A wide array of research techniques has been applied over time, with the choice of one 
design over the other inherently determined by the study at hand, i.e. the nature of the 
research problem it seeks to address. The various designs of research broadly fall into three 
categories of research approaches, these being Quantitative, Qualitative and Mixed 
Methods (Creswel, 2014). Below is a discussion of a range of methodologies considered at 
the initial states of this study.  
2.2.1. Qualitative approaches 
 
 These approaches to research are often characterised by an intention to gain an in-depth 
understanding in a given setting, using methods that tend to generate words (rather than 
numbers) for data analysis (Patton and Cochran, 2002). A qualitative approach to research 
is accompanied by freedom from presumptions as the focus is to gain understanding from 
data as and when the analysis progresses, as opposed to quantitative methods (see below) 
where the researcher typically starts with an understanding to be tested (BCPS, 2006). A 
further advantage of this approach is its ability to simplify and manage data without 
destroying complexity and context, particularly when handling research problems with which 
a preemptive reduction of data will prevent discovery (Atieno, 2009).   
Qualitative research is, however, not without limitations, the widely recognised one being 
the small size of populations normally targeted in this type of research. This tends to create 
reluctance to extend findings to wider populations by other researchers (Creswel, 2014). In 
addition, no attempt is made to assign frequencies to features identified in the data; 
consequently, a random occurrence receives the same amount of attention as the more 
frequent ones.   
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Under the broader category of the Qualitative approach to research we find a number of 
techniques, each suited to specific research problems at hand.  
Narrative research – Moen (2006) views this research technique as a frame of reference, a 
way of reflecting during the entire inquiry process, a research method, and a mode for 
representing the research study. This view of narrative research has been suggested earlier 
by Connelly and Clandinin (1990) who described it as both the phenomenon and the 
method.  With this technique, the researcher collaborates with the research subjects in 
documenting a narrative as data is sequentially presented. It thus has an advantage of 
limiting the scope for distortion (Zinchenco, 1985). In its pure form, the narrative technique 
has widely been applied in studies concerning human behavioural sciences as opposed to 
organisational and business science (Banks, 1982; Bell, 1988; Brody, 1987; Heilbrun, 1988; 
Polinghorne, 1988).  
 
Case study – A case study approach to research facilitates the exploration of a phenomenon 
within its context, but using a variety of data sources to that ensure the phenomenon is 
explored from multiple lenses (Baxter and Jack, 2008). Case studies generally fall into three 
main categories, these being exploratory, descriptive and explanatory (Yin, 2003). Below is 
a table by Baxter and Jack (2008) outlining a wider variety of different categories, and 
definitions. 
Table 2.1: Definitions and Examples of Different Types of Case Studies  
Case Study Type  Definition  Published Study Example  
Explanatory  This type of case study 
would be used if one were 
seeking to answer a 
question that sought to 
explain the presumed causal 
links in real-life interventions 
that are too complex for the 
survey or experimental 
strategies. In evaluation 
language, the explanations 
would link programme 
implementation with 
program effects (Yin, 2003).  
Joia (2002). Analysing a web -
based e-commerce learning 
community: A case study in 
Brazil. Internet Research, 12, 
305-317.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 15 
 
Exploratory  This type of case study is 
used to explore those 
situations in which the 
intervention being evaluated 
has no clear, single set of 
outcomes (Yin, 2003).  
Lotzkar & Bottorff (2001). An 
observational study of the 
development of a nurse-patient 
relationship.  
Descriptive  This type of case study is 
used to describe an 
intervention or phenomenon 
and the real-life context in 
which it occurred (Yin, 2003).   
Tolson, Fleming, & Schartau  
(2002). Coping with 
menstruation: Understanding 
the needs of women with 
Parkinson’s disease.  
Multiple-case studies  A multiple case study 
enables the researcher to 
explore differences within 
and between cases. The 
goal is to replicate findings 
across cases. Because 
comparisons will be drawn, it 
is imperative that the cases 
are chosen carefully so that 
the researcher can predict 
similar results across cases, 
or predict contrasting results 
based on a theory (Yin, 
2003).   
Campbell & Ahrens (1998). 
Innovative community services 
for rape victims: An application 
of multiple -case study 
methodology.  
 
Intrinsic  Stake (1995) uses the term 
intrinsic and suggests that 
researchers who have a 
genuine interest in the case 
should use this approach 
when the intent is to better 
understand the case. It is not 
undertaken primarily 
because the case represents 
other cases or because it 
illustrates a particular trait or 
problem, but because in all 
its particularity and 
ordinariness, the case itself  
is of interest. The purpose is 
NOT to come to understand 
some abstract construct or 
generic phenomenon. The 
purpose is NOT to build 
theory, although that is an 
option, (Stake, 1995).    
Hellström, Nolan, & Lundh 
(2005). “We do things together” 
A case study of “couplehood” in 
dementia. Dementia, 4(1), 7-22.  
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Instrumental  Is used to accomplish 
something other than 
understanding a particular 
situation. It provides insight 
into an issue or helps to 
refine a theory. The case is 
of secondary interest; it plays 
a supportive role, facilitating 
our understanding of 
something else. The case is 
often looked at in depth, its 
contexts scrutinised, its 
ordinary activities detailed, 
and because it helps the 
researcher pursue the 
external interest. The case 
may or may not be seen as 
typical of other cases (Stake, 
1995).   
Luck, Jackson, & Usher (2007). 
STAMP: Components of 
observable behaviour that 
indicate potential for patient 
violence in emergency 
departments. Journal of  
Advanced Nursing, 59, 11-19.   
Collective  Collective case studies are 
similar in nature and 
description to multiple -case 
studies (Yin, 2003)  
Scheib (2003). Role stress in the 
professional life of the school 
music teacher: A collective case 
study. Journal of Research in 
Music  
Education, 51,124-136.  
Source: Baxter and Jack (2008)  
However, these categories are not necessarily hierarchical despite the common 
misconception, but rather as strategies that can be applied across a variety of purposes 
(Platt, 1992) for which a case study approach has been identified as appropriate. 
Yin (2003) identifies four scenarios under which the case study should be considered, these 
being when: 
 the study seeks to answer ‘how and why’ type of questions; 
 the behaviour of research subjects is fixed and incapable of being manipulated; 
 there is need to interrogate all relevant facts in their own context; or 
 there is ambiguity between the phenomenon and the context. 
 
The case study method presents a set of significant advantages including the following: a) 
data examination is conducted within the context of its use (Yin, 1984); b) a variety of 
techniques can be applied to allow for other forms of qualitative methods as well as 
quantitative methods (see Block, 1986; Hosenfeld, 1984); and c) the qualitative narrative 
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often presents an opportunity to cut through real life complexities while maintaining 
originality and testability (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
Disadvantages of this approach include limited scope for generalisation of findings, lack of 
sufficient rigour as well as the cumbersome nature of case studies (Yin, 1984).     
 
Other qualitative approaches - In addition to the other techniques discussed in detail, there 
exist other qualitative methods that include Phenomenology and Ethnographies, which are 
however barely relevant to the nature of the research problem which the current study seeks 
to address.  
 
2.2.2. Quantitative approaches 
These are also various social research techniques that employ empirical methods and 
statements (Cohen, 1980) in order to explain phenomena by collecting numerical data that 
are analysed using statistical methods (Creswell, 1994). The choice of the quantitative 
approach as a method of research depends on the research question(s) at hand, but the 
following have been cited as key advantages incorporated in the use of quantitative 
approaches to research by Yauch and Steudel, (2003): a) a quick turnaround due to the 
relative ease in analysing data; b) and the approach dealing with numerical and factual data 
which can facilitate inter-organisational comparisons as well as across-time analysis within 
the same entity.  
However, the method does have its own disadvantages, Dudwick et al., (2006) observe the 
approach as requiring extensive data which can cost massive resources to obtain. The 
authors also criticise the quantitative approaches of their inability to capture very important 
characteristics within a research population, typically those that, although extremely 
relevant, cannot readily be reduced to numbers.       
Quantitative techniques fall under two broad categories, these being experimental and non-
experimental techniques (Creswel, 2004).   
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Experimental research design - With this technique, the researcher’s interest is in the effect 
of a change in environment on the dependent variable. This is observed using standardised 
procedures to hold the dependent variable constant, while the experiential variables are 
modified by the researcher (Ross and Morrison, 2003). A number of authors have hailed 
experimental research methodology as the only one that can truly test a hypothesis 
concerning cause-and-effect relationships, thus providing a real solution to both practical 
and theoretical research problems (Gay, 1992; Moore and McCabe, 1993; Dallal, 1999). A 
distinctive feature, perhaps peculiar to experimental research design emerges; such designs 
are developed to answer pre-existing hypotheses formulated by the experimenter in a quest 
to address research questions.  
Experimental research designs typically take one of three forms, depending on the 
phenomenon at hand.  
The first of these is the Randomised Controlled Trials, which are seen as the strongest form 
of collecting un-biased primary evidence (Greenhaulgh, 2001). This method makes use of 
randomised sampling, with room for an additional control group. Despite its advantages, 
however, four types of bias are still associated with this approach, these being 
measurement, attrition, performance and selection bias (Jadad ,1998; Elwood, 1998).  
The second is the Quasi-experimental approaches in which case the research subjects are 
not randomised to specific environments, leaving the researcher with limited control over 
independent variables.  Putting it differently, a researcher pursuing a quasi-experimental 
approach will typically rely on a pre-existing population, but with an additional control group. 
This approach suffers from its inability to control for heterogeneity between research 
subjects, making it less appealing for certain research problems (Robson, 1993).   
Third are Single subject designs, which seek to reveal a generic nature of a response to a 
specific intervention. With this approach, the researcher has the latitude to perform multiple 
iterations with variables in order to account for causal-effect relationships that occur. 
However, changes are not always associated with the variables being modified.   
Non - experimental designs - This is a broad category of all techniques that involve neither 
the manipulation of independent variables nor the random assignment of research subjects 
to conditions. Such approaches may take the form of surveys, correlational research or 
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causal-comparative inquiry, among others. Whilst the specifics of each phenomenon 
ordinarily dictate when to opt for the non-experimental research design, they are very 
relevant for studies whose research questions are broad and exploratory in nature, see 
(Bushman and Huesmann, 2001). Econometric techniques are the most advanced and 
widely used methods in this approach.  These techniques permit the fusion of economic 
theory and statistical approaches in the analysis of institutional and other numerical data 
(Hood and Koopmans, 1953), based on the development of probabilistic models and 
statistical inference in studying relationships between variables.  
A generic econometric model takes the form:  
 𝑌 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 + ⋯ 𝛽𝑘 + 𝜀𝑘 =  where 𝛽  is a vector of unknown parameters and 𝜀  is the 
error term.  
Okun (1975) proposes a number of advantages associated with econometrics and these 
include: 
 the mathematical interrelationships in econometric models achieving consistency 
within the component elements of equations; and 
 limited bias in modelling and enhanced reproducibility of outcomes.   
 
2.2.3. Mixed Methods 
As a rather newer approach to research design, Mixed Methods entail the combining or 
integration of qualitative and quantitative techniques within different phases of a broader 
research process (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2008; Creswel, 2014). The approach focuses 
on collecting and analysing both qualitative and quantitative forms of data in a broader study 
(or a series of studies) as the view here is that such a combination yields a better 
understanding of research problems than when each applied in isolation (Creswell and 
Clark, 2011). Creswel (2014), while acknowledging the existence of many designs in the 
Mixed Methods field, identifies three forms as being the primary ones: 
Convergent parallel mixed methods – with these techniques, the research integrates 
qualitative and quantitative data so as to provide a more comprehensive approach to 
analysing the research problem. The process of collecting both forms of data typically 
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happens concurrently, hence parallel, and any inconsistencies are probed in the design. 
This approach would be more suited to research questions which are complex, and require 
substantial iteration between possible meanings of outcomes from both quantitative and 
qualitative analysis. Its biggest disadvantage, however, is that the process of concurrently 
performing the two techniques, including the continuous switch between them, can be 
cumbersome and difficult to define (Creswel, 2011).    
 
Explanatory sequential mixed methods – unlike with parallel mixed methods, a researcher 
taking this approach would conduct a quantitative research, whose analysis would then feed 
into a detailed qualitative inquiry.  This approach affords the researcher an opportunity to 
explore and explain the findings from the quantitative research further through a 
comprehensive qualitative inquiry. This method is mostly suited for studies with a strong 
quantitative perspective, but whose findings deserve explanation through structured inquiry. 
Its main advantage is that it is straightforward and easy to apply due to the distinction 
between phases, which are also easier to describe than concurrent phases (Creswel, 2011).  
The shortcomings of explanatory sequential methods are more pronounced when there is a 
difficulty in identifying the set of results from the quantitative study to carry forward to the 
qualitative phase, as well as when sample sizes differ across phases.   
 
Exploratory sequential mixed methods - ordered just like explanatory sequential mixed 
methods.  However, coming with them, the researcher would start with the qualitative 
research and then move on to quantitative research. It therefore stands to reason that they 
are best suited for studies with much strong emphasis on quantitative aspects, where results 
from the qualitative research can then be applied in developing an instrument to use in the 
quantitative phase. Just like the explanatory sequential mixed methods, the challenges of 
the exploratory sequential mixed methods are more pronounced when there is a difficulty in 
identifying which aspects of outcomes of the first phase to carry to the next.  
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2.3. Sampling techniques  
 
A wide array of sampling techniques has evolved over time, each suited to specific research 
scenarios. The following have emerged as popular; a) Probability sampling; b) Purposive 
sampling; c) Convenience and; d) Mixed Methods sampling. Below is a detailed discussion 
of each. 
2.3.1.  Probability Sampling 
These are sampling techniques in which each unit in a target population has a non-zero 
probability of being selected as part of the sample. The techniques give every unit an equal 
chance of being selected from the population (Fink, 1995), thereby eliminating the research 
bias during the selection process (Frey et al., 2000). The elimination of bias enhances the 
scope for generalisation of research findings from data obtained through probability 
sampling.   In addition to eliminating researcher bias, probability sampling provides the 
researcher with an opportunity to calculate specific bias and error with respect to collected 
data (Latham, 2007). A number of probability sampling types exist and Table 2.2 below gives 
an outline of these.  
Table 2.2: Types of probability sampling 
Type of Sampling  Selection Strategy  
Simple  
Each member of the study population has an 
equal probability of being selected.  
Systematic  
Each member of the study population is either 
assembled or listed; a random start is 
designated, then members of the population are 
selected at equal intervals.   
Stratified  
Each member of the study population is 
assigned to a group or stratum, then a simple 
random sample is selected from each stratum.  
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Cluster  
Each member of the study population is 
assigned to a group or cluster, then clusters are 
selected at random and all members of a 
selected cluster are included in the sample.  
Source: Henry (1990).  
2.3.2. Purposive sampling 
Also referred to as judgmental sampling, this technique affords the researcher the 
opportunity to pick samples on the basis of their desirable qualities. It does not require a 
pre-determined number of subjects, neither does it need any underlying theory (Etikal et al., 
2016). This method is typically used in qualitative research that require information - rich 
cases (Patton, 2002). A strong feature associated with purposive sampling is that it affords 
the researcher an opportunity to spend resources only on those samples within a wider 
population that will add real value to the attainment of the research objective, (Etikal et al., 
2016). Consequently, it is time saving as well.   
2.3.3. Convenience Sampling 
This is a non-random (or nonprobability) sampling technique where each member of a target 
population is selected on the basis of meeting a certain criterion like accessibility, 
geographical proximity, data availability or similar (Etikal et al., 2016). The objective of the 
researcher is to collect data from research subjects who are accessible to the researcher 
and who meet a certain criterion, with an assumption that there is homogeneity amongst the 
members of the target population (Palinkas et al., 2013).  The technique, however, suffers 
from bias (Mackey and Gass, 2005) and an inability to deal with cases of significant outliers 
(Hatch and Lazaraton, 1991). The major advantage of this form of sampling is that it is 
ordinarily cheaper and easier to execute.       
2.3.4. Mixed Methods Sampling 
Mixed Methods sampling techniques entail sampling strategies that employ a combination 
of probability sampling and non-probability sampling. The probability sampling techniques 
are employed with a view to increase external validity, whilst the use of non-probability 
techniques, typically purposive (rather than convenience) is applied to increase 
transferability (Teddlie and Yu, 2007). Thus, these sampling techniques have the advantage 
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of enhancing the scope for generalising findings to wider populations, although with a 
significant disadvantage concerning their cumbersome nature.     
 
2.4.  Measuring performance  
 
Measuring the performance of organisations is a topical issue in organisational science. The 
broad nature of the subject makes it one that must always be pursued in the context of the 
phenomenon being studied (Hofer, 1983). At the most basic level, performance 
measurement considers the outcomes of management decisions, and also the rate of 
executing such decisions by an organisation.  Since management decisions are 
contextualised to the objectives of the organisation, and its environment, it follows that any 
basis selected for measuring performance should be reflective of the specific circumstances 
of the organisation being studied (Chenhall, 2003). Such a view to performance 
measurement is very critical in the context of the current study as the nature of the 
organisations in question is rather unique. For instance, SOEs are often saddled with vague 
objectives that need to be properly dissected into those that are economic in nature and 
those that are social. This symbolises the need for the adoption of broad based performance 
measures for SOEs, in particular.     
To achieve this, one needs to adopt an approach that would cover different perspectives 
within a single phenomenon. Such an approach would be one that unifies financial and non-
financial measurers (Combs et al., 2005; Venkatraman and Ramanujan, 1986). Such an 
approach to measuring performance has been adopted by a number of studies in the past, 
see (Cheung et al., 2012; Kanyoma, 2008; Omran,  2001; Clive, 2004). 
2.4.1.  Financial Measures 
These are predominantly based on accounting information and often criticised for being 
based on the past, with limited scope for aiding future explorations (Helfert, 2003).  However, 
financial measures still remain very popular and relevant, in that, rather than being merely 
measures of performance, some of the ‘return based’ measures assist in illustrating 
efficiency in the employment of capital, and the extent of opportunity costs as well as levels 
of risk accommodated in pursuing business opportunities (Drury, 2008). 
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Financial measures of performance are broad and include: 1) Profitability measures (e.g. 
Return on Assets, Return on Investment and a broad range of margin based measures); 2) 
Efficiency (e.g. sales turnover, receivables turnover); 3) Liquidity (e.g. current ratio, quick 
ratio) and, 4) Solvency (e.g. Debt to asset ratio, debt to equity ratio).  For this study, such 
measures remain relevant given the commercial mandate that the SOEs in question have, 
along with other non-commercial objectives.   
2.4.2. Non-financial measures 
These measures focus on the non-financial aspects of the firm, but may combine operational 
data with accounting and other economic information. A very distinctive feature of these 
measurers stems from the view that high performance in non-financial aspects tends to lead 
to good financial performance in future (Banker et al., 2000), hence the importance of 
tracking such performance trends.      
An excessive focus on non-financial measures of performance, however, may result in some 
significant consequences which can in turn compromise performance measurement 
intentions; first, they tend to create some pervasive incentives when focus shifts to achieving 
isolated targets, while compromising on more strategic intentions (Hawkins and Hastie, 
1990).  Secondly, they can be difficult to compute objectively in a timely and efficient manner 
(Chow and Vanderstede, 2006). Nonetheless, performance measurement based on non-
financial measurers appeals for SOEs given the tradeoffs that frequently and constantly 
need to take place between financial (the commercial mandate) and non-financial (the social 
mandate) performance outcomes.    
Non-financial measures can be grouped into three broad categories and these are: 1) 
Internal Operational measures (e.g. labour productivity, machine productivity and production 
volumes); 2) Employee orientated measures (e.g. employee satisfaction, employee turnover 
and employee development) and 3) Customer orientated measures (market share, 
customer retention and customer satisfaction), all which are very relevant for utility 
companies in particular, which in the case of sub- Saharan Africa are mostly SOEs.   
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2.4.3. Integrated approaches 
Due to the importance of both financial and non-financial measurers, as well as their 
respective weaknesses and advantages, the two approaches can be viewed as 
complementary rather than competing. Other integrating approaches to performance 
measurement have emerged, the most common being the Balance Score Card which 
benefits from both approaches in a cohesive manner.  The Total Factor Productivity, an 
econometric technique model can also be seen as integrating. Such integrated approach 
comes out as being best applicable in an SOE environment where performance objectives 
are two-pronged, i.e. social vs economic objectives.    
2.5. The design of the study 
 
The study pursues a very broad topic in organisational science, focusing on a rather unique 
type of organisation whose performance trends, though somewhat documented in literature 
are not much appreciated from the perspective of what drives them. The study selects a 
wide array of variables, seeking to investigate how they interplay each other to influence 
performance towards a certain direction and this is done from a perspective of some 
seemingly contending but popular organisational theories.  
Due to the breath of the topic, the study is broken down into a series of four separate but 
interconnected essays whose findings eventually combine to answer the overall research 
questions as well as addressing its objectives. Each of the essays take its own perspective 
as outlined in Table 2.3 below. 
Table 2.3: An outline of the approach adopted in the study 
SN Topic Focus 
1 Performance of State Owned 
Enterprises: sub-Saharan Africa 
overview4 
 
The essay takes a quantitative form, and 
uses econometric techniques in analysing 
performance trends in 23 SOEs across 10 
sub-Saharan countries operating in six 
different industries.  The essay seeks to 
                                                          
4 Under review in a journal 
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investigate and compare performance 
patterns across countries and industries.  
2 Drivers of Organisational 
Performance in State Owned 
Enterprises5 
 
Flowing from the findings in the preceding 
essay, this essay then selects the Power 
industry (whose aggregated performance is 
below average) in which five utilities are 
selected for detailed inquiry into the 
variables influencing their performance in a 
certain direction. The essay takes a 
quantitative approach using econometric 
techniques.  
3 Performance drivers in SOEs: 
Botswana Power Corporation 
(BPC) Perspective6 
This essay takes a qualitative approach, 
selecting one power utility from the 
preceding essay (a below average 
performer) and undertakes a detailed case 
analysis based on a 15-year period. This 
approach gives the researcher an 
opportunity to validate some inconclusive 
findings from the quantitative study.  
4 Performance of SOEs: Evidence 
on Botswana 
Telecommunications 
Corporation7 
 
In addition to the preceding essay, this 
essay also takes a qualitative approach, 
but selects an above average performer 
from the telecommunications industry (also 
an industry with an above average 
performance) for a detailed case analysis.  
     
 
                                                          
5 Accepted for publication and forthcoming in the International Journal of Productivity and Performance Management  
6 Published in Risk Governance and Control: Financial Markets and Institutions (2016) 
7 Accepted for publication and forthcoming in the International Journal of Social Economics 
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A detailed analysis of literature in the subject of SOE performance 8  has revealed the 
relevance of the following organisational theories to the debates on SOE performance; the 
agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976;  Eisenhardt, 1989). The stakeholder theory 
popularised by (Freeman, 1994). The public choice theory (Niskanen, 1971; Tullock, 1976 
and Krueger 1990) and the resource-based theory (Wernerfelt, 1984).  
 
2.6. Methodology   
 
2.6.1. Research techniques  
Given its broad nature, the study ultimately takes the form of a complex undertaking, calling 
for an innovative use of qualitative and quantitative methods, and so mixed methods have 
been adopted. The study begins with two successive quantitative studies, each with a 
different focus, followed by two further successive qualitative inquiries taking the form of 
case analysis. Thus, the broader study makes use of Explanatory sequential mixed 
methods, with limited application of the parallel mixed methods approach. This approach is 
influenced mainly by the fact that the research problem centers mainly around quantitative 
performance data, which however needs a great deal of qualitative analysis in order to 
deduce more meaning from the analysis of quantitative data and trends (see Creswel, 
2011).      
2.6.2. Sampling methods  
In determining how to sample the SOEs for the study, the following factors were taken into 
consideration: a) there was no inherent need to have a pre-determined number of units in 
the sample for this particular study, although it was important to cover the sub-Saharan 
Africa region as widely as practically possible; b) Only certain types of organisations were 
relevant, i.e. non- privatized SOEs operating along commercial lines; and c) The qualitative 
analysis required information rich cases which could provide the breadth of scenarios 
requisite for the type of inquiry at hand. These types of characteristics have been associated 
with the purposive sampling techniques (Patton, 2002; Etikal et al., 2016). Thus, both the 
                                                          
8 See detailed discussion on main submission. 
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successive quantitative and qualitative studies making up this research work are based on 
SOEs selected using the purposive sampling method.  
2.6.3. Qualitative phases of the study 
The quantitative phase of the research (made up of two studies) was followed by two 
successive qualitative studies. In choosing the qualitative methods to apply, the following 
were considered as main determining factors. The first was the need to interrogate all 
relevant facts within their context. There was also an element of ambiguity between 
phenomenon and context. Thirdly, there are ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions the studies need to 
answer. From the various forms of case studies outlined by Baxter and Jack (2008), the 
explanatory type of case study comes highly recommended for research with the outlined 
characteristics, mainly because of its ability to cut through the complexities of each case 
(Johansson, 2003) whilst maintaining originality and testability (Eisenhardt, 1989). Thus, the 
qualitative phase of the research takes the form of two successive explanatory case studies, 
each focusing on a peculiar but rich case.  
2.7.  Review of previous studies 
 
Although the present study takes a unique approach not adopted in previous studies, an 
extensive review of research work carried out on SOEs, albeit from a different perspective 
was conducted. Table 1.1 below highlights some of the key studies reviewed.  
 
Table 1.1: Summary of previous studies reviewed 
Author/s  Description and Methodology Main Empirical findings and 
Conclusion 
Omran (2001) The study evaluates performance of 
newly privatised firms. Accounting-
based performance measures are 
adopted to evaluate a sample of 
newly privatised Egyptian firms 
against that of SOEs.  
  
Significant improvement in 
profitability, efficiency and 
dividend pay-out ratios are 
evident post privatisation. This 
comes with negligible reduction 
in leverage, employment, and 
risk, capital expenditure and 
output show following 
privatisation. Matching sample 
firms (privatized) to control firms 
(SOEs), it emerges that 
privatized firms do not 
experience any significant 
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improvement in their 
performance, which questions 
the benefits of privatisation. 
Beugre (2002) The study attempts to develop a 
framework explaining the 
effectiveness 
of privatisation in emerging 
economies by building on the 
growing literature on 
transformational leadership.  
Drawing from the literature on 
organizational leadership 
 
 
Although privatisation has been 
considered as a strategy for 
improving the performance of 
state-owned enterprises in 
emerging economies, the simple 
transfer of ownership from public 
to private hands per se will not 
necessarily reduce costs nor will 
it enhance the quality of goods 
and services. Rather, the pros 
and cons of privatisation in 
emerging economies should be 
measured against the standards 
of good managerial practices. 
The findings further suggest that 
transformational leadership 
would successfully drive the 
transition from state owned 
enterprises to private 
enterprises.  
Halkos (2002) The study compares performance of 
SOEs against that of private 
companies. It is based on a sample 
of 23 State owned manufacturing 
enterprises that operated 
continuously from 1978 to 1991. 
Adopting the use of ratio analysis, 
the performance of sampled 
enterprises is compared to the 
average efficiency of the industry 
sectors these firms belong. To 
ensure the higher comparability, 
firms are grouped into 10 two digit 
Standard Industrial Classification, 
and the ratios are divided by the 
number of firms. Then the 
performance is compared on the 
basis of corresponding average two-
digit industry ratios. Ratios used 
were ROA, Profit margins, 
Remuneration per employee, Net 
profit per employee, Liquidity and 
Machinery Depreciation ratio, high 
ratios reflect high performance 
State own enterprises appear to 
exhibit inferior efficiency 
compared to their private 
counterparts. State Controlled 
Entities are managed with a 
model, which diverge from the 
respective one of the 
private firms in economic 
efficiency terms , Cost of labour 
being one of the main drivers of 
SOE inefficiencies.  Continued 
state support ensures continued 
operations of SOEs despite their 
financial failures, but introduces 
excessive state interference in  
prices, investment decisions and 
recruitment of personnel. This 
setting ultimately contributes to 
SOE inefficiency.  
Maheshwari and 
Ahlstrom (2004) 
Examines corporate decline and 
turnaround in an environment with 
numerous challenging environmental 
constraints: the state-owned sector 
This research found that the 
business environment, the firm’s 
decision-making process, its 
leadership characteristics, and 
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in India. The firm studied in this 
article was a major producer of a key 
niche vehicle in India—the motor 
scooter. This firm, Scooters India 
Limited (SIL) had  more than 3000 
employees and annual revenue of 
US$ 50 million annually. Using a 
qualitative research approach, the 
study performs an in-depth case 
study of a state-owned enterprise in 
India. This study examines the 
process that led to decline and 
subsequent turnaround of the firm 
after making losses for 25 years 
from inception, especially the 
constraints of operating as a state 
owned firm in a transition. 
the stakeholders’ responses 
influence the firm’s action 
choices during a turnaround 
process. This study also shows 
that in addition to the strategic 
and operational changes so 
commonly associated with firm 
turnaround, the importance of 
leadership and the basic 
credibility of the firm’s top 
management with major 
stakeholders and government 
officials also play key roles in the 
turnaround. 
Aivaziana et al,. (2005) The study employs a unique 
database compiled from two 
enterprise surveys conducted by the 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
(CASS) in 1995 and 2000 and avails 
annual data on 442 SOEs from 1990 
to 1999. This study was a contributor 
to a larger survey and employed 
questionnaires administered on those 
in charge with factory operations and 
governance as well as on those in 
charge with finances. The study 
sample comprises SOEs selected 
from 34 different manufacturing 
industries across four provinces in 
China. Corporate performance is 
measured in terms of profitability, 
efficiency (output and sales) and 
investment ratios (investment to 
assets and investments to sales).    
Targeted internal governance 
reforms can introduce 
efficiencies within SOES. 
Corporatisation has a significant 
positive impact on SOE 
performance, even without an 
element of privatisation. This 
presents a real policy alternative 
to privatisation.  
The study further projects 
corporatisation as a likely 
predecessor of privatisation, in 
cases where the former is being 
pursued.    
 
Berg et al (2005) The study reviews forces that 
shaped the development of the 
Ukrainian 
electricity sector over the past 
decade, and presents   
the regulatory constraint in a stylized 
form. The study further empirically 
investigates the performance of 
distribution utilities and explain the 
results in terms of regulatory 
incentives and differential 
managerial behaviour within state-
owned and privatized firms.  
Privately owned firms respond to 
incentives that add to net cash 
flows (associated with reducing 
commercial and non-commercial 
network losses). However, they 
also respond more aggressively 
than do state-owned distribution 
utilities to mark-up (cost-plus) 
regulatory incentives that 
increase shareholder value but 
decrease cost efficiency. 
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Gupta, (2005) 
 
The study aims to investigate 
whether the operating performance 
of firms depends on the share of 
equity sold. The study controls for 
other factors that can also affect 
performance, such as manager 
incentives. 
Several approaches are adopted to 
address the potential endogeneity of 
privatisation. To minimize the 
possibility of simultaneity between 
privatisation and performance, the 
authors investigate the impact of the 
lagged share of private ownership on 
current performance. Firm fixed 
effects specification that addresses 
selection bias that may arise are 
also estimated. The specifications 
include firm-specific controls and 
year dummies to control for 
contemporaneous macroeconomic 
shocks. The assumption of strict 
exogeneity in the fixed effects model 
is relaxed and an estimation of the 
dynamic GMM model developed by 
Arellano and Bond (1991) is 
performed while potential dynamic 
selection bias is controlled for using 
the method proposed by Frydman et 
al. (1999). Thus, the control group is 
restricted to firms that are likely to 
share similar unobserved and time-
varying characteristics as the 
partially privatised enterprises.  
Using data on Indian state-
owned enterprises the study 
finds that that partial 
privatisation has a positive 
impact on profitability, 
productivity, and investment. 
 
Goldeng et al, (2008).  
The study investigates the effect of 
market competition on SOEs. It 
utilises a comprehensive panel data 
set containing accounting 
information for all registered 
companies in Norway over the 
period 1990 to 1999. Both the 
ownership and market structure 
effects on performance are 
modelled, leaving out naturally 
monopolistic SOEs that provide 
public Goods under regulated 
markets. Profitability is adopted as 
the main performance measurer.  
Increased competition is less 
detrimental to SOE performance 
than to Private Company 
performance. 
 
 
Less efficient SOEs competing 
with privately owned companies 
are expected to suffer in 
performance outcomes.  
 
Choudhury and Khanna 
(2009).  
The study is based on the leadership 
reforms at 42 government owned 
labs in India, a setting where 
Even in the absence of property 
rights, SOEs may significantly 
improve performance through 
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privatisation was perceived a sub 
optimal option. Data from the 42 labs 
pertaining to the period 1995 – 2006 
was collected on all directorships in 
order to test the proposition that new 
directorship aim for increased 
operational performance in an SOE 
set . The study analyses the 
impact of director change on the 
level of U.S. and domestic patents. 
The analysis deal with count data 
and based on Hausman Hall and 
Griliches (1984), in the base case, 
therefore  a fixed effects Poisson 
model adjusted for quasi-maximum 
likelihood estimation and robust 
standard errors as described by 
Wooldridge (1999) was adopted. 
appropriate of the right type of 
leadership, this is the case with 
the 42 Indian state-owned 
laboratories. Appropriate policy 
and leadership changes have a 
significant positive impact on 
SOE performance.  
 
Eljelly. A.M.A, (2009) This study examines the relationship 
between firm ownership and 
corporate performance in Saudi 
Arabia, using a sample of Listed 
Private Companies (LPCs) and 
Listed Government Related 
Companies (LGRCs). The study 
compares the operating and market 
performance of the LPCs and 
LGRCs during the period 2000-2003.  
The study adopts a combination of 
profitability based measures of 
performance (Return on Equity, net 
profit margin), operational efficiency 
(Return on Assets) as well as market 
valuation based measures.  
LGRCs outperform or match the 
performance of LPCs. More 
specifically, the study finds that 
LGRCs tend to mostly 
outperform LPCs in terms of 
profitability, as measured by 
Return on equity (ROE) and Net 
Profit Margin (NPM), operating 
efficiently, as measured in terms 
of Return on assets (ROA), and 
match them in their stock market 
risk adjusted performance. The 
study concludes that these 
results may have implications for 
the issue of privatisation 
programs which the government 
has recently started. 
Richard et al,. (2009) The study analyses the long-term 
performance of privatisation, that is, 
IPOs of former State Owned 
Enterprises by measuring 
unadjusted and excess returns in 
average annual and cumulative 
terms.  
The results show negative 
abnormal price performance 
during the first post initial trading 
day, and subsequently 
thereafter. On average, 
privatisation offers year one 
returns which can be  50% lower 
than market returns over the 
same time period.  On the other 
hand, the state of economic 
development of the privatizing 
country and the initial return do 
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not appear to have a long-term 
impact on performance. 
Al-Qudah (2011) This study examines the impact of 
privatisation by using a unique 
sample of 23 Jordanian privatized 
firms through the period 1992-2005, 
offering some unique performance 
measurers not commonly adopted in 
previous studies. A double pronged 
approach to performance 
measurement is adopted and 
incorporate operating efficiency 
measured by turnover ratio  and 
market performance measured by 
market value ratio. Panel data 
analysis is employed to determine 
the impact of privatisation on firms’ 
efficiency and performance.  
Privatisation has a positive and 
significant impact operating 
efficiency and on performance 
as measured by market value 
ratio. This finding is consistent 
with most of the existing 
evidences on the impact of 
privatisation on performance and 
efficiency. The results also show 
that strategic partnership has a 
positive and significant impact 
on privatised firms operating 
efficiency and market value.  In 
general Liquidity has a positive 
impact on privatized firms’ 
operating efficiency and 
performance. Further, the firms’ 
specific effect (size) is a 
significant performance 
determinant since it influences 
operating efficiency and 
performance of privatized firms’.  
The study also finds that 
openness of the economy is also 
a factor that affects privatized 
firms operating efficiency and 
performance. 
Bhatti and Sarwet 
(2012) 
Analyses financial performance of 
SOEs in emerging economies, with 
specific reference to Pakistan 
Railways during the period 2001 to 
2011. The aim is to highlight those 
factors that have contributed to the 
poor financial performance of 
Pakistan Railways. The study is 
based on a review of official 
documents and work practices, 
including interviews with senior 
managers and officials. The report 
focuses on audited financial 
statements from the last eleven 
years. 
The major causes of poor 
financial performance are   
bad financial management 
practices; a deficient 
management information 
system; absence of key 
performance indicators; 
incompetent management 
policies; and corruption – (which 
is concluded to be a common 
factor in all organizations with 
poor salary structures) and 
political interference. 
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2.8. Description of methodology adopted per essay 
 
 
2.8.1. Essay 1: Performance of State Owned Enterprises: sub-Saharan Africa overview 
 
Various studies have adopted different approaches to measuring performance, with some 
focusing on productivity and profitability (Majumdar, 1997; Xu et al., 2001), whilst some 
attempt to use broader based measures encompassing operational efficiency, productivity, 
employment, output and value creation (Cheung et al., 2012; Kanyoma, 2008; Omran,  2001 
and Clive, 2004).  
Following an argument presented by Combs et al. (2005) and Venkatraman and Ramanujan 
(1986), that a unified approach to performance measurement would be one that captures 
both financial and non-financial variables, this essay adopts a two pronged measurement 
approach; financial (return on assets) and productivity (total productivity factor).  
 
Return on Assets (ROA) - ROA represents the final operating result of an entity within the 
context of capital employed in the business and it is highly regarded for its ability to capture 
wide aspects of operations into one composite indicator (see Siminica et al., 2012). Thus, 
the ratio measurers the return on capital employed and typically computed as Net Profit 
divided by Net Assets (Uyar, 2009). Other approaches to measuring the return on capital 
invested disaggregate Return on Assets into various components, for example, Asset 
Turnover and Profit Margins per unit of capital. However, such an approach has not been 
found to provide any incremental information (Fairfield and Yohn, 2001). In this study, the 
composite ROA is computed as Net Income divided by Total Assets. Net Income is after 
interest, but before tax, as enterprises in the study sample receive different tax treatment, 
with some enjoying a complete exemption. Total assets are represented by an average of 
the value of total assets at the beginning of the year and that of assets at the end of the 
year. Fixed assets are taken at net values. For the purposes of analysis, monetary values 
were converted to nominal United States Dollar (USD) values using average annual 
exchange rates.       
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Total Factor Productivity (TFP) - From its original version by Solow (1957), the application 
of TFP in empirical studies has substantially increased, with accompanying improvements 
in methodological approaches (Beveren, 2012). Bartelsman and Doms (2000) attribute this 
upsurge in the interest in TFP to an increase in the availability of data at micro levels.    
Several approaches have been proposed for estimating TFP using micro-level panel data, 
often with the advantage of limiting the analysis to micro-econometric approaches (Del 
Gatto et al.,2010). Such an approach permits the reliance on enterprise-level data that is 
much richer for analysing heterogeneity across firms (Harris and Moffat, 2011). A widely 
adopted approach to TFP estimation takes output as a function of inputs employed in 
generating such output and firm productivity (Beveren, 2012). The majority of studies taking 
this approach measure output in terms of adjusted sales values (deflated logarithms), whilst 
inputs are usually the adjusted values of capital employed, total labour costs and material 
inputs into the production process (Harris and Moffat, 2011; Katayama et al., 2009; 
Raheman, 2008; Pyo et al., 2006; Meyer and Vickers, 1997).    
Beveren (2010) outlines a comprehensive and very useful demonstration of the 
methodological approaches to the estimation of TFP. These later represent a strong form 
of reference in Harris and Moffat (2011): 
At its very basic form, estimating TFP departs from the production function itself, given as:  
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝐴𝑖𝑡𝐾𝑖𝑡
𝛽𝑘
 𝐿𝑖𝑡
𝛽𝑙
  𝑀𝑖𝑡
𝛽𝑚
          (1) 
  
Where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 represents the production output of entity i, at time t. 𝐴𝑖 is the unobservable factor.  
𝐾𝑖𝑡, 𝐿𝑖𝑡 and 𝑀𝑖𝑡 represent capital, labour and materials in that order.  
 
In order to handle more appropriately the non-linear relationship that may exist between the 
dependant and independent variables, the absolute values of the variables are often 
transformed into their logarithmic form in practice. This logarithmic transformation is also a 
convenient way of converting significantly skewed variables into a substantially normal form.    
Logarithmically transforming variables in (1) results in: 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 36 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡+  𝑖𝑡                       (2) 
 
𝐼𝑛(𝐴𝑖𝑡)  = 𝛽0 +  𝑖𝑡                        
 ; where K, L and M represent the natural logarithms of the values for capital, labour and 
materials respectively. 𝛽0  is a measure of the mean efficiency level across entities,  𝑖𝑡                            
denotes the time and entity level deviation from the mean. This is then decomposed into 
observable and unobservable components, resulting in: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡+  𝑣𝑖𝑡  + 𝑢𝑖𝑡
𝑞
                     (3) 
Where 𝜔𝑖𝑡 =𝛽0 +𝑣𝑖𝑡   and  𝑢𝑖𝑡
𝑞
 denote entity level productivity and measurement error related 
deviations from the mean respectively.  
In empirical research, (3) is often estimated, followed by a step involving solving for 𝜔𝑖𝑡.  
Entity level productivity is then calculated as: 
𝜔𝑖?̂?= 𝑣𝑖?̂?+ β0̂ = 𝑌𝑖𝑡 -  𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑡 - 𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡 - 𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡           (4) 
Following the description by Beveran (2010), total output in this essay is estimated as 
follows:  
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝐿 𝐿𝑖𝑡  +𝛼𝑀 𝑀𝑖𝑡+  𝑖𝑡               (5) 
 
Where:       
Y represents total output, measured as the logarithm of revenue in dollar terms; 
L represents labour employed, measured as the logarithm of total staff costs in 
dollar terms; 
M represents materials employed, measured as the logarithm of cost of sales in 
dollar terms; and 
K represents capital, measured as the logarithm of total capital employed terms in 
dollar terms.        
  is the composite error term.   
 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 37 
 
Equation (5) is then directly estimated via panel data modelling through the use of the 
Stata statistical software to obtain TFP as follows: 
ln 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝛼𝐿 𝑙𝑖𝑡 −  𝛼𝑀 𝑚𝑖𝑡−  𝛼𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑡   =     (6) 
    
This essay bases its analysis on data obtained across 23 SOEs from 10 sub- Saharan 
African countries operating in six different industries, and covers a period from 2001 to 2012. 
The SOEs selected are those in which the government has either a shareholding in excess 
of fifty per cent or is in possession of strategic control by means of shareholder agreements, 
and the focus is only on those operating along commercial lines with their principal source 
of revenue being customer charges (fares and tariffs). The study also focuses on those 
industries in which the SOE business model is prevalent, these being the power, 
telecommunications, airline, rail, water and sanitation industries. The selection of SOES 
within the respective countries is also based on available and consistent data.  
    
A full list of the SOEs in the sample, along with their assigned identifier numbers (1-23) is in 
Appendix I. Table 2.4 depicts the country and industry make-up of SOEs in the sample.  
Table 2.4: Sample analysis by country and industry 
By Country By industry 
Botswana 5 Power 5 
Ethiopia 1 Postal 3 
Ghana 1 Telecommunications 3 
Kenya 1 Water and Sanitation  6 
Lesotho 1 Airlines 4 
Malawi 1 Rail and Transport 2 
Mauritius 2  
Namibia 3 
Swaziland 1 
South Africa 7 
Total 23 6 23 
 
The data has predominantly been obtained from audited annual financial statements and 
other publicised annual reports of the SOEs in the sample. The major source of information 
has been the websites of the SOEs where available; however, in some cases hard copies 
have been formally requested and granted.  
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2.8.2. Essay 2: Drivers of Organisational Performance in State Owned Enterprises  
 
Whilst the findings in the preceding essay reflects the power industry as a poor performer 
compared to other sectors, it remains the single major cornerstone in economic 
advancement drives being pursued by many African governments. Yet, important 
challenges remain.  
The sub-Saharan electrified minority still faces complex problems including   intermittent 
power supply, prohibitive pricing and constrained access to main grid lines. The generation 
capacity remains the lowest in the world and has been facing a stagnated growth (Eberhard, 
2008). Various industry diagnostic research work has pointed to a glaring growth deficit 
which must be plugged if the 2030 target for full industrial power access is to be attained in 
sub-Saharan Africa. A growth rate of 13% is required, but historical trends have stagnated 
at around 1.7% over the recent past decade (Bazilian et al., 2012). 
 
Whilst important milestones have been achieved around the world in the privatisation of 
SOEs, marked state participation in the sub-Saharan power sector continues to sustain the 
greatly desired industrial growth and economic performance, notably through the SOE 
business model whose performance remains central to the sectorial reform initiatives 
(Tallapragada, 2009). This could be because experience in sub-Saharan Africa privatisation 
transactions shows that issues and pitfalls have not fundamentally changed since the early 
days of privatisation itself (Buchs, 2003), with only 2% of the African power generation 
having been privatised, and a meagre 6% of its distribution having been privatised by the 
2000s (UNIDO, 2008). This phenomenon projects the importance of the SOE business 
model in the very crucial power sector in sub-Saharan Africa for some time to come, hence 
the need to focus on its performance through the respective utilities.  The poor performance 
of such SOEs is a widely documented phenomenon (Boko and YuanJan, 2011; Xia and 
Chen, 2007; Elwel and Labonte, 2007; Kikeri and Kolo, 2006). Unfortunately, this widely 
publicised poor performance of SOEs is not accompanied by sufficient empirical evidence 
on what fundamentally drives SOE performance.  
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The study focuses on five countries whose power utilities have experienced very little to no 
degree of privatisation, and it selects four such power utilities from the following countries: 
Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia and South Africa. Owing to the inherent linkages between 
political cycles and SOEs, the study focuses on these countries for their relative political 
stability during the study period. Given the monopolistic nature of the power industry in 
Africa, the study selected the only power utilities found in each of the selected countries, 
and so the study is based on four utilities. Data on the SOEs constituting the sample has 
predominantly been obtained from the audited annual financial statements and other 
publicised annual reports of these entities. This is for a 20-year period spanning from 1994 
- 2013. Thus, the study is based on a panel data of four utilities over a 20-year period across 
four countries, yielding 80 observations.  
The audited annual financial statements provide quantitative data whilst the rest of the 
qualitative information is available from narratives in the annual reports (e.g. size of work 
force, strength of the board and its composition etc.). 
This essay employs panel data modelling to examine the drivers of SOE performance. Panel 
data is constituted from a sample of entities over time period. Analysing panel data entails 
a set of econometric models constructed from a combination of time series and cross-
sectional data.  
Panel data analysis assists in resolving the difficulty of making inferences about the change 
dynamics, but from a cross-sectional perspective. The techniques also aid in minimising the 
effects of omitting variables that have a correlation with explanatory variables.  
A further strength of panel data analysis is that it allows the researcher to control for 
individual heterogeneity as it assumes that individual entities are heterogeneous. As an 
example, different SOEs will differ in terms of their political landscape, history and mandate 
disposition. The analysis provides a large number of data points thereby improving on 
efficiency of the econometric estimates, through the increase in the degrees of freedom, 
and a reduction in the collinearity amongst the explanatory variables (Hsiao ,1986).  
Thus, a major strength of panel data has to do with its ability to isolate the effects of 
characteristics specific to individual entities.  
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The panel model is therefore generally expressed as  
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 +  𝑖𝑡 …. i = 1, …n and t = 1, …T………   ( 7 )  
 
The use of panel data methods is due to the fact that the data involves two dimensions 
these being; individual cross-sectional units in the study, being the SOEs. For model 
construction purposes these are denoted by the subscript i, and the time series dimension 
is denoted by subscript t, in the context of n, being the number of observations.  
Panel data modelling techniques have gained currency due to the superior advantages they 
provide. The increase in the use of panel data techniques has been aided by among other 
factors; (i) data availability; (ii) greater capacity for modelling the complexity of human 
behavior than a single cross-section or time series data, and (iii) challenging methodology, 
(Hsiao, 2010). The techniques provide a wide range of advantages and these are listed 
below. 
 There is improved accuracy in model parameter inference. Panel data analysis yields 
a higher degree of freedom, with increased variability of samples when compared to 
cross-sectional data analysis (typically with a T value of 1), or time series (typically 
involving a single subject, N=1). See (Hsiao et al., 1995).  
 There is the ability to control the impact of omitted variables as they capture 
information on both the intertemporal dynamics, as a result the individuality of study 
subjects may then allow the researcher to control the effects of unobserved variables 
(see MaCurdy, 1981).  
 Another advantage is the simplification of computation and statistical inference as 
two dimensions are involved in panel data analysis, these being the cross-sectional 
and time-series dimensions.  
Whilst the method has its own disadvantages, these tend to be dealt with by splitting the 
approach into two forms, each addressing a set of shortcomings in such a way that the 
disadvantages of the other becomes advantages of the other (Hsiao, 2010). 
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For a given panel data structure;    itiiitit uzxy      ( 8 ) 
Where; 
 itx  is a k1  is a vector of variables that vary over individuals and time,  
1k  is a vector of coefficients on x ,  
iz is a p1  is a vector of time-invariant variables that vary only over individuals,  
 is the 1p  is a vector of coefficients on 
iz ,  
iu  is the individual-level effect, and  
it  is the disturbance term. 
Panel data model estimation generally takes two forms: fixed effects and Random Effects.  
The Fixed Effects model explores the relationship between the predictor and the dependent 
variable within an entity, and it is mostly appropriate in phenomena wherein the interest lies 
in analysing the impact of variables that vary over time. This approach does offer flexibility 
in handing time variant and time invariant variables simultaneously, whilst presenting an 
opportunity to control for the unobserved heterogeneity across firms and countries (see 
Baltagi, 2001).  
The FE makes the assumption that the regression function remains constant over time and 
space. With a one-way FE model, each cross-sectional unit is permitted to have its own 
constant term, with the slope estimates ( ) remaining constrained across units, as is the 
2
 . This is known as the least-squares dummy variable (LSDV) model, since it is equivalent 
to including N-1 dummy variables in the OLS regression of y on x, inclusive of a unit’s vector.  
Unlike with the fixed effects model, the random effects model assumes that the variation 
across entities is random and uncorrelated with the independent variable in the model. As 
explained by Green (2008), what separates the random effects from fixed effects is whether 
the unobserved individual effects carry elements that correlate with the regressors in the 
model. This model has been adopted by a researcher who believes that differences across 
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entities have some influence on the study variable. This model is credited for its ability to 
accommodate time invariant variables.   
Thus, for a given panel data structure if the individual effects ( iu  ) are correlated with the 
vector of independent variables, then the model is a Fixed Effects estimator and given as 
ititiit Xuy   )(  but, where the individual effects ( iu ) are uncorrelated with the 
vector of regressors, then the model becomes a Random Effects model and is given as 
)( itiitit uXy   .     (9) 
Empirically, it is always difficult to select the appropriate estimator. A standard hausman test 
is performed across panel data regression models to test for random and fixed effects, after 
which a determination is made as to which one to go for, and for this essay, the fixed effects 
method was adopted after the test. 
Dynamic Panel-data results may indicate presence of a lagged dependent variable and 
other regressors. In such a scenario, the correlation results in a large sample may entail a 
bias in estimating the coefficients of the lagged dependent variable (Nickell, 1981). 
Unfortunately, increasing the number of units in the sample (N) does not solve this problem.  
An auto-regressive model, with no additional regressors will therefore appear in the 
following form:  
    itiittiit uxyy   21,      ( 10 )  
Both the constant term and the individual effect are thus removed from the first difference 
transformation.   
    itittiit xyy   21,       ( 11 ) 
With the availability of an Instrumental Variable (IV), instruments for the lagged dependent 
variable can be constructed from the second and third lags of y  and this can either be in 
the form of lagged levels or differences.  
An approach proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) is widely adopted for the purposes of 
estimating a Dynamic panel-data model. The Arellano-Bond technique operates through the 
specification of a model, as a system of one equation per period, while allowing the 
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instruments applying to the individual equations to vary. These instruments include 
appropriate lags of the levels of endogenous variables included in the equation in a 
differentiated form as well as the exogenous regressors.  Unlike time series analysis, 
dynamic panel techniques do not rely on arbitrary prior restrictions, hence their ability to 
uncover unpredicted dynamic relationships between variables (Nerlove, 2002). 
The specific model adopted for this study was constructed following the one proposed by 
Dewenter and Malatesta, (2001) and modified by Bozec et al., (2002). In this case, the 
model is further augmented by allowing for a vector of variables measuring organisational 
theories.  
 
The model is stated as: 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼1 + β1𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑑𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡  +β2𝐵𝑂𝐷𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡+ β3𝐵𝑂𝐷𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡 + β4 GOVinv 5 itcontrol   )(           (12)                                                                                                                                                         
  
Where: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡   = the performance measure for SOE i at year t  
LIQdty      = Liquidity  
BODst      = Board Strength   
BODdiv    =Diversity of the board in terms of stakeholder representation 
GOVinv    = Extent of Government’s involvement in pricing decisions 
it               = Error term 
 
Whilst various studies have accepted and adopted different approaches to measuring 
performance, there is a school of thought suggesting that a more comprehensive approach 
is one that combines both financial and non-financial measures (see Combs et al., 2005; 
Venkatraman and Ramanujan, 1986).  
This essay follows this line of thinking and adopts broader based measures encompassing 
operational efficiency, productivity and financial performance. The study uses the following 
performance variables:  profitability measure (gross profit margin), productivity (total factor 
productivity), and operational efficiency measure (gigawatt hours sold per employee), and 
thus presents a real opportunity to base findings on a composite type of a measure.  
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Under the financial measure, gross profit is selected as it remains the most comparable 
metric across the power utilities in question, with revenue (power sales) and cost of sales 
(inputs and direct labour) being determined in a uniform manner without specific 
adjustments.  
The application of TFP on micro-level panel data, such as the one in this essay has seen 
an upsurge mainly due to its ability to permit the reliance on enterprise-level data that is 
much richer for analysing heterogeneity across firms (Harris and Moffat, 2011). See section 
2.1.1 for more details on the usage of the TFP approach.   
 
Measuring efficiency must have a direct link to the core existence of an entity, and be based 
on core output relative to a major resource maintained for making that output available. 
Thus, the study selects gigawatt hours sold (net of system and commercial losses often 
reflective of some level of inefficiencies), as the output and the number of employees as a 
key resource in producing that output.   
Table 2.5 below summarises how each of these measures is derived.  
Table 2.5: Description of models (performance measures) 
Model Description Measurement 
GPMG Gross Profit Margin 
(
Sales Revenue − Cost of Sales
Sales Revenue
)
+ 1  
TPF Total Factor productivity (Measured by the 
Solow Residual) 
 
Let gY denote the growth rate of 
aggregate output, gK the growth rate of 
aggregate capital, gL the growth rate of 
aggregate labour and alpha the capital 
share.   The Solow Residual is then 
defined as gY − α ∗ gK − (1 − α) ∗ gL.9 
GwhPE Net Gigawatt hours sold per employee 
(
Net gigawatt hours sold
Average number of employees
)  
 
                                                          
9 (Comin, 2006) 
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This essay approaches the interrogation of performance drivers from an organisational 
theory perspective, borrowing from existing literature on generic variables known to drive 
firm performance.  
 
Liquidity: In line with the fundamentals of the resource-based theory, which posits that 
resources have the capability of driving firm performance (Raza , 2012; Tan and Peng, 2003; 
Hamel and Prahalad, 1994; Wernerfelt, 1984), the literature identifies firm liquidity as a 
critical resource in influencing performance in the context of a generic enterprise (Al-
Quadah, 2011; Tang and Peng, 2003; Singh,  1986, Bromiley , 1991; Hambrick and D’Aveni 
, 1988).   
 
Government involvement in pricing decisions: From a public choice theory perspective, 
politicians, acting through functionaries of government, may exert influence in SOEs, often 
with a direct impact on organisational performance (Shaw, 2008; Hill, 1999; Downs, 1957). 
A number of studies suggest ways in which political leadership can hold on to controlling 
SOEs, and these include the signing-off of any tariffs and service levies proposed by SOEs 
(Lioukas et al., 1993; Ramamurti, 1987a).  
 
Board Strength: The use of corporate boards is often seen as a panacea for good firm 
performance by proponents of the agency theory (Raelin and Bondy, 2013; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). However, having a board in place is not a solution by itself, its strength 
weighs more in determining a board’s effectiveness in driving performance.(Ongore and 
K’Obonyo, 2011; Wicaksono, 2009; Ross, 1973).  
 
Board stakeholder diversity: The proponents of the stakeholder theory are of the view that 
good firm performance arises from a reconciliation of various stakeholder interests in 
operating enterprises (Freeman, 1994). Various factors are indicative of how an enterprise 
subscribes to the tenets of the stakeholder theory, amongst them is the extent to which the 
board composition drawn from various stakeholder groups (Brenner and Cochran, 1991, 
Jones and Wicks, 1999). 
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Firm age and size: These have been suggested to have a bearing on firm performance 
(Lioukas et al., 1993; Kim and Chung, 2008; Aivazian etal 2005) and as such, they are 
incorporated in the study.  
Table 2.6 shows how each of the explanatory variables is measured. The table also depicts 
the theoretical underpinnings of the model as well as the theoretical expectations.  
Table 2.6: Definition of proxy independent variables 
Variable Theory Measurers Predicted relationships 
Liquidity (LIQ) Resource-based 
theory 
=
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
 
Liquidity is positively 
correlated to good 
performance in line with the 
resource-based theory 
(Tan and Peng, 2003;  
Singh,  1986;  Bromiley , 
1991; Hambrick and 
D’Aveni , 1988; Chudson, 
1945) 
Government 
involvement in 
pricing decisions 
Public choice 
theory 
Score =1 if Tariffs are 
determined by 
government 
 
Score = 0 if tariff 
setting is regulated by 
an independent body 
Higher levels of 
government (political) 
involvement are negatively 
correlated to performance 
in line with the public 
choice theory (Mwaura, 
2007; Shaw, 2008; 
Anthony,  1957; Hill, 1999) 
 
Board Strength  
Agency theory  
Assessed in terms of 
the following skills: 
i)power, engineering or 
related, ii) Financial 
management, iii) 
Environmental  and 
social Management, iv) 
Legal, v) Human 
Capital Management 
Scores: 1 if 3 or more 
of the above, 0 if 2 of 
less 
 
In accordance with the 
agency theory, the strength 
of the board, as measured 
by diversity of skills, is 
positively correlated to 
performance (Ongore and 
K’Obonyo, 2011; Ross, 
1973; Leech, 1986; 
Toninelli, 2000 and 
Wicaksono, 2009) 
Board stakeholder 
diversity 
Stakeholder 
theory 
Assessed in terms of 
representation on the 
board from the  
following stakeholder 
groups: i)Public Sector,  
ii) Private Sector,  iii) 
Civic Organisations, iv) 
Legal, v) General 
Public   
According to the 
stakeholder theory, a wider 
stakeholder representation 
on boards is positively 
related to performance. 
(Freeman, 1994; Brenner 
and Cochran, 1991, Jones 
and Wicks, 1999).  
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Scores: 1 if 3 or more 
of the above, 0 if 2 of 
less  
Age  Control Variable Number of years in 
operation 
Firm age is expected to be 
conversely correlated with 
profitability, but a positive 
correlation is expected 
between age and 
productivity.  (Majumdar, 
1997; Dogan, 2013) 
Size  Control Variable Natural Logarithm of 
dollar value of capital 
assets 
Firm size is expected to 
display a positive 
correlation with profitability, 
but a negative correlation 
with productivity. 
(Majumdar, 1997; Dogan, 
2013) 
 
Three performance models are then estimated as follows: 
 
Total Factor Productivity = 𝛼1 + β1𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑑𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡  +β2𝐵𝑂𝐷𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡+ β3𝐵𝑂𝐷𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡 + β4 GOVinv 5
  )(control (13) 
Gigawatt Hours per employee = 𝛼1 + β1𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑑𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡  +β2𝐵𝑂𝐷𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡+ β3𝐵𝑂𝐷𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡 + β4 GOVinv 5
  )(control (14) 
Gross profit = 𝛼1 + β1𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑑𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡  +β2𝐵𝑂𝐷𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡+ β3𝐵𝑂𝐷𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡 + β4 GOVinv 5   )(control (15) 
In order to control for possible dynamism and ensure model robustness, this essay also 
estimated a dynamic version of the panel data model using the Arellano-Bond technique 
(Arellano and Bond, 1991). This technique is informed by the inability of the Instrumental 
Variable approach to exploit all the information available per sample. 
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2.8.3. Essay 3: Performance drivers in SOEs: Botswana Power Corporation (BPC) 
Perspective and Essay 4: Performance of SOEs: Evidence on Botswana 
Telecommunications Corporation 
  
These are case analyses, following through performance trends and their underlying 
influential variables over a 15-year period (BPC) and an 18-year period (BTC). The cases 
largely center around variables that emerge as significantly correlated to performance in the 
previous quantitative essay. This perspective presents an opportunity to gain an in-depth 
understanding of how several variables combine to influence the performance of State 
Owned Enterprises, hence the choice for an ontological approach. The approach naturally 
presents an advantage of cutting through the complexities (Johansson, 2003) whilst 
maintaining originality and testability (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
The essays are primarily based on secondary data obtained from publicly available audited 
financial statements, annual reports, relevant statutes and policy documents. However, the 
studies make limited use of primary data collected through face to face and paper-based 
interviews with senior managers selected on the basis of their involvement with core 
operations of the corporations in the study. These interviews were mainly for validation and 
clarification.  
The BPC case focuses on a 15-year time period spanning from 2000, the year the 
Corporation’s performance (by various measures) started an impressive upward trend which 
lasted up to 2005/06 when it reversed, reaching an all-time low in 2014. During this 15-year 
stage, BPC went through phases which make the period an interesting one for this study.   
The BTC case considers an 18-year period spanning from 1995 to 2012. The year 1995 
marked the beginning of extensive changes in the telecommunications industry, prompting 
gradual but comprehensive organisational transformation within BTC, lasting until 2012, 
when the corporation was ushered in for a privatisation initially scheduled for 2013. This 
makes the period 1995 to 2012 an interesting one for the study.      
Firm performance is a widely researched area, but its measurement remains largely left to 
interpretation under a variety of settings. However, it is widely acknowledged that a more 
unifying approach to measuring firm performance would be one that consists of both 
financial and operational variables (Combs et al., 2005; Venkatraman and Ramanujan, 
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1986). Despite the upsurge in popularity of financial measures of performance over the 
decades (Carton and Hofer, 2006; Richard., et al., 2009), Cameron (1986b) has put forward 
a compelling case on the relationship between financial and operational measures, arguing 
that good financial performance logically precedes good operational performance.  This 
view introduces the importance of focusing on industry-specific operational measures, 
combined with the generic financial measures in assessing organisational performance.  
 
Given the broad nature of factors identified as influencing SOE performance, studies in this 
subject have adopted a wider spectrum of performance measurers, and in line with 
literature, these often incorporate both financial and non-financial aspects (e.g. Aivazian, et 
al., 2005; Bozec, et al., 2002; Li and Xia, 2007). These essays adopt broad performance 
measurers covering financial (revenue and profitability) and non-financial outcomes 
(efficiency and other operational measurers). The selection of non-financial measures is 
also influenced by the non-financial performance goals of SOEs.  
 
The analysis is conducted within the context of organisational theory, according to which 
each independent variable is a proxy of a specific organisational theory as indicated in Table 
2.7 below. (See section on a discussion on the choice of exploratory variables).  
 
 
Table 2.7: Variables and underpinning theory 
Theory Examples factors 
Agency  Board effectiveness, relationship between board and management, 
Experience, qualifications and attendance record of board members 
 Performance management and measurement mechanisms in place 
(including management contracts) 
 Reward schemes in place 
Resource-based  Liquidity, asset base, strategic licences (and other intangible resources) 
Stakeholder  Extent of stakeholder diversity in boards 
 Stakeholder focus in crafting business and operational strategies 
 Nature of non-economic transactions 
Public choice  The link between political choices and corporate goals 
 The legal and regulatory environment 
 Extent of political directives in company operations 
 Level and nature of consultation with Ministry authorities in resource 
allocation and price setting 
 Nature of non-economic transactions 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 50 
 
2.9. Conclusion 
 
The present study is very broad and potentially complex, thus, it demands an innovative use 
of a variety of approaches in order to produce meaningful deductions in a quest to address 
its objectives. Mixed methods of research, aided by mixed sampling methods were carefully 
adopted in designing the study, which has been phased in two successive steps, one made 
up of two quantitative studies and the other made up of two qualitative inquiries. Such an 
approach enhances the soundness of overall findings.   
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CHAPTER THREE: PERFORMANCE OF STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES: SUB-
SAHARAN AFRICA OVERVIEW10 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
This essay analyses performance across 23 State Owned Enterprises selected across 10 
different sub-Saharan African countries, representing six industries. The relevance and 
importance of SOEs in the context of sub-Saharan Africa is supported by compelling 
evidence, including the fact that they operate virtually in all sectors (Kikeri and Kolo, 2006). 
State enterprises contributed up to 40% to the total output in developing countries by mid 
2000s (World Bank, 2007), whilst accounting for up to 25% of service delivery (Vagliasindi, 
2008). Despite their proven importance in sub-Saharan Africa, SOEs are often associated 
with a history of uneven performance dating back to the 1970s (Nellis, 2005), but even then, 
their performance trends have been inadequately documented in literature.  In this essay, 
performance patterns across different SOEs selected from 10 sub-Saharan Africa countries 
are established. 
Governments continue to own enterprises for a variety of reasons, which are in general the 
same as those that gave rise to the SOE concept in the early 20th century. In sub-Saharan 
Africa such reasons include driving economic development in sectors where private sector 
participation is not optimal, but again this rationale can be a deliberate stance by 
governments to retain control over sectors deemed as strategic (Bozec et al., 2002). For 
these and other reasons, it is almost by default that SOEs continue to dominate 
infrastructural sectors such as power, air transport, water and sanitation, railways and 
telecommunications (Nelllis, 2005). Consequently, SOEs are widely expected to remain an 
important instrument in driving societal and public value creation in developing countries, 
given the right context (Sturesson et al., 2015). In the light of such a legitimate expectation, 
paired with the inefficiencies and inconsistent performance they are generally known for 
(Boko and YuanJan, 2011), there is a case for the literature on this subject to be enriched 
with SOE performance trends, drawing from real SOEs operating in different environments 
and industries. Existing studies in the subject of SOE performance have tended to be too 
narrowly focused in scope, often referring to a single SOE, or a handful SOEs in the same 
                                                          
10 Under review in a journal 
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country or industry (Villalonga, 2000, Aivazian et al., 2005; Etukudo, 1997; Bozec et al., 
2002 and Moushibahou, 2010). Even then, the objective in many of such studies has been 
biased towards performance comparisons between SOEs and private sector as well as pre-
and post-privatisation performance (Aivazian et al., 2005; Bozec et al., 2002). 
Consequently, a gap has remained in terms of systematically understanding the 
performance patters of SOEs across countries and industries and once this gap has been 
filled, important lessons could be discerned to guide the quest for improving SOE 
performance.             
Against this background, this essay analyses and explains the performance patterns of 
selected African SOEs focusing on the following industries: power, telecommunications, 
railways, water, postal services and air transport. These industries were chosen, based 
mainly on the fact that they are the ones through which African states predominantly adopt 
the SOE model for service and infrastructure delivery.  
The remainder of the essay is structured as follows: the next section gives a conceptual 
framework and brief literature overview followed by a section outlining the approach, after 
which an analysis section follows before conclusions are presented.   
 
3.2. Overview of Relevant Literature 
 
Attempts have been made to define the SOE business concept in universally accepted 
terms, but there is often a difficulty in that such enterprises vary in shape and form from one 
country to the next. Similarly, the usage of State Owned Enterprises as a term in itself is not 
a universally adopted practice. A 2012 South African Presidential Review Committee (PRC) 
on State Owned Entities observed the fundamental mandate of SOEs as a generic 
determinant of the appropriate naming convention, with the terms ‘public entities, state-
owned agencies, non-commercial state-owned entities’ often adopted for service delivery 
orientated non-commercial state owned bodies. On the other hand, those with a commercial 
mandate are often referred to as ‘commercial state-owned entities, government-owned 
corporation, government-owned business, government linked company, quasi-
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governmental organisation, state-owned company, state-owned enterprise, publicly-owned 
corporation, government business enterprise, or parastatals’, (PRC, 2012).  
The specific terms adopted, as they relate to the definition of SOEs will however still differ 
across territories and a number of factors influence such a variation including level of state 
ownership, definition of state, legal status and the position in the hierarchy of public 
administration (Sturesson et al., 2015).  The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development (OECD) has offered a somewhat neutral definition, which broadly defines 
SOEs as enterprises where the state has significant control through full, majority or 
significant minority ownership (OECD, 2005). This essay adopts this definition, but with yet 
another variation in that it focuses only on SOEs operating along commercial lines, typically 
adopting cost plus profit-based models mostly common in power, telecommunications, 
railways, airlines, postal and water industries, among others. 
Organisational performance is a widely studied subject in organisational science with a 
variety of measurement methods proposed across the literature. A universally acceptable 
approach to measuring performance has been seen as one that incorporates both financial 
and operational measures (Ketchen and Bergh, 2005; Venkatraman and 
Ramanujam,1986). Supporting this view is the popular argument that operational 
performance is merely an antecedent of financial performance (Cameron, 1986b), and vice 
versa. Thus, from a financial performance perspective, profit-based measures such as 
return on assets have been widely relied upon, (Carton and Hofer, 2006; Richard et al., 
2009) whilst operational performance, defined from an efficiency perspective, has in many 
cases been measured in terms of Total Factor Productivity (Bartelsman and Doms, 2000). 
TFP is an approach combining profitability and productivity based measures and has the 
advantage of permitting comparability across firms, industries and countries.  
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3.3. Approach 
 
3.3.1. Measure of Performance 
 
Various studies have adopted different approaches to measuring performance, with some 
focusing on productivity and profitability (Majumdar, 1997; Xu et al., 2001), whilst some 
attempt to use broader based measures encompassing operational efficiency, productivity, 
employment, output and value creation (Cheung et al., 2012; Kanyoma, 2008; Omran,  2001 
and Clive, 2004). In this essay, performance is measured from two perspectives; financial 
(return on assets) and productivity (total productivity factor). 
Return on Assets (ROA) represents the final operating result of an entity within the context 
of capital employed in the business and it is favourably regarded for its ability to capture 
wide aspects of operations into one composite indicator (see Siminica et al., 2012). Thus, 
the ratio measurers the return on capital employed and typically computed as Net Profit 
divided by Net Assets (Uyar, 2009). Other approaches to measuring the return on capital 
invested disaggregate Return on Assets into various components, e.g. Asset Turnover and 
Profit Margins per unit of capital. However, such an approach has not been found to provide 
any incremental information (Fairfield and Yohn, 2001). In this study, the composite ROA is 
computed as Net Income divided by Total Assets. Net Income is after interest but, before 
tax, as enterprises in study sample receive different tax treatment, with some enjoying a 
complete exemption. Total assets refer to an average of the value of total assets at the 
beginning of the year and that of assets at the end of the year. Fixed assets are taken at net 
values. For the purposes of analysis, monetary values were converted to nominal United 
States Dollar (USD) values using average annual exchange rates.       
From its original version by Solow (1957), the application of the Total Factor Productivity 
(TFP) in empirical studies has substantially increased, with accompanying improvements in 
methodological approaches (Beveren, 2012). Bartelsman and Doms (2000) attribute this 
upsurge in the interest in TFP to an increase in the availability of data at micro levels.    
Several approaches have been proposed for estimating TFP using micro-level panel data, 
often with the advantages of limiting the analysis to micro-econometric approaches (Del 
Gatto et al.,2010). Such an approach permits the reliance on enterprise-level data that is 
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much richer for analysing heterogeneity across firms (Harris and Moffat, 2011). A widely 
adopted approach to TFP estimation takes output as being a function of inputs employed in 
generating such output and firm productivity (Beveren, 2012). The majority of studies taking 
this approach measure output in terms of adjusted sales values (deflated, logarithms etc.), 
whilst inputs are usually the adjusted values of values of capital employed, total labour costs 
and material inputs into the production process (Harris and Moffat, 2011; Katayama et al., 
2009; Raheman, 2008; Pyo et al., 2006; Meyer and Vickers, 1997).    
In this essay, TFP is estimated in terms of the Cobb-Douglas function as follows: 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝐿 𝑙𝑖𝑡  +𝛼𝑀 𝑚𝑖𝑡+ 𝛼𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑡 +   𝑖𝑡                                    (1) 
 
Where:       
Y represents total output, measured as the logarithm of revenue in dollar terms; 
L represents labour, measured as the logarithm of total staff costs in dollar terms; 
M represents materials, measured as the logarithm of cost of sales in dollar terms; 
K represents capital, measured as the logarithm of total capital employed terms in 
dollar terms.         
Equation (1) is then directly estimated via panel data modelling through the use of the 
Stata statistical software to obtain TFP as follows; 
 
ln 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝛼𝐿 𝑙𝑖𝑡 −  𝛼𝑀 𝑚𝑖𝑡−  𝛼𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑡    
 
      
3.3.2. Data 
 
This essay basis its comparisons on data obtained across 23 SOEs from 10 sub-Saharan 
African countries operating in six different industries, and covers a period from 2001 to 2012. 
The SOEs selected are those in which the government has either a shareholding in excess 
of fifty percent or is in possession of strategic control by means of shareholder agreements, 
and the focus is only on those operating along commercial lines with their principal source 
of revenue being customer charges (fares and tariffs). A full list of the SOEs in the sample, 
along with their assigned identifier numbers (1-23) appears in Appendix I. Table 3.1 depicts 
the country and industry make up of SOEs in the sample.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 64 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.1: Sample analysis by country and industry 
By Country By industry 
Botswana 5 Power 5 
Ethiopia 1 Postal 3 
Ghana 1 Telecommunications 3 
Kenya 1 Water and Sanitation  6 
Lesotho 1 Airlines 4 
Malawi 1 Rail and Transport 2 
Mauritius 2  
Namibia 3 
Swaziland 1 
South Africa 7 
Total 23 6 23 
 
Data has predominantly been obtained from audited annual financial statements and other 
publicised annual reports of the SOEs in the sample. The major source of information has 
been the websites of the SOEs where available; however, in some cases hard copies have 
been formally requested and granted.  
 
3.4. Analysis of Findings 
 
3.4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
A table of descriptive statistics is presented below: 
Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 3.2 above reflects depressed financial performance amongst the SOEs in the sample, 
with an average return on assets of just 4%.  
Variable  Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Return on Assets -10% 14% 4% 0.05 
Total Factor Productivity 0 3.182 1.625 1.033 
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The SOEs analysed display a considerable degree of variation in their performance 
measured in terms of TFP. A standard deviation of 1.033 reflects significant differences in 
productivity levels amongst the SOEs in the sample, possibly symbolising the broad range 
of contextual issues affecting SOE productivity (including country context, nature of industry, 
and the economy-wide free rider problem, among others).  
 
3.4.2. Firm performance – return on assets 
A graphical presentation of performance comparisons is given in Appendix II (Figures 1-5). 
Figures 1 and 2 present a comparison of firm financial performance across industries and 
countries as well as between firms. SOEs in the telecommunications sector outperform the 
rest of the SOEs for the period covered by the study, with an industry ROA average of 12% 
against an overall 4% for all industries in the sample. A plausible reason for such a trend 
would be that telecommunications as a sector has been an early starter in matters of market 
liberalisation and independent regulation, creating healthy competition through efficiencies, 
whilst political involvement has become gradually restrained since the 1980s (Gasmi et al., 
2011). Another dimension is that, unlike other SOE dominated industries, the 
telecommunications sector often faces little pressure to deliver on essential and basic social 
services, with real chances to concentrate on the economic objectives (see Aharoni, 1981) 
by focusing on more profitable stakeholder segments. Their corporate governance 
structures are typically pro-private sector, with all supportive performance monitoring and 
improvement infrastructure in place. Market competition from the private sector often 
dictates the need to maintain the requisite resources (including competent employees). The 
rail sector is marginally above average in its financial performance, whilst the airline and 
water industries are at the average.  
During the period covered by the study, the power and postal industries displayed below 
average financial performance and several reasons could explain such a picture. Chiwaya 
et al., (1996) blame the almost chronic poor performance of power utilities on excessive 
involvement of the state which has led to systemic problems like poor governance, sub 
optimal tariff structures and compromised operating models. Among other factors, postal 
services, particularly in a sub-Saharan Africa context, are often riddled with the needs of 
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geographically dispersed stakeholders, with far less flexibility in defining areas of business 
that best define good business performance (Mokoena and Mbohwa, 2013).  
At an individual firm level, the Botswana Telecommunications Corporation, Telcom Namibia, 
Telkom South Africa, Ethiopian Airlines, Water Utilities Corporation (Botswana) and the 
Bloemfontein Water Board (South Africa) display above average financial performance 
compared to the rest of the SOEs in the sample. Conversely, SOEs like Botswana Post, 
Ghana Electricity Company, and the Botswana Power Corporation post financial 
performance below the average of the sample.  
3.4.3. Firm performance – Total Factor Productivity 
The airline, rail and telecommunications sectors displayed above average performance in 
total factor productivity terms during the period 2001-2012. Isaksson (2007) identifies 
several factors that typically drive TFP, amongst them capital intensity, skill of the workforce, 
innovation, competition and financial resources. Competition in the airline and 
telecommunications sectors is widely acknowledged for its power to force innovative 
approach to business and a scramble for a highly skilled workforce. In Figure 5 one can also 
observe that the rail sector in particular displays higher productivity levels than its peers.  
The power and postal sectors fall below the average performance of the industries in the 
sample, whilst the water sector is at the average. Although capital intensity within the power 
sector would be expected to account for a growth in TFP, sub-Saharan Africa power utilities 
are notorious for aged and hence less efficient plants (Tallapragada, 2009), and typically 
face resource constraints to maintain them or foster innovation.   Mokoena and Mbohwa 
(2013) note the lack of innovation in the African postal sector to be exposing it to 
unprecedented levels of competition from electronic forms of communication, but again 
riddled with the responsibilities of reaching out to widely dispersed stakeholders who often 
make limited usage of innovative technology-based business offers. The slow pace of 
change in the business landscape of the postal service can be seen as inhibiting the 
attraction of modern human skills into the sector.  
In addition to the airlines, South Africa’s Telkom and Transnet have posted above average 
performance compared to the rest of the SOEs in the sample and this can be attributed to 
competition induced productivity and innovative business operations as discussed above. 
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All water utilities in the sample fall below the average performance of the SOEs in the study, 
although the trend is more obvious in the case of the Lesotho Water and Sewerage 
Authority, the Blantyre Water Board, the Amatola Water Board and the Swaziland Water 
Services Corporation. (These three utilities operate in difficult geographical terrains that 
could easily impact on productivity). The Botswana Power Corporation, Nampower and the 
Central Electricity Board of Mauritius also display performance which falls below the 
average of SOEs in the sample.   
Overall, the telecommunications industry emerges out as the best performer compared to 
all other sectors in the study. This sector displays an above average financial and 
productivity performance over the period covered by the study. This result is plausible, given 
the competition induced efficiencies common in this sector. The high levels of independent 
regulation of the telecommunications industry across Africa are credited for the reduced 
political interference, which is often blamed for subdued productivity and general 
performance in other SOE dominated industries.  
Conversely, the power and postal industries are below average performers when 
performance is measured in both financial and productivity terms. These two industries in 
particular have been identified as often having been burdened by diverse stakeholder needs 
and massive political pressures, both with a noticeable negative impact on firm 
performance.  
Telkom South Africa emerges as an above average performer under each of the 
performance models, compared to the rest of the SOEs in the sample. On the other hand, 
the Botswana Power Corporation emerges a below average performer consistently under 
both performance measures.         
3.5. Conclusions 
 
This essay aimed to analyse and explain performance patterns of SOEs over a 12-year 
period, with emphasis on firm level and across industry comparisons.  The essay uses data 
from 23 SOEs selected from six industries in ten sub-Saharan Africa countries. Based on 
the analysis presented, the telecommunications sector emerges as an above average 
performer compared to other industries in the sample, and this is so across both models of 
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performance adopted in the study. Conversely, the power sector is a below average 
performer under both performance models. The study further reveals Telkom South Africa 
and the Botswana Power Corporation as occupying the extreme ends of above and below 
average performance respectively.  Among other factors contributing to such a result are 
competition induced efficiencies, independent market regulation and the extent and basis 
of government involvement in the industry operations.  
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APPENDIX A: LIST OF SOEs IN THE SAMPLE BY INDUSTRY AND COUNTRY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SOE full name Code Country Industry 
Amatola Water Board AWB South Africa Water and Sanitation 
Bloemfontein Water Board BWB South Africa Water and Sanitation 
Botswana Post BPS Botswana Postal Services 
Botswana Power Corporation BPC Botswana Power 
Botswana Railways BRC Botswana Rail 
Botswana Telecommunications 
Corporation 
BTC Botswana Telecommunications 
Blantyre Water Board BWB Malawi Water and Sanitation 
Central Electricity Board CEB Mauritius Power 
Eskom ESK South Africa Power 
Ethiopian Airlines ETC Ethiopia Airline 
Ghana Electricity Company GEC Ghana Power 
Kenyan Airways KEC Kenya Airline 
Lesotho Water and Sewerage 
Authority 
LWS Lesotho Water and Sanitation 
Air Mauritius AMC Mauritius Airline 
NamPost NPC Namibia Postal Services 
NamPower NPW Namibia Power 
Telcom Namibia TNC Namibia Telecommunications 
South African Airways SAA South Africa Airline 
South African Post Office SAP South Africa Postal Services 
Swaziland Water Services 
Corporation 
SWS Swaziland Water and Sanitation 
Telkom South Africa TSA South Africa Telecommunications 
Transnet TRC South Africa Rail 
Water Utilities Corporation WUC Botswana Water and Sanitation 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 70 
 
 
APPENDIX B: COMPARISON OF PERFORMANCE ACROSS FIRMS AND INDUSTRIES 
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CHAPTER FOUR: DRIVERS OF ORGANISATIONAL PERFORMANCE IN STATE 
OWNED ENTERPRISES11 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
Despite the publicised inefficiencies and poor performance of State Owned Enterprises, or 
SOEs (Boko and YuanJan, 2011), compelling evidence suggests that SOEs remain 
relevant. Such relevance and popularity is more pronounced in developing countries, 
typically in sub-Saharan Africa where SOEs operate virtually in all sectors (Kikeri and Kolo, 
2006). This is particularly so in the infrastructural sectors where huge capital requirements 
and low returns serve as a disincentive for the private sector (Bozec et al., 2002). Given this 
importance and the central role SOEs play in developing countries, it becomes imperative 
to understand the factors that fundamentally drive their performance, yet this remains a 
poorly researched area in organisational science. Existing studies have taken a rather 
narrow focus in this field, concentrating mainly on the prevailing SOE inefficiencies while 
proposing alternative business models. Examples of these are Boko and YuanJan (2011), 
Elwel and Labonte, (2007), Mwaura, (2007), Kikeri and Kolo, (2006), Fritz and Menocal, 
(2006), Buchs, (2003). This approach taken by such studies, however, fails to contribute to 
a clear understanding of performance drivers in SOEs, which remains a critical gap. The 
clear understanding of factors that combine to influence SOE performance, which is the 
focus of this essay, is essential for any attempts to improve performance in these often 
strategic enterprises.    
Whilst attempts have been made in the literature to explore those factors that drive 
organisational performance, such research work has adopted a generic perspective, which 
fundamentally fails to recognise the uniqueness of SOEs. Further, such studies (Putterman, 
1993; Xu et al., 2001; Stan et al., 2013; Mwaura, 2007 and Shirley, 2013) have considered 
performance variables in isolation, whilst in a practical organisational setting ultimate 
                                                          
11 Accepted for publication and forthcoming in the International Journal of Productivity and Performance 
Management  
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performance is a product of many variables interacting with each other, an aspect which this 
essay addresses.   
Various organisational theories have been relied on in explaining and predicting 
organisational performance. However, the extent to which such theoretical underpinnings 
can aid in the understanding of firm performance in the context of SOEs remains an 
unexplored area (Bozec et al., 2002). In addition, the interplay of the various theories in 
explaining the performance of SOEs is a unique phenomenon often overlooked in research. 
The complexity of SOEs demands a broader based approach; by their nature they are a 
unique business model often modelled around political cycles (Toninelli, 2000). The inherent 
influence from politics often exposes such enterprises to a myriad of competing stakeholder 
needs (Heath and Norman, 2004). The agency problem and its impact on SOE performance 
is not as well understood from an SOE perspective (Li and Xia, 2007; Bolton, 1995). The 
problem is fraught with issues that make it difficult to comprehend and manage and these 
include: flawed governance structures (World Bank, 2006), ill-defined property rights, 
ambiguous objectives (Shirley, 2008) and weak managerial incentives (Bolton, 1995). 
Beyond placing blame for poor SOE performance and inefficiencies on political interference, 
existing studies have not provided consensus on what could be the fundamental drivers of 
performance in these enterprises. Such researchers include Hertog, (2010); Shaw, (2008); 
Mwaura, (2007); Hill, (1999) and Downs, (1957).  
The SOE dominated African power sector is often characterised by deficient infrastructural 
development that fails to sustain desired levels of economic development (Davidson and 
Mwakasonda, 2003). Owing to prevailing inefficiencies and sub-optimal investment 
outcomes, sub-Saharan Africa electrification levels have been lagging behind, remaining 
below 30% by 2011 (Findt and Scott, 2011).   
Although enterprises are affected by many different factors in their ordinary course of 
business, SOEs face a common phenomenon of political interference (Xu et al., 2001; 
Mwaura, 2007), often with some obvious implications on their performance (Carney et al., 
2011).  The precise impact of political influence on SOE performance varies from one 
geographical setting to another (Hellman and Schankerman, 2001). SOEs in less politically 
stable regions tend to display more strain, possibly with performance trends that become 
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almost inexplicable unless addressed in a dedicated study beyond the focus of this essay. 
Thus, the research direction pursued by this essay selects enterprises in countries that have 
sustained relative political stability over the study period. A number of studies have 
mentioned Botswana, Namibia, Mauritius and South Africa as countries that have enjoyed 
sustained stability in their politics during the period covered by this study (Zafar, 2011; Plane 
and Vencatachellum, 2009; African Economic Outlook, 2003; Matlosa, 2000).  This essay 
therefore has selected the power utilities in Botswana, Namibia, Mauritius and South Africa.  
The remainder of this essay is structured as follows: section 2 gives an overview of literature, 
followed by the methodology in section 3. The analysis and findings are presented in section 
4, followed by the conclusions in section 6.  
4.2. Literature Review  
 
Governance has been cited as a factor with influence on firm performance (Putterman 1993; 
Nayyar 1990). Boards are often projected as stewards of good governance in firms, wherein 
they protect the interests of the shareholders against those of managers who tend to be 
blamed for pursuing self-interests (Carney et al., 2011).  Thus, according to the agency 
theory, the existence of strong boards is expected to drive good performance in a firm. 
However, two problems arise when such a view is applied to the SOE context, meaning that 
the relevance of the agency theory to SOEs is barely appreciated. First, the agent-principal 
relationships in SOEs are often unclear (Toninelli, 2000), and secondly, the corporate 
objectives (to be pursued by agents) are often too broad and vague, encapsulating both the 
social and financial perspectives (Aharoni, 1981). The broad nature of SOE objectives on 
the other hand derives from the nature of their stakeholders as these are often 
heterogeneous groups. This fact presents a further problem of compromised firm 
performance in pursuit of divergent stakeholder interests (Carney et al., 2011). This line of 
argument is a direct criticism of the stakeholder theory which postulates that good firm 
performance arises from a reconciliation of various stakeholder interests (Freeman, 1994).  
Given their ownership structures, SOEs are often exposed to almost that type of unlimited 
political influence that comes with pronounced negative consequences on their performance 
(Cuervo-Cazurra and Dau, 2009). Thus, heightened political interference often associated 
with SOEs contributes to bad performance (Xu et al., 2001). A good resource base is also 
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known to influence firm performance positively (Peteraf, 1993; Majumdar, 1996; Raza, 2010 
and Hoskisson et al., 2000), although the undue political interference in the administration 
of SOEs can substantially undermine such positive impact (Stan et al., 2013; Xu et al., 
2001).    
Organisational theory posits that organisations are rational institutions existing to serve 
human needs through the attainment of established objectives in the provision of utilities 
and products (Shafritz et al., 2011). This tends to imply that the determination of the level of 
organisational performance is inherently linked to the extent to which human needs are met. 
However, this becomes a complex undertaking given that organisations are affected, 
influenced and pressured by their technical and institutional environments (Scott, 1998). 
This view of an organisation conforms to the broad theory that organisations are open 
systems with a tendency to depend on resource availability (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) and 
are affected by stakeholder preferences and related societal values (Meyer and Rowan, 
1991). According to organisational theory, the dependence on resources exposes 
organisations to the will and discretion of those in power to control the resources (Hardy, 
1996), and in the case of SOEs, this includes politicians.  
Given these, certain organisational theories become prominent in the attempt to explain firm 
performance in the specific context of SOEs. These include the agency theory (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989), the stakeholder theory popularised by (Freeman, 1994), 
the public choice theory (Niskanen, 1971; Tullock, 1976; Krueger 1990) and the resource-
based theory (Hamel and Prahalad, 1994). 
The agency theory has dominated corporate governance literature, and has been explained 
as applying to all settings based on an agent-principal relationship (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). The theory is premised on the agency problem which arises when firm managers 
(agents) pursue their personal interests which are at variance with those of the owners 
(principals). Several approaches have been adopted to deal with this problem, the most 
common being the appointment of boards of directors (Heath, 2009).  In recent times 
managerial incentives and award of ownership stakes to managers have also increasingly 
become common (Raelin and Bondy, 2013). These approaches are based on the ability to 
identify principals and agents distinctively.  However, when applied in the SOE context the 
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process of identifying the principals, or their representatives can be complicated (Toninelli, 
2000). Who are the principals- the people, the government, the state or the ministers? 
In most cases (typically in the power sector), SOEs tend to exist as natural monopolies for 
which an agency-principal approach becomes inappropriate as it breeds inefficiencies and 
managerial indiscipline (Worch et al., 2013). Monopolistic environments are also known for 
encouraging information asymmetry, typically resulting from rent seeking managers who 
selectively disclose and manipulate business and industry data (Fremeth and Holburn, 
2009; Goldeng et al., 2004). The fundamental result of information asymmetry is chronic 
industrial inefficiency (Pamacheche and Koma, 2007), which in turn promotes poor 
performance at enterprise level.  
As argued by Toninelli (2000) the agency theory has greatly influenced the architecture of 
modern day governance structures, which are however often seen as less effective in the 
context of the politically exposed SOEs (Mwaura, 2006). Political influence and interference 
often undermine enterprise performance through management and governance structured 
around political cycles, rather than being based on pure business rationale and commercial 
merit (see Mwaura, 2006).  
In line with the agency theory, the following hypothesis is offered with respect to firm 
performance. 
H1: Strong governance is positively linked to good firm performance. 
From a resource-based theory perspective, organisations will perform better if they own and 
control those resources capable of driving sustainable performance (Wernerfelt, 1984; 
Barney, 1986). This capability can be leveraged if firms have the internal capacity to 
innovate strategies with an entrepreneurial mindset (Christensen et al., 1987 and Raza, 
2012). However, a study by Worch et al., (2013) identifies high ambiguity in SOE objectives 
as a huge stretch to internal capabilities, often resulting in a capability gap. This is in 
agreement with an earlier finding by Spiller, (2010) that multiple objectives faced by SOEs 
are an important reason for performance deficiencies due to the capability gap. The 
capability gap results when there is an insufficient availability of competencies, skills and 
experiences within an organisation (Lavie, 2006) to pursue identified priorities. A further 
dimension, which is considered under the public choice theory, is that well-resourced SOEs 
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are often known for attracting higher levels of political influence (Mwaura, 2007). 
Nonetheless, the fundamentals of the resource-based theory influence the hypothesis 
below. 
H2: The availability of adequate resources has a positive association with firm 
performance. 
A stakeholder view of the firm demands that an organisation’s existence be linked to the 
interests of its stakeholders (Jones and Wicks, 1999). An enterprise will excel if it balances 
the needs of all stakeholders (Freeman, 1994). SOEs face a wide range of stakeholders 
which Kamal (2010) divides into two broad groups: 1) the primary stakeholders comprising 
shareholders, lenders, consumers, employees, suppliers and managers; and 2) the 
secondary stakeholders, comprising the local community, the media, the government, 
special interest groups and the general public. A number of studies have found an intra and 
inter stakeholder group heterogeneity from which diverse but legitimate expectations are 
derived (Wicaksono, 2009; Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Aguilera and Jackson, 2003). 
Such diverse interests then become a source of confused priorities for SOEs which fail to 
strike an optimal balance in their attempts to pursue and satisfy these interests. The concept 
of a stakeholder approach has been largely motivated by a perceived moral deficiency of a 
purely shareholder approach (Boatright, 2006). It imposes a social obligation on SOEs 
which, however can be difficult to effectively institutionalise as it suggests broadened 
managerial responsibilities over a variety of secondary stakeholder groups. Hypothesis 3 is 
set out below.   
 
H3: The more widely the interest stakeholder groups are considered in the 
administration of firms, the better the firm performance. 
 
SOEs are exposed to political interference and influence at varying degrees, depending on 
their demographic existence and perceived level of importance in the socio-economic 
space. Under the public choice theory, politicians are depicted as rent seekers who will, 
depending on how effective mechanisms meant to monitor their performance are, act 
according to self-interest (Hill, 1999; Shaw, 2008). Given that executives and boards of 
SOEs are appointed by, or with the influence of political leaders (Xu et al., 2001), their duty 
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to deal with political influence becomes a complex one. Political interference normally 
manifests itself through various effects, including SOEs run along geo-political lines as 
opposed to business rationale (Carney et al., 2011).  Such interference is known to 
undermine good corporate performance (see Hill, 1999) due to compromised governance 
practices and other costly non-economic politically motivated transactions. 
Studies have suggested various forms of measuring such interference including: the extent 
to which key decisions are subject to vetting by the political leadership; the number of 
political directives in a year, and political representation on the boards of SOEs (See 
Bortolotti and Pinotti, 2008). A number of authors, including Xu et al., (2001) and Bortolotti 
and Pinotti, (2008) have found such undue political interference in the governance and 
management of SOEs to be negatively correlated to good enterprise performance. Such a 
finding supports a conclusion by a variety of studies that the success of SOEs depends on 
lessened political influence (Xu et al., 2001). Accordingly, hypothesis 4 is stated below.  
H4: The higher the level of political interference in the administration of firms, the lower the 
firm performance. 
Clearly, the literature on organisational theories depicts a level of tension amongst the 
theories which are reviewed from an SOE perspective. Resources drive performance, but 
also attract higher levels of political interference, which come in the form of politically 
motivated governance and management structures. The agency problem may not be 
effectively resolved in SOEs, given such political interference. A stakeholder-centric view 
imposes a burden of social responsibility which is almost impossible to institutionalise 
effectively if an optimal balance on stakeholder priority is not struck. This has been found to 
exacerbate the very same agency problems which agency theorists seek to resolve. Finally, 
so much depends on political influence, if self-serving politicians are in charge of resolving 
the agency problem, directing the use of resources and determining the stakeholder 
disposition of public enterprises. 
 
The sub-Saharan electrified minority still faces complex problems including   intermittent 
power supply, prohibitive pricing and constrained access to main grid lines. The generation 
capacity remains the lowest in the world and has been facing a stagnated growth (Eberhard, 
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2008). Various industry diagnostic research work has pointed to a glaring growth deficit 
which must be plugged if the 2030 target for full industrial power access is to be attained in 
the sub-Saharan Africa. A growth rate of 13% is required, but historical trends have 
stagnated at around 1.7% over the recent past decade (Bazilian et al., 2012). 
Whilst important milestones have been achieved around the world in the privatisation of 
SOEs, marked state participation in the sub-Saharan power sector continues to sustain the 
much desired industrial growth and economic performance, notably through the SOE 
business model whose performance remains central to the sectorial reform initiatives 
(Tallapragada, 2009). This could be because experience in Sub-Saharan Africa privatisation 
transactions shows that issues and pitfalls have not fundamentally changed since the early 
days of privitisation itself (Buchs, 2003), with only 2% of the African power generation having 
been privatised, with a meagre 6% of its distribution having been privatised by the 2000s 
(UNIDO, 2008). This phenomenon reveals the importance of the SOE business model in 
the very crucial power sector in Sub Saharan Africa for some time to come, hence the need 
to focus on its performance through the respective utilities.   
However, the poor performance of such SOEs is a widely documented phenomenon (Boko 
and YuanJan, 2011; Xia and Chen, 2007; Elwel and Labonte, 2007; Kikeri and Kolo, 2006). 
Unfortunately, this widely publicised poor performance of SOEs is not accompanied by 
sufficient empirical evidence on what fundamentally drives SOE performance.  
 
4.3. Methodology  
  
4.3.1. Data 
 
The study focuses on five countries whose power utilities have experienced very little to no 
degree of privatisation, and selects four such power utilities from the following countries: 
Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia and South Africa. Owing to the inherent linkages between 
political cycles and SOEs, the study focuses on these countries for their relative political 
stability during the study period. Given the monopolistic nature of the power industry in 
Africa, the study selected the only power utilities found in each of the selected countries, 
and so the study is based on four utilities. Data on the SOEs constituting the sample has 
predominantly been obtained from the audited annual financial statements and other 
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publicised annual reports of these entities. This is for a 20-year period spanning from 1994 
to 2013. Thus, the study is based on a panel data of four utilities over a 20-year period 
across four countries, yielding 320 observations.  
 
The audited annual financial statements provide quantitative data whilst the rest of 
qualitative information is available from narratives in the annual reports (e.g. the size of work 
force, strength of the board and its composition etc.). 
 
4.3.2. Model Estimation 
 
The researcher adopts the model proposed by Dewenter and Malatesta, (2001) and 
adopted by Bozec et al., (2002). The regression mode is empirically estimated using the 
linear mixed model within the framework of longitudinal data analysis. The linear mixed 
modelling approach was selected for two main reasons: first, its flexibility in handling both 
time variant and time invariant variables in the model, and secondly the need to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity across the firms and countries (see Baltagi, 2001). This model is 
augmented by allowing for a vector of variables measuring organisational theories. The 
model is stated as: 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼1 + β1𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑑𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡  +β2𝐵𝑂𝐷𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡+ β3𝐵𝑂𝐷𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡 + β4 GOVinv 5   )(control           (1)                                                                                                                                                         
  
Where: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡   = the performance measure for SOE i at year t;  
LIQdty      = Liquidity;  
BODst      = Board Strength;  
BODdiv    =Diversity of the board in terms of stakeholder representation; 
GOVinv    = Extent of Government’s involvement in pricing decisions;  
               = Error term. 
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4.3.3. Measure of Performance 
 
Various studies have measured performance in different ways, with some focusing on 
productivity and profitability. The current study, however, uses more broad based measures 
encompassing operational efficiency, productivity and financial performance. The study 
uses the following performance variables; profitability measure (gross profit margin), 
productivity (total factor productivity) and operational efficiency measure (gigawatts 
produced per employee).   
SOE Performance (𝑌𝑖𝑡) is thus measured under three different models as outlined in Table 
4.1:  
Table 4.1: Description of models (performance measures) 
Model Description Measurement 
GPMG Gross Profit Margin 
(
Sales Revenue − Cost of Sales
Sales Revenue
)
+ 1  
TPF Total Factor productivity (Measured by the 
Solow Residual) 
 
Let gY denote the growth rate of 
aggregate output, gK the growth rate of 
aggregate capital, gL the growth rate of 
aggregate labour and alpha the capital 
share.   The Solow Residual is then 
defined as gY − α ∗ gK − (1 − α) ∗ gL.12 
GwhPE Net Gigawatt hours sold per employee 
(
Net gigawatt hours sold
Average number of employees
)  
 
4.3.4.  Choice of independent variables 
This essay approaches the interrogation of performance drivers from an organisational 
theory perspective, borrowing from existing literature on generic variables known to drive 
firm performance.  
 
Liquidity: In line with the fundamentals of the resource-based theory, which posits that 
resources have the capability to drive firm performance (Raza, 2012; Tan and Peng, 2003; 
                                                          
12 Comin (2006) 
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Hamel and Prahalad, 1994; Wernerfelt, 1984). The literature suggests firm liquidity as a 
critical resource in influencing performance in the context of a generic enterprise (Al-
Quadah, 2011; Tang and Peng, 2003; Singh, 1986, Bromiley, 1991; Hambrick and D’Aveni, 
1988).   
 
Government involvement in pricing decisions: From a public choice theory perspective, 
politicians, acting through functionaries of government, may exert influence in SOEs, often 
with a direct impact on organisational performance (Shaw, 2008; Hill, 1999; Downs, 1957). 
A number of studies suggest ways in which political leadership can hold on to controlling 
SOEs, and these include the signing-off of any tariffs and service levies proposed by SOEs 
(Lioukas et al., 1993; Ramamurti, 1987a).  
 
Board Strength: At the nucleus of good governance are independent corporate boards (Jan 
and Sangmi, 2016). The use of boards is often seen as a panacea for good firm performance 
by proponents of the agency theory (Raelin and Bondy, 2013 Jensen and Meckling, 1976), 
and this position derives from their perceived effectiveness in guarding the interests of the 
shareholders. However, having in place a board by is itself, not a solution, rather, its strength 
weighs more in gauging the intended effectiveness in driving organisational performance. 
(Ongore and K’Obonyo, 2011; Wicaksono, 2009; Ross, 1973). While a number of factors 
have been proposed as possible determinants of board strength, the extent of skills diversity 
within a single board is a popular indicator (Toninelli, 2000; Wicaksono, 2009). A common 
skills set would combine finance, economics, Human Capital, Industry Specific and Legal, 
and the more these are present in a board, the stronger it is perceived to be.     
 
Board stakeholder diversity: The proponents of the stakeholder theory are of the view that 
good firm performance arises from a reconciliation of various stakeholder interests in 
operating enterprises (Freeman, 1994). A number of factors are indicative of how an 
enterprise subscribes to the tenets of the stakeholder theory, amongst them is the extent to 
which the board composition draws from various stakeholder groups (Brenner and Cochran, 
1991, Jones and Wicks, 1999). 
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Firm age and size: These have been suggested to have a bearing on firm performance 
(Lioukas et al., 1993; Kim and Chung, 2008; Aivazian et al 2005) and as such, they are 
accounted for in the study.  
Table 4.2 shows how each of the explanatory variables are measured. The table also 
depicts the theoretical underpinnings of the model as well as theoretical expectations.  
 
Table 4.2: Definition of proxy independent variables 
Variable Theory Measurers Predicted relationships 
Liquidity (LIQ) Resource-based 
theory 
=
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
 
Liquidity is positively 
correlated to good 
performance in line with the 
resource-based theory 
(Tan and Peng, 2003; 
Singh, 1986; Bromiley, 
1991; Hambrick and 
D’Aveni, 1988; Chudson, 
1945) 
Government 
involvement in 
pricing decisions 
Public choice 
theory 
Score =1 if Tariffs are 
determined by 
government 
 
Score = 0 if tariff 
setting is regulated by 
an independent body 
Higher levels of 
government (political) 
involvement are negatively 
correlated to performance 
in line with the public 
choice theory (Mwaura, 
2007; Shaw, 2008; 
Anthony, 1957; Hill, 1999) 
 
Board Strength  
Agency theory  
Assessed in terms of 
the following skills: i) 
power, engineering or 
related, ii) Financial 
management, iii) 
Environmental and 
social Management, iv) 
Legal, v) Human 
Capital Management 
Scores: 1 if 3 or more 
of the above, 0 if 2 of 
less 
 
In accordance with the 
agency theory, the strength 
of the board, as measured 
by diversity of skills is 
positively correlated to 
performance (Ongore and 
K’Obonyo, 2011; Ross, 
1973; Leech, 1986; 
Toninelli, 2000 and 
Wicaksono, 2009) 
Board stakeholder 
diversity 
Stakeholder 
theory 
Assessed in terms of 
representation on the 
board from the 
following stakeholder 
groups: i) Public 
Sector, ii) Private 
Sector, iii) Civic 
Organisations, iv) 
According to the 
stakeholder theory, a wider 
stakeholder representation 
on boards is positively 
related to performance. 
(Freeman, 1994; Brenner 
and Cochran, 1991, Jones 
and Wicks, 1999).  
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Legal, v) General 
Public   
Scores: 1 if 3 or more 
of the above, 0 if 2 of 
less  
Age  Control Variable Number of years in 
operation 
Firm age is expected to be 
conversely correlated with 
profitability, but a positive 
correlation is expected 
between age and 
productivity.  (Majumdar, 
1997; Dogan, 2013) 
Size  Control Variable Natural Logarithm of 
dollar value of capital 
assets 
Firm size is expected to 
display a positive 
correlation with profitability, 
but a negative correlation 
with productivity. 
(Majumdar, 1997; Dogan, 
2013) 
 
Three performance models are then estimated as follows: 
Total Factor Productivity = 𝛼1 + β1𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑑𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡  +β2𝐵𝑂𝐷𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡+ β3𝐵𝑂𝐷𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡 + β4 GOVinv 5
  )(control (2) 
Gigawatt Hours per employee = 𝛼1 + β1𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑑𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡  +β2𝐵𝑂𝐷𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡+ β3𝐵𝑂𝐷𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡 + β4 GOVinv 5
  )(control (3) 
Gross profit = 𝛼1 + β1𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑑𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡  +β2𝐵𝑂𝐷𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡+ β3𝐵𝑂𝐷𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡 + β4 GOVinv 5   )(control (4) 
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4.4. Analysis and findings 
 
The descriptive statistics are presented in Table 4.3: 
Table 4.3: Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Gross profit 0 1.609 1.277 0.280 
GWh per employee 0.7 4.1 1.959 0.881 
Total factor productivity 0.020 1.016 0.340 0.241 
Liquidity 0.5 4.94 2.250 1.177 
Size 4.263 9.971 7.841 1.601 
Age 23 90 51 19.343 
 Score Frequency  
 
Government involvement 
High  50% 
Low  50% 
 
Board Strength 
Strong  50% 
Moderate  50% 
 
Board stakeholder diversity 
High  74% 
Low 26% 
   Note: Under ‘Level of frequency’, each of the individual variables is measured per the criteria set out in table  
   2.6 (page 36) and defined as either high or low as follows: High for a score of 1, and low for a score of 0.  
 
The sampled utilities are significantly different in terms of efficiency, with a minimum 
gigawatt per employee at 0.7 against a maximum of 4.1. This huge discrepancy is reflected 
by a standard deviation of 0.88. On average, these utilities have been operating for the past 
51 years, accumulating capital assets, generation and transmission capacity. Utilities that 
have been slow (due to a number of reasons) in increasing generation capacity and 
maintaining existing facilities will naturally achieve lower gigawatt hours per employee 
compared to those that have been actively doing so.  
There is an even spread in terms of the extent to which governments are involved in tariff 
setting processes, reflecting a gradual shift towards eventually handing over the process to 
independent regulatory bodies who act on market forces. Such a gradual shift is 
compensated for by the same split in terms of board strength, which is presumably a critical 
factor in an environment of market forces. Interestingly, the involvement of a broader 
stakeholder base in the administration of SOEs is prevalent.  
 
 
 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 89 
 
Table 4.4: Regression Results 
The dependent variable is in column (1), Total Factor Productivity (Solow Residual) : Let gY denote the growth rate of aggregate 
output, gK the growth rate of aggregate capital, gL the growth rate of aggregate labor and alpha the capital share.   The Solow 
Residual is then defined as gY − α ∗ gK − (1 − α) ∗ gL. In column (2), gigawatts per employee (total gigawatt hours sent out/ 
average number of employees). Gross profit in column (3) is computed as [(sales revenue-cost of sales)/sales revenue)]. To 
eliminate negative values (for input into the statistical software), 0.91382 was added across to the nominal gross profit margin 
values. These dependent variables are regressed against four organisational theories based on pre-determined proxy variables; 
resource-based theory (liquidity, measured as current assets/current liabilities), agency theory (board strength measured in terms of 
assigned scores), board stakeholder diversity (variety of stakeholder representation on board measured by assigned scores) and 
public choice theory (extent of government’s involvement in the tariff setting process). Age and size effects are controlled for by 
variables age (number of years in operation) and size (natural logarithm of dollar value of capital assets). p-values are reported in 
parentheses.  
Following the standard procedure of testing for fixed and random effects, the Hausman test 
was performed across all three models, upon which the fixed effects model was established 
as being appropriate for all the three. The results of the Fixed Effects model are shown in 
columns 1-3 in Table 4.4. 
 
 
 
 Productivity Efficiency  Profitability 
(1) (2) (3) 
 Total Factor Productivity Gigawatt hours per 
employee 
Gross Profit 
 
Liquidity (Resource-based 
theory) 
0.042 0.096 0.096 
(0.001) (0.020) (0.000) 
 
Board Strength (Agency 
theory) 
0.168 0.391 0.203 
(0.001) (0.022) (0.059) 
Board Stakeholder diversity 
(Stakeholder theory) 
-0.128 -0.582 -0.074 
(0.188) (0.072) (0.714) 
Government involvement in 
pricing (Public choice theory) 
-0.128 -0.041 -0.007 
(0.099) (0.873) (0.964) 
 
Size (Control variable) 
-0.164 0.236 -0.077 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.036) 
 
Age (Control Variable) 
0.030 -0.052 -0.008 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.041) 
Diagnostic tests  
No. of observations 80 77 80 
F-stats 41.77 26.26 10.79 
R2-within 0.816 0.670 0.304 
Hausman tests 84.24 157.65 21.11 
Prob>chi2 0.000 0.000 0.002 
Estimators Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects 
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4.4.1. Model 1:  Gross Profit Margin (Profitability) 
Under this financial performance model, performance is positively correlated with the 
liquidity and board strength variables, whilst it correlates negatively with the board 
stakeholder diversity and government involvement in pricing variables. This implies that, the 
more financial resources a firm has, and the stronger its board is, the better it will perform. 
The positive influence of firm liquidity on its firm performance has been credited because of 
its ability to assist enterprises to negotiate early payment discounts, and take advantage of 
opportunistic procurement, as well as negotiating better supplier terms (Tang and Peng, 
2003; Leiblein, 1996). SOEs in the infrastructure sectors, power utilities in particular have 
substantial procurement spend, characterised by high trade creditor balances and massive 
supply contracts, and thus a good base of monetary resources has the ability to drive good 
financial performance.  
The positive correlation between strength of the board and firm performance is consistent 
with the findings on generic literature, and this is mainly because boards bring to enterprises 
objective discipline, rare skills and a clear focus on core objectives (Ongore and K’Obonyo, 
2011). However, such a finding is interesting in the context of SOEs in which boards are 
typically labelled as political appointees lacking the requisite expertise and objectivity 
(Mwaura, 2007; Bortolotti and Pinotti, 2008), neither are they often expected to focus on 
good financial performance (Shirley, 2008).      
Both the board stakeholder diversity and government’s involvement in pricing decisions are 
negatively correlated to financial performance, that is, the more governments intervene in 
pricing policies of SOEs, the less profitable the SOEs will be. Similarly, a wider 
representation of various stakeholders on SOE boards contributes to reduced profitability. 
In the case of board stakeholder diversity, although displaying statistical insignificance 
under the model, the finding seems to caution against the generalisation of the stakeholder 
theory consistent with its criticism, that SOE stakeholder interests are too diverse, often 
conflicting and at times difficult to define (Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Wicaksono, 2009; 
Heath and Norman, 2004). The negative relationship between the level of government’s 
intervention in pricing decisions and financial performance confirms the hypothesis. In 
arriving at their final decisions, political leaders do not necessarily focus on financial 
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performance but rather on an often ill-defined criterion, harbouring personal rent seeking 
(Hill, 1999), although in some cases such criteria may be driven by wider societal 
considerations, often geared towards satisfying conflicting stakeholder interests (Carney et 
al., 2011; Murdock, 2004).   
4.4.2. Model 2: Gigawatt hours per employee (Efficiency)  
When performance is measured in terms of efficiency, liquidity emerges as a driver for good 
performance. Adequate maintenance is cited as being critical for attaining optimal levels of 
power infrastructure (Mahmoudi et al., 2014), and any utility needs sufficient liquidity in order 
to carry out maintenance on its infrastructure at adequate intervals. Given this relationship 
therefore, SOEs with lower liquidity would be expected to be less efficient.  
As with the model 1, board strength is positively related to firm performance. This implies 
stronger boards can contribute to achieving better firm efficiency and this could mainly be 
by instituting objective discipline.  
The board stakeholder diversity variable is only statistically significant under this model, 
where it displays a negative relationship with efficiency, i.e. SOEs with a wider stakeholder 
representation on their boards tend to be less efficient.  A wider stakeholder representation 
on a board of a typical SOE means a wider range of conflicting interests with a substantially 
reduced scope for homogeneity in strategic focus and operational direction. Reconciling the 
interests of such heterogeneous stakeholder groups without compromising on efficient 
organisational operations is often an impossible balance to achieve in practical terms 
(Heath, 2004; Donaldson and Preston, 1995), thus such a finding is expected in the context 
of SOEs.      
4.4.3. Model 3: Total Factor Productivity (Productivity) 
The firm’s liquidity displays a positive influence on its productivity, meaning that firms with 
adequate financial resources become more productive. Financial resources are often 
identified as enabling a firm to acquire optimal technologies, the requisite capital and skilled 
workforce, all which are critical drivers of productivity (Isaksson, 2007). Similarly, the 
relationship between board strength and firm productivity also emerges as a supportive one, 
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implying that strong boards influence the attainment of the right structures, optimal operating 
models and supportive infrastructure all which are credited with driving productivity.  
An inverse relationship emerges between productivity and the level of government 
involvement in pricing decisions. Government’s interference in setting utility tariffs often 
leads to lower than sufficient pricing (see Shirley, 2008), with a direct impact on the 
availability of factors that typically drive productivity, such as optimal technologies, requisite 
capital and skilled workforce.      
The econometric estimates reflect firm liquidity as being positively correlated and statistically 
significant with respect to enterprise performance across all three models, signifying the 
importance of resources in driving performance. However, it is acknowledged that resources 
will support SOE performance if an entrepreneurial and innovative mind-set exists on the 
part of agents managing the entities (Christensen et al., 1987; Raza, 2012) although this 
research did not bring this aspect into the model.  
Given this positive relationship between resource availability and firm performance, the 
hypothesis that the availability of adequate resources has a positive association with firm 
performance is thus accepted. 
Furthermore, the strength of boards of directors is found to be significantly and positively 
correlated to firm performance under the three performance models. Although a host of 
other considerations come into play in appointing SOE board members, the results 
underscore the importance of skill and capability in such boards.  
Such a finding supports agency theory based postulations that strong boards are more 
effective in dealing with the agency problem and in aiding good overall performance. Thus, 
the hypothesis that strong governance is positively linked to good firm performance is 
accepted. 
Board stakeholder diversity is statistically significant only under the efficiency based 
performance measure, where it displays a negative correlation. This implies that 
governance and operational structures which are biased towards wide attention to diverse 
stakeholder interests impact negatively on SOE efficiency. A number of previous studies 
have emphasised the role of stakeholder heterogeneity in undermining efficiency in SOEs 
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that attempt to satisfy all their stakeholder interests (Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Bozec 
et al., 2002; Heath and Norman, 2004; Wicaksono, 2009). This would arise, for example as 
a result of inefficient allocation of economic resources towards addressing stakeholder 
interests without tangible business outcome (Post et al., 2002; Simmons, 2004). This would 
in turn undermine the power of organisational resources to drive performance. However, the 
importance of stakeholders and their diverse interests should not be undermined, but rather 
it is the optimal balance between satisfying such interests whilst remaining sustainable that 
must be attained. This study therefore rejects the hypothesis that the wider the interest 
stakeholder groups are considered in the administration of firms, the better the firm 
performance. 
The extent of government’s involvement in the tariff setting process is significant only under 
the productivity model where a negative correlation with firm productivity is observed. 
Through undue political pressures, SOEs often engage in counter-productive ways of 
operating including maintaining excess staffing and idle capacity. Perhaps the distinction 
between acting in self-interest versus acting for the interest of the wider society (employment 
creation) becomes blurred when politicians derive personal benefit from pursuing interests 
of wider stakeholder spectrum, that is, political expediency. This view links back to the issue 
on stakeholder interests discussed earlier, that, whether pursued out of political pressure or 
through deliberate enterprise actions, diverse stakeholder interests are potentially 
detrimental to SOE performance if not well balanced. The theoretical perspective here 
becomes that the fact the Public choice and stakeholder theories is a combination with a 
potential to undermine SOE performance. Ultimately, the hypothesis the higher the level of 
political interference in the administration of firms, the lower the firm performance, is 
accepted.   
The control variables, size and age are statistically significant across all three performance 
measurers, yet the direction of correlation differs. Size is negatively correlated with 
enterprise productivity and profitability, whilst positively correlated with efficiency. Whilst in 
a generic context larger firms may derive efficiencies from economies of scale (Dorgan, 
2013), productivity would benefit from firm size depending upon the capacity of labour and 
the quality of intensive capital (Williamson, 1967). Unfortunately, larger SOEs are known for 
carrying aged capital assets and large pools of less motivated workforce. In terms of age, 
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older firms may exploit accumulated experience in order to be more productive. However, 
efficiency and profitability could be eroded by old plants which are poorly maintained and 
costly to operate. 
In order to control for possible dynamism and ensure model robustness, this research also 
estimated a dynamic version of the model using the Arellano-Bond technique. The results 
of the dynamic model do not differ much from those of the static model These are shown in 
Appendix 2.  
4.5. Conclusion  
 
This essay has investigated the fundamental drivers of performance of State Owned power 
utilities operating as commercial enterprises. This was done in the context of known 
organisational theories. The study adopted broad based measures of performance 
incorporating profitability, efficiency and productivity indicators. The study has revealed that 
good SOE performance could be explained by the agency and resource-based theories, as 
it found both strong boards and resource availability to be positively related to all forms of 
performance. The analysis also reveals that an unbalanced approach to stakeholder 
interests compromises SOE efficiency.  Similarly, a higher level of government involvement 
in the operations of SOEs is detrimental to SOE performance, thus supporting the notions 
of the public choice theory.  
This study provides some practical insights from both an administration and a policy 
perspective. First, it reveals the importance of ensuring adequate resourcing of SOEs. 
Whilst this may sound obvious, resources on their own may fail to drive performance if the 
boards in place are not sufficiently strong and optimally balanced in terms of stakeholder 
representation. In other words, appointments to SOE boards should strike a balance 
between the need for skill diversity and stakeholder representation. Political involvement in 
the administration of SOEs should be very limited. Rather, the focus of political involvement 
should be at a policy setting level, including matters concerning regulations. There is need 
for a regulatory framework supported by precise legal provisions that support restrained 
political interference in the administration of SOEs. In fact, such frameworks should aim at 
reinforcing government’s ownership rights, and ensure that a good performance disposition 
is demanded from SOE executives.  
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This essay further contributes towards filling an important gap in organisational performance 
literature and it does so from two unique perspectives. The first is that it introduces an SOE- 
specific focus to the interrogation of organisational performance drivers; and secondly, it 
incorporates a concept of interrogating multiple performance variables in determining such 
drivers of SOE performance with the emphasis being on how the multiple variables interplay 
each other.  
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A: Additional post-estimation results 
Test for cross-sectional dependence (Parasan-CD test) 
Model Total factor 
productivity 
Gigawatt hours 
per employee 
Gross profit 
Pr 0.713 0.792 0.433 
Average absolute value of 
off-diagonal elements 
0.167 0.206 0.264 
 
Test for cross-sectional dependence (BP-LM test) 
a. Total factor productivity 
 _e1 _e2 _e3 _e4 
_el 1.000    
_e2 -0.0365 1.0000   
_e3 -0.2006 0.2961 1.0000  
_e4 0.1762 0.1310 -0.1644 1.0000 
 
b. Gigawatt hours per employee 
 _e1 _e2 _e3 _e4 
_el 1.000    
_e2 -0.1235 1.0000   
_e3 0.1735 -0.4209 1.0000  
_e4 0.0589 0.1500 0.3065 1.0000 
 
c. Gross Profit 
 _e1 _e2 _e3 _e4 
_el 1.000    
_e2 0.6944 1.0000   
_e3 -0.1133 -0.2433 1.0000  
_e4 0.0769 0.2356 -0.2212 1.0000 
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APPENDIX B: Dynamic Panel Estimation results (Allerano-Bond Technique) 
Dynamic Panel Estimation results 
The dependent variable in column (1), Total Factor Productivity is computed as 𝐴𝑥𝐾𝛼𝑥𝐿𝛽 (K = dollar value of capital assets, 
L= dollar value of employee costs). In column (2), Gigawatts per employee (total gigawatt hours sent out/ average number of 
employees). Gross profit in column (3) is computed as [(sales revenue-cost of sales)/sales revenue)]. To eliminate negative values 
(for input into the statistical software), 0.91382 was added across to the nominal gross profit margin values. These dependent 
variables are regressed against four organisational theories based on pre-determined proxy variables; resource-based theory 
(liquidity, measured as current assets/current liabilities), agency theory (board strength measured in terms of assigned scores), 
board stakeholder diversity (variety of stakeholder representation on board measured by assigned scores) and public choice theory 
(extent of government’s involvement in the tariff setting process). Age and size effects are controlled for by variables age (number 
of years in operation) and size (natural logarithm of dollar value of capital assets). p-values are reported in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 Productivity Efficiency  Profitability 
(4) (5) (6) 
 Total Factor 
Productivity 
Gigawatts per 
employee 
Gross Profit 
 
Liquidity (Resource-based theory) 
0.025 0.056 0.074 
(0.043) (0.080) (0.006) 
 
Board Strength (Agency theory) 
0.139 0.222 0.120 
(0.005) (0.087) (0.026) 
Board Stakeholder diversity 
(Stakeholder theory) 
0.085 -0.691 -0.065 
(0.364) (0.004) (0.743) 
Government involvement in 
pricing (Public choice theory) 
-0.160 0.027 -0.118 
(0.030) (0.888)   (0.466) 
 
Size (Control variable) 
-0.117 0.115 -0.063 
(0.000) (0.018) (0.083) 
 
Age (Control Variable) 
0.022 -0.020 -0.006 
(0.000) (0.011) (0.181) 
Diagnostic tests    
No. of observations 72 77 80 
Prob>chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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CHAPTER FIVE: PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN SOEs: BOTSWANA POWER 
CORPORATION (BPC) PERSPECTIVE13 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) are well known for poor performance and inefficiencies 
(Boko and Yuan Jain, 2011; Xia and Chen, 2007), but their relevance and importance 
remain uncontested. The importance of SOEs is evident in developing countries, including 
in sub-Saharan Africa (Elwel and Labonte, 2007), where they operate in virtually all sectors 
(Kikeri and Kolo, 2006). Despite their widely publicised poor performance, the literature on 
what fundamentally drives SOE performance is inadequate. By their nature, SOEs operate 
in a unique situation and this is often attributed to their ownership structures and ill-defined 
property rights. SOEs are typically saddled with geo-political driven deliverables of no 
tangible commercial outcomes (Carney et al., 2011), including contradictory but legitimate 
expectations from a wide range of stakeholders (Freeman, 1994). This results in a tension 
that blurs the understanding of what fundamentally influences how SOEs perform, and this 
is the focus of this essay.  
A wide array of variables is thought to drive SOEs performance, and these drivers include 
political factors, governance and management fundamentals, control of adequate and 
relevant resources and pursuing stakeholder interest. These drivers are quite often 
discussed as well within a contextual perspective to these drivers of SOE performance: 
access to strategic resources and the existence of competition (Stan et al., 2013) has been 
associated with good performance displayed by many American SOEs. In China, restrained 
political involvement is a factor widely admired in SOEs (Xu et al., 2001).  More recent 
studies also identify slack as a possible driver of SOE performance (Stan, 2013; Liu et al., 
2013; Li et al, 2013).  
Management and directorship of SOEs have been found to be a key factor to consider in 
turnaround situations, wherein a change of boards and executive leadership was found to 
have significantly positive impact on firm performance (Maheshwari and Ahlstrom, 2004).  
                                                          
13 Accepted for publication and forthcoming in Risk Governance and Control: Financial Markets and Institutions (2016) 
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Toninelli (2000) and Mwaura (2007) also observe significant vagueness in SOE objectives 
which they blame for breeding inefficiencies. The lack of clarity of SOE objectives is seen 
to be a result of the numerous stakeholders often with conflicting expectations and demands 
from SOEs (Shirley, 2008). SOEs inherently face a burden of satisfying a range of interests 
pursued by heterogeneous stakeholder groups, but with limited appreciation of what impact 
this undertaking has on performance.           
From a generic perspective, performance contracts have become popular due to their 
perceived positive influence on organisational performance. However, empirical evidence 
on their effectiveness in SOEs remains rather inconclusive; a study analysing the effects of 
performance contracts on productivity and financial performance of SOEs in Ghana, 
Senegal, India, Mexico, South Korea and the Philippines found no positive correlation 
(Shirley, 2008). Perhaps this is not surprising; the success of performance contracts 
invariably hinges on a supportive governance framework, typically pro-agency theory whose 
effects become diluted with heightened political interference and the pressure to maximise 
social benefits often associated with SOEs (Mwaura, 2007).     
From this discussion, it can be deduced that the following are drivers of organisational 
performance in the context of SOEs; restrained political influence, effective governance and 
management, control of adequate and relevant resources and a balanced approach to 
pursuing stakeholder interests.  
Attempts to explain the poor performance of SOEs with generic organisational theories have 
also not yielded much consensus, with some of the theories depicting conflicting positions.  
Theories that have been commonly referenced in explaining organisational performance 
include the agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989) , the resource-
based theory (Wernerfelt, 1984), the stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1994) and the public 
choice theory (Niskanen, 1971; Tullock, 1976; Krueger 1990). Proponents of the agency 
theory have argued a case for effective boards as a foundation for dealing with the agency 
problem, whilst those supporting the resource-based theory emphasise the importance of 
resources owned and controlled by organisations in driving positive performance. The 
stakeholder theory holds that a good sense of existence for any organisations is 
underpinned by its stakeholder disposition and this would, among others be reflected by 
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stakeholder representation on boards, whilst the public choice theory associates political 
influence and interference with poor organisational performance.  
Still, the application of such theoretical underpinnings to an SOE context has not been 
adequately explored in academic studies (Bozec et al., 2002). However, such an 
interrogation remains key, given the extent of interaction of these theories in practical 
organisational settings, and even more so with SOEs, given their widely acknowledged 
uniqueness. The unique features of SOEs (heightened political influence, competing but 
legitimate stakeholder interests, flawed governance structures, the capability gap etc.) tend 
to imply tension amongst some of the organisational theories which can be best understood 
through a broad based-approach to academic inquiry. Such an approach will simultaneously 
interrogate a number of factors under the microscope of organisational theories, thereby 
dealing with the often overlooked but central question of how different organisational 
theories interact with each other to influence the performance outcomes of an enterprise.    
Most of the studies on the subject of SOE performance, for example Nayyar, (1990); 
Putterman, (1993); Xu et al., (2001); Stan et al., (2013); Mwaura, (2007) and Shirley, (2013) 
analyse SOE performance factors in isolation. None of these studies adequately addresses 
the issue of SOE performance from a perspective of combined several factors. A similar 
deficiency is observed in studies that review the performance of African SOEs, with quite a 
number focusing on the effects of privatisation pressures and commercialisation (Godana 
and Hlatshwayo, 1998; Nellis, 2005; Nellis, 2005b; Adeyemo and Salami, 2008).  Similarly, 
poor governance in African SOEs (commonly due to political interference) is a widely 
researched area, and many studies blame such governance for poor performance (Mwaura, 
2007; Edoun, 2015; Balbuena, 2014).  
 While all these studies contribute significantly to the debate on SOE reforms, they do not 
offer much in terms of improving SOE performance without necessarily altering their 
ownership structures, yet this remains an important dimension, given that the positive 
effects of privatisation itself are yet to be proven by empirical evidence (Shirley, 2008).   
 This essay takes a much broader view in analysing and explaining how several factors 
interact with each other to influence performance. The essay considers governance, 
resource availability, political and stakeholder interactions. It does so in a context of 
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organisational theories which, when applied to an SOE setting, tend to display some degree 
of tension towards each other.  
The study focuses on the electricity sector where the SOE business model is heavily relied 
on by almost all sub-Saharan African countries for the generation and transmission of 
electric power. Given the profound influence of socio-geo-politics on the governance (and 
ultimately on the performance outcomes) of SOEs, this study chooses an entity from a 
country in which relative political stability has been sustained over a long period of time. 
Thus, the case is based on the Botswana Power Corporation (BPC).  The BPC has been in 
operation since 1970 and provides electricity to individuals and businesses spread 
throughout the country.  
Despite a good performance history, by 2012 the BPC was nearing complete failure, heavily 
relying on government subventions to sustain core operations. During the four-year period 
of 2010 to 2014, the corporation barely satisfied the local power demand, mainly due to the 
dwindling plant availability rates and the prohibitively priced emergency power supplies.  
Such an operational performance background and history also make the BPC a unique case 
to study.  
The rest of the essay is structured as follows: section 2 gives an overview of the BPC 
followed by a review of the relevant literature, and methodology in sections 3 and 4 
respectively. Section 5 presents a detailed analysis, while section 6 concludes the 
discussion.  
5.2. Review of the literature 
 
In a generic context, performance incentives, the prevalence of the free rider problem and 
efficient performance monitoring are identified as determinants of organisational 
performance (Nayyar 1990; Putterman 1993). An SOE context, however, introduces a very 
distinct perspective with respect to performance objectives. SOEs are by nature saddled 
with both economic and social objectives, which potentially clash if not well managed. 
(Aharoni, 1981).  
Quite often SOEs are exposed to a wide spectrum of stakeholders without a unifying 
corporate governance mechanism which monitors their performance (Stan et al., 2013). 
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This, coupled with blurred agent-principal relationships has often exposed SOEs to political 
directives of no business rationale (Cuervo-Cazurra and Dau, 2009), yet at times such 
directives benefit a constituency of legitimate stakeholders (Shirley, 2008). Just as in any 
organisation, resources are identified as potential drivers of SOE performance (Bourgeois, 
1981; Tan and Peng, 2003), although they are often diverted to pet projects for political 
expediency (Stan et al., 2013).   
The widely publicised success story of the Chinese SOE sector has been attributed to good 
governance (Aivazian et al., 2005), the implementation of effective performance monitoring 
devices (Kole and Mulherin ,1997) and also as restrained political influence (Xu et al., 2001).  
 
 A number of theories exist to explain all these factors in a coherent manner and these 
include the following: agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989), 
stakeholder theory popularised by Freeman (1994), the stewardship theory (Donaldson and 
Davies, 1991; Donaldson, 1990; Barney, 1990), the public choice theory (Niskanen, 1971; 
Tullock, 1976; Krueger, 1990) and the resource-based theory (Wernerfelt, 1984). 
At the nucleus of the agency theory is a principal-agent problem that arises when managers 
subordinate the interests of the owners in pursuit of their own. Unlike with privately owned 
firms, the extent of the agent-principal problem in SOEs is less appreciated (Qian, 1996). 
This is because private owners often have a single and well-articulated objective of wealth 
maximization, whilst SOE goals can be diverse, vague and conflicting (Shirley, 2008). A 
widely held consensus is that fundamental problems in the governance of SOEs explain 
much of their poor performance (Robinett, 2006), but the extent to which this can be 
resolved through pro-agency theory models is less clear. Private owners have often resorted 
to boards of directors in dealing with the agency problem. Managerialism, supported by 
adequate reward schemes, has also become a popular approach in privately owned 
enterprises (Raelin and Bondy, 2013). Although SOEs are adopting the same approaches 
in resolving their counterproductive governance problems, important limitations remain: 
managerial incentives are often weak (Bolton, 1995), performance objectives and measures 
are frequently ill defined (Toninelli, 2000), boards are in most cases constituted from 
politically connected individuals (Toninelli, 2000) and the shareholder is usually represented 
by politicians.   
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The agency theory has been criticised for its narrow focus on owners’ interests (profit 
maximisation) to the detriment of those societal benefits which are supposed to accrue from 
enterprises (Carney et al., 2011). SOEs, by their nature are not profit maximisers, but rather 
deliver on a wide array of objectives in a self-sustaining manner (Wicaksono, 2009).   
Under the stakeholder theory, a firm’s value disposition, managerial decisions and its 
situation are shaped by legitimate stakeholder expectations. Such a view supports a 
conclusion by Carney et al., (2011) that organisations are a nexus of contracts. Thus, 
successful performance is dependent upon contracting with the right stakeholders based on 
their justified expectations.  Although supported by research (Coff, 1999; Mitchell et al., 
1997), such a view it is based on an oversimplified perception that stakeholder groups are 
homogenous. In reality, stakeholders belong to groups with contesting interests, particularly 
in the context of the SOEs, given the broad expectations different groups have of them 
(Donaldson and Preston, 1995).  
From a stewardship theory perspective, performance is driven by the existence of those 
organisational structures, including executive managerial capacity, that aid the formulation 
and execution of sound strategic plans (Donaldson, 1985). Such structures must provide 
clear and consistent role expectations, and must also authorise and empower senior 
management (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Thus, in accordance with the stewardship 
theory, boards, whilst they play an oversight function, may not solely be credited for good 
enterprise performance.  This creates a complementary perspective between the agency 
and stewardship theories supported by an observed shift in the relationship between the 
CEOs and boards from being supervisor-supervisee to a collaborative undertaking (Yang et 
al., 2009). 
 
Whilst the majority of the firm theories deal with the behavioural aspects of firm governance 
and management, the resource-based theory has taken a much wider view. The theory’s 
proponents see organisations as bundles of resources which, depending on how these are 
uniquely combined, make one firm perform better than the next (Hamel and Prahalad, 1994). 
That calls for apt entrepreneurial ability, which Conner (1991) and Raza (2012) argue is 
essential for enterprise excellence. This view has been popular amongst other researchers 
(Grant, 1991; Makhija, 2003; Wernerfelt, 1984; Hoskisson et al., 2000). In an enterprise 
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setting, business rationale dictates the acquisition and allocation of resources, with 
competition being an important stimulant of innovative thinking (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 
1998). This, however, does not always hold for SOEs, where resource allocation and 
application are both subjected to socio-political pressures beyond pure enterprise 
imperatives, (Xia and Chen 2007).  
 
The public choice theory deals with the widely publicised political influence on SOEs. The 
theory is premised on the homo-oeconomicus assumption that politicians generally act 
collectively to exploit a system in advancing their individual interests (Hill, 1999). SOEs are 
prone to such exploitation as they are overseen by politicians. Such exploitation often comes 
in the form of biased legislation (Hill, 1999) and the abuse of resources and budget 
manipulation (Fudanga and Mwaba, 2006). However, the extent to which politicians can 
completely suppress a system for personal benefit varies by circumstances. Lack of voters’ 
incentives to hold politicians accountable, and also voter ignorance, contribute immensely 
to the exploitation of SOEs by politicians (Downs, 1957; Shaw, 2008). The governance 
systems often expected to guard against political exploitation of are under the custodianship 
of the very same politicians and politically appointed boards (Mwaura, 2007).  
 
Whilst the agency theory focuses on incentives and the allocation of decision rights among 
managers and owners (Carney et al., 2011), the stakeholder theory tends to be socio-
political centric (Fligstein, 2001). Thus, the agency theory seeks a governance model which 
leads to wealth maximisation of owners, whereas a stakeholder driven model incorporates 
the interests of society. This results in a balancing problem: can enterprises maximise 
wealth whilst at the same time delivering on societal benefits? Unfortunately, due to the 
dominance of the agency theory in corporate governance research work (Raelin and Bondy, 
2013), the quest for good governance has concentrated too heavily on achieving wealth 
maximisation through managerialism. The defect of such an approach has been that other 
SOEs’ specific counter-productive relationships are overlooked, such as the inverse 
relationship between political interference and the SOE performance (Xu et al., 2001). 
Whilst resource-based theorists have argued that resources are a source of good 
performance (Grant, 1991), SOEs with vast resources tend to attract higher levels of 
exploitation by politicians for reasons of political expediency (Bozec et al., 2002). 
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5.3. An overview of the Botswana power sector 
 
The Botswana power industry has historically performed well in the sub-Saharan African 
context. Access to electricity by the rural population improved significantly from just 22% in 
2000 to 55% in 2013 (BPC, 2013). This improvement has contributed to a growth of 
electricity consumption per capita to 1,406 kWh per annum by 2008, being amongst the top 
20 in Africa (Tallapragada et al., 2009). Power connection lead times in Botswana are 20-
30 days, comparing favourably with an average of 35 days for the sub-Saharan Africa region 
(Tallapragada et al., 2009).  
However, by 2009 Botswana’s power sector was seen as a major bottleneck to sustainable 
development, failing dismally to meet local power needs (BPC, 2009). Unprecedented 
power cuts and operational inefficiencies had become a norm (Garmendia and Pushak, 
2011).  
Prior to 2007, the BPC had remained the exclusive power generator, transmitter and 
distributor in the country. Supply gaps were met with imports from neighbouring countries. 
An amendment of the Electricity Supply Act was passed in 2007 to permit the licensing of 
independent power producers to generate power.  However, the BPC retained the exclusive 
rights to purchase power from producers and distribute it to consumers. 
  
5.4. Methodology  
 
Gaining an in-depth understanding of how several variables combine to influence the 
performance of State Owned Enterprises needs to be examined within an ontological 
context. A case analysis approach presents the advantage of cutting through the 
complexities (Johansson, 2003) whilst maintaining originality and testability (Eisenhardt, 
1989).  
This essay analyses how a variety of variables have combined to determine patterns of 
performance at the BPC. This essay is primarily based on secondary data obtained from 
publicly available audited financial statements, annual reports, relevant statutes and policy 
documents. However, the study makes limited use of primary data collected through face to 
face and paper-based interviews with senior managers selected on the basis of their 
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involvement with core operations of the Corporation. These interviews were mainly for 
validation and clarification. The study focuses on a 15-year time period spanning from 2000, 
the year the Corporation’s performance (by various measures) started an impressive 
upward trend which lasted up to 2005/06 when this reversed, reaching an all-time low in 
2014. During this 15-year horizon, BPC went through phases which make the period an 
interesting one for this study.    
5.4.1. Performance measurement variables 
 
Firm performance is a widely researched area, but its measurement remains largely left to 
interpretation under a variety of settings. However, it is widely acknowledged that a more 
unifying approach to measuring firm performance would be one that consists of both 
financial and operational variables (Combs et al., 2005; Venkatraman and Ramanujan, 
1986). Despite the upsurge in popularity of financial measures of performance over the 
decades (Carton and Hofer, 2006; Richard., et al., 2009), Cameron (1986b) has put forward 
a compelling case on the relationship between financial and operational measures, arguing 
that good financial performance logically precedes good operational performance.  This 
view introduces the importance of focusing on industry-specific operational measures, 
combined with the generic financial measures in assessing organisational performance.  
 
5.5. Discussion of findings  
 
5.5.1. An overview of the BPC 
The BPC was established in 1970 by an Act of Parliament, (BPC Act: CAP 74:01) with the 
objective of generating, transmitting, supplying and distributing electricity in the country. It 
is governed by a board of directors appointed by the minister responsible for energy affairs. 
The board comprises between six and eight members, including the chairperson. In making 
board appointments, the Act requires the minister to take into account the need to cater for 
the representation of key stakeholders. 
 Since 1970, the corporation has been gradually expanding in size (in terms of headcount, 
assets, areas of operation etc.) to the latest status, as indicated in Table 5.1.  
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Table 5.1: The BPC Selected Statistics as at March 2013 
Statistic Value 
Number of employees 2,047 
Asset size in USD’000 189,130 
Number of countrywide customer service centers 24 
Annual Turnover (USD’000) 227,000 
Gross Expenditure (USD’000) 333,800 
Source: BPC 2013 Annual Report 
 
The BPC currently operates in all the 11 districts of Botswana in which it has a customer 
base of 300,000 individuals and institutions. The corporation has decentralised its sales, 
credit control, distribution and related technical and engineering functions. The rest of the 
corporate units remain centralised at its Gaborone[14] based head office, where a team of 
nine executives leads four business units (Generation, Transmission, Distribution and 
Corporate Services) and five corporate support units (Human Resources, Finance, Audit, 
Legal, Strategy).  
The analysis divides the 15-year-period covered by the study into two distinct but successive 
phases the BPC went through, i.e. the growth phase (prior to 2005) and the decline phase 
(post 2005). 
5.5.2. The growth phase 
Figures 5.1 to 5.7 below depict the corporation’s historical good performance as measured 
by a variety of indicators. [15].   
                                                          
14 Gaborone is the capital city of Botswana.  
15 Monetary values are in the local currency, Botswana Pula (BWP), whose unit is the Thebe (t).  
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 18 
                                                          
16 Total debt as a proportion of total capital employed 
17 Current assets less current liabilities 
18 Total revenue less primary costs and operational expenditures 
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The BPC has historically performed well, registering a gradual improvement in profitability 
which reached an all-time high of BWP216.6 million (USD36 million) by 2005 (see 
Figure.5.1). Revenue growth rates averaged 12% for the six years to 2005 compared to an 
average of 7.4% Gross Domestic Product growth rate for the same period [19]. Asset 
turnover, value created and return on assets gradually improved during the same period, 
with productivity as measured by revenue per employee (Figures. 5.1 and 5.3) also 
improving. The corporation’s indebtedness was declining, with the gearing levels falling from 
14% to as low as 5% by 2005 (Figure.5.4). The overall current position remained on a net 
asset (more current assets than liabilities), whose nominal value was on a consistent rise 
over the six year-period. (Figure 5.5).   
The next section of the study interrogates what drove good performance.  
Human and capital resources have been identified as a source of good firm performance 
(Grant, 1991 and Makhija, 2003). However, this should be supported by an enabling 
corporate environment, an entrepreneurial orientation and innovative thinking (Conner, 
1991; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). The resource-based view emphasises on the 
importance of control and ownership of performance driving resources (Raza, 2010).  The 
power industry has increasingly become capital intensive and technology based. Therefore, 
constant investments in intellectual capital are a prerequisite for success.  
The BPC progressively invested in capital assets from 2000 to 2005, a period during which 
the asset book value grew by 113% (see Figure.5.6). Such investments were mainly in 
transmission and distribution infrastructure which by law [20] are owned and controlled 
exclusively by the BPC. High quality transmission and distribution assets are associated 
with improved performance, reduced system losses, low repair and maintenance costs and 
also low fault levels. Investments in technologies were also made resulting in the book value 
of IT assets rising by over 70% within the six-year-period to 2005. Technological 
advancement supports efficiency and productivity. Human capacity development was a 
priority, with a fully-fledged training institute established in-house, offering a range of 
industry specific courses to a certification level. This is in addition to other staff development 
                                                          
19 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG/countries (accessed on 23 October 2014) 
20 The Electricity Act of Botswana, No.1 of 1970 
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training initiatives (including executive development and graduate trainee programmes, staff 
exchange programmes). Such initiatives presumably contributed to staff motivation and 
satisfaction given the low attrition rate of just 3% on average for the six year-period to 2005 
(Figure.5.7).  
The BPC maintained healthy liquidity levels [21], averaging five times during the six-year-
period to 200522. This was mainly driven by high levels of cash held, thus aiding the 
corporation to obtain favourable trading terms from suppliers. The ability of liquidity to drive 
firm performance has been established by a number of studies (Tang and Peng, 2003; 
Singh, 1997; Bromiley, 1991; Miller and Leiblein,1996; Hambrick and D’Aveni, 1988; 
Chudson, 1945).  Thus, during the growth phase, the availability of resources (human, 
financial and capital) drove the successful performance to a large extent. 
 
A wide ranging forum of stakeholders imposes legitimate, but conflicting interests on the 
operations of the BPC. Two schools of thoughts influence an organisation’s disposition to 
its stakeholders. The first is that stakeholder interests are to be reconciled and satisfied in 
order to achieve good overall enterprise performance (Freeman, 1994; Brenner and 
Cochran, 1991; Jones and Wicks; 1999). The second, which is supported by Heath (1994), 
Donaldson and Preston (1995), Post et al., (2002) and Simmons (2004), argues that 
stakeholder tensions are inherent in the heterogonous nature of stakeholder groups and so 
attempts to reconcile them become a fruitless exercise. During the six-year-period to 2005, 
the BPC seem to have subscribed to the latter school of thought: there was no stakeholder 
engagement strategy in place, resulting in a very narrow focus targeting only a handful of 
stakeholder groups. Board composition was biased more towards quality (skills and 
competence) rather than stakeholder representation. Corporate reporting [23] focused on 
core operations (financial outcomes, delivery on core mandate and future expansion plans), 
                                                          
21 Measured as current assets/current liabilities. It is an indicator of the extent to which an entity can meet its short-term 
obligations from its short-term assets.  
22 BPC annual reports, 2000- 2005 
23 Reviewed Annual Reports from 1999 to 2004 
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and key performance indicators were limited to financial and core operational measures, 
which were more internal in nature.     
Whilst such a narrow approach is supported by some of the literature, it potentially collides 
with the fundamentals of the stakeholder theory itself as projected by policy makers and the 
political leadership who may favour a broad-based approach. Perhaps the BPC escaped 
this counterproductive trap due to the willingness of political leaders to limit their interference 
in the affairs of the corporation during the period of growth (see Xu et al., 2001 and Bortolotti 
and Pinotti, 2008).  
Still, a non-targeted approach to pursuing stakeholder interest is associated with poor 
performance, and BPC clearly avoided that route. Thus, a significant driver to good 
performance of BPC during the growth face was deliberate segregation of stakeholder 
groups with a view to focus on stakeholder interests commensurate with sustainable 
performance objectives.    
In addition to these factors (good resource base, lack of political interference and the 
existence of an effective board), the BPC had appropriately qualified and experienced 
managers across its units.  Stewardship theorists have argued that good quality managers 
are not necessarily as opportunistic as they are taken to be by the proponents of the agency 
theory, but are instead an important variable in driving organisational performance. 
However, the existence of an enabling environment, based on established and respected 
structures and policies, is a prerequisite for good stewardship. For the entire period covered 
by the study, the BPC had in place minimum work experience and educational requirements 
for all management positions to ensure that the candidates employed were of the right 
calibre. A review of the corporation’s human resources and operational guidelines reflects 
management as having adequate authority to plan, organise and execute the organisational 
mandate in accordance with the BPC Act as there is no provision for consultation with either 
the state or board on operational matters.  
Quite clearly, BPC’s growth phase was also driven by an experienced and appropriately 
skilled leadership, working in a conducive environment characterised by fair a performance 
management and reward system.   
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Ultimately, the agency and stewardship theories operated well with the resource-based 
theory to drive the positive growth, whilst the public choice theory was underplayed mainly 
due to a non-interfering political leadership. On the surface, it would appear that a narrow 
focus on stakeholders assisted in driving good performance, but a later chapter exposes the 
limitations of this.   
5.5.3. The decline phase  
The corporation’s performance entered a phase of accelerating decline as from the 2005/06 
financial year. Below are Figures 5.8- 5.16 depicting the BPC’s performance trends during 
this phase.  
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Despite rising revenues, the BPC’s profitability started declining from 2006 when the first 
operating loss was recorded (Figure 5.9). However, for the three years to 2008 these 
operational losses were fully offset by high finance income which accrued from invested 
cash reserves. Unfortunately, a sharp decline in these reserves set in from 2009 (Figure. 
5.13). Thus, the first net loss was recorded in 2009 and rose exponentially over the years 
to reach a historically high of BWP1.5 billion (USD201 million), with negative value creation 
figures being reported as from 2011 (Figure.5.8). The BPC’s main output (power generation) 
declined to its historical lows of 250 GWh (just 7% of the total power sold for the year, with 
the 93% covered by imports). Return on assets and assets turnover rapidly declined from 
3% and 24% respectively in 2006 to -5% and 10% by 2012 along with a worsening net 
current liability of BWP 6.9 billion (over USD800 million) by the 2013/14 financial year 
(Figures 5.10 and 5.12). Staff attrition rates were on the rise as from 2006 reaching 6% in 
2009 before declining to lower levels in subsequent years (Figure.5.13). However, this 
decline has been associated with a depressed global labour market arising from the 2008 
financial crisis rather than from any circumstances specific to the BPC at that time.  
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Although very little to no political interference was established during the years prior to the 
period of declining performance, the effects of political directives were later more 
discernable and dominating throughout the period of declining performance.   
At the crux of the BPC’s declining performance were the non-cost reflective tariffs, which for 
some time had remained among the lowest in the southern African region (Tallapragada et 
al., 2009). Meanwhile, the BPC Act [24] requires that the tariffs charged by the corporation 
must enable it to cover all costs. However, the government regulates tariffs, with final 
approval given by the minister responsible for energy, after consultation with the cabinet. 
The approval is given or declined on the basis of the submission from the BPC management, 
who compute the tariffs required for the corporation to operate in a self-sustaining manner. 
Table 5.2 reflects historical submissions along with outcomes. 
Table 5.2: Historical outcomes on tariffs adjustment requests 
*Represents no evidence for requests  
During the 11-year period to 2013, the BPC made requests for full cost recovery tariffs 10 
times, but only four requests were approved. The rest were either partially approved or 
entirely rejected. In making decisions, the political leadership considers a wide range of 
dimensions beyond just commercial imperatives, including those of a socio-economic 
nature. For instance, whilst the BPC management may focus on ensuring the sustainability 
of operations through economic tariffs, such tariffs may be unaffordable to businesses and 
households, thus negating government’s wider efforts to fight other social ills like poverty 
and unemployment. 
 Another school of thought stems from the public choice theory view that politicians are self-
serving and the decisions they collectively make are for political expediency (Hill, 1999; 
Bozec et al., 2002).  Buchanan (2003) extended this theory to managers and government 
                                                          
24 Section 17 of the BPC Act No. 1 of 1970 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Tariff 
awarded as 
submitted/ 
(Yes/No) 
Yes * No Yes  No 
 
No 
 
* No Yes 
 
Yes No 
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officials who, like voters, take decisions according to electoral cycles. A probable conformity 
to this line of thought is displayed through the decisions taken by both management and 
politicians possibly to comply with wider voter expectations. No evidence on tariff request 
by the BPC management exists for the year 2003, ahead of the 2004 general elections. A 
similar pattern is observed for the year 2009, where no adjustments were approved ahead 
of the general elections in October of the same year. Whilst partial adjustments were 
awarded in 2011 and 2012, following a consultant’s recommendation for a multi-year tariff 
adjustment plan, the trend was broken in 2013 ahead of the 2014 general elections.   
Ultimately, decisions made on the basis of socio-political considerations became a 
significant driver of declining performance, given the extent of ripple effects the decisions, 
particularly those to do with tariff adjustments.  
The sub-economic tariffs had a noticeable ripple-effect on wide ranging areas, notably on 
resources on which the corporation had relied in the years prior to 2006. For instance, faced 
with costs escalating at a rate higher than revenues, reliance was placed on cash reserves 
to fund operational losses. This resulted in severe capital expenditure budget cuts, reduced 
maintenance expenditures, and a staff recruitment and salary increase moratorium as well 
as lower interest earnings. The effect of restrained capital expenditures was reflected on 
increased customer complaints and increasing system losses (Figure.5.14). Transmission 
system faults reached a peak of 311 by 2011 and this translates to loss of revenue (BPC 
Annual Report, 2011). The high failure rate at the generation plant further diminished the 
locally generated power (see Figure.5.15). The supply gap widened forcing the corporation 
to resort to highly expensive emergency power sources (diesel generated power, imported 
emergency supplies etc). The increase in staff attrition rates between 2006 and 2010 (see 
Figure.5.13) was possibly symbolic of a declining staff satisfaction. This would have been 
worsened by reduced training and development opportunities as reflected by trimmed staff 
development costs, which were a paltry BWP0.76 million (USD0.09 million) by 2014 
compared to an average of BWP4.1 million (USD0.66 million) registered in the years prior 
to 2008[25].  
                                                          
25 BPC audited annual financial statements for year 2000 – 2013 
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Earlier on, this essay acknowledged and demonstrated the central role the resources owned 
and controlled by the BPC had played in driving its performance during the years prior to 
2006. However, resources are a performance driver only to the extent to which they are 
sustained (Raza, 2010; Majumdar, 1996). Sub-economic tariffs, which were linked to 
political administrative process meant that the rate at which resources were being 
accumulated was diminishing, eventually leading to a depletion and deterioration of such 
resources.  
The result was multi-faced; the corporation could not fund the much needed capital 
investments from internally generated resources, since these were being diverted to fund 
operational losses. Moreover, the ability to attract and retain talent was also impaired.  
Much as a good base of BPC owned and controlled resources drove organisational 
performance on an impressive growth trend, the severe curtailment of such resources 
(aging equipment, lost talent, depleted cash, etc) became a significant driver of the decline 
in performance.    
Despite the existence of a strong board and competent stewards, the corporation could not 
sustain its performance due to either depleted or significantly impaired resources. Since the 
deterioration of the resource base resulted from an event directly linked to a political 
process, an important question arises regarding the ability of both the management and the 
board to influence such a process effectively for the benefit of the enterprise. It would seem 
that they were either unable or simply unwilling to do so for several reasons. Most 
importantly, BPCs stakeholder engagement was unclear and, if anything, too narrowly 
focused, hence there was not a formal mechanism of reacting to stakeholder interest 
induced pressures in a manner that would not compromise enterprise performance. The 
narrow stakeholder focus itself has the potential to attract political interference.  
Ultimately, the agency and the stewardship theories cannot explain good enterprise 
performance in isolation from the resource-based theory. Above all, the public choice theory 
superseded over other theories. A further crucial consideration is that an undue focus on a 
very narrow stakeholder base can be viewed as myopic and against the broader SOE 
corporate objectives, but an indiscriminate attempt to satisfy all interests could be 
detrimental to long-term sustainability. Therefore, a framework based balance is necessary.  
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5.5.4. Key responses to the deepening crisis  
As a means of turning around the corporation, various aspects were overhauled and radical 
changes introduced through a new business model which came into effect in 2007. Central 
to the changes was a redefinition of the corporation’s mission, vision and values which were 
made more responsive to the needs of a broadened stakeholder base.   
A ‘corporate turnaround strategy’ was formulated to serve as the cornerstone of crisis 
response. Its key aspects are outlined in Table 5.3.  
Table 5.3: An outline of the BPC Corporate Turnaround Strategy 
Broad theme Typical choices and actions Theory alignment 
Cash generation 
and preservation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
New business 
generation 
 
 
Business process 
re-engineering 
 
 Ramping up tariffs 
 Obtaining revenue grants from 
government (through subsidising 
tariffs) 
 Selling off non-core assets 
 Cost cutting across budget lines, 
including no adjustment to salaries 
 
 Selling excess fibre optic capacity 
to third party telecommunications 
operators 
 
 System integration and interface 
 Increased debt collection 
Resource-based 
 
Business process 
re-engineering 
 
 A re-organisation of the value chain 
 Staff rationalisation 
 Reformulation of the organisational 
structure 
Stewardship/Agency 
Enhanced human 
resource 
performance 
 Job profiling and redesigning 
Agency/Resource-based 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 125 
 
 A new staff performance 
management and monitoring 
system 
 Contracts for senior management 
Improving 
stakeholder 
relations 
 Debtors and creditors 
 Government (shareholder) 
 Communities 
 Restatement of Mission and Values 
Stakeholder  
 
The broad themes of the Turnaround Strategy were influenced by four theories: the 
resource-based, stewardship, agency and stakeholder theories. From a resource-based 
view, additional cash, being a primary source of liquidity (Hoskisson et al., 2000), was to be 
raised through the disposal of non-value adding assets and savings accruing from re-
engineered business processes. New business lines were to bring in additional revenue.  
The work of the stewards was enhanced by means of a re-organised value chain with more 
authority being delegated to business line executives and senior managers. Influenced by 
an agency theory perspective, the board introduced management contracting alongside a 
revamped performance management system.    
To support the visibly widened stakeholder focus, a theme specifically dealing with 
improving stakeholder relations was incorporated into the Turnaround Strategy, aiming to 
depart from the narrow focus disposition noted in the earlier years.  
Table 5.3 depicts a leadership which saw the importance of, and the need to prioritise 
resources (mainly human and financial) in an effort to turnaround the declining performance. 
This signifies the importance management placed on skills, revenues, cash and related 
resources in driving performance. Governance also received attention, wherein executive 
performance contracts were introduced.    
Although a slowdown in the deterioration of certain performance measures (profitability, 
value creation and return) is observable as from 2012 (see Figures 5.8 to 5.12), a widely 
held sentiment was that the results of the turnaround strategy were not as intended. The 
possible reasons are analysed from different theoretical perspectives.  
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Earlier on it was argued that a careful balance is required in managing stakeholder interests, 
failing which performance is compromised (see Heath, 2004). The stakeholder aspects of 
the strategy contained some fundamental flaws which impacted on performance. Improving 
stakeholder relations introduced lenience towards debtors through a more relaxed credit 
control policy. Customers with overdue accounts were given an option to negotiate extended 
settlement periods beyond the established 15-day period free of penalties. This 
compounded into a growing debtor book characterised by increasing impairment provisions 
(Figure 5.16). Meanwhile, improving relations with creditors entailed enforcing shorter 
creditor days. Extended debtor days combined with shorter creditor days imposed an 
obvious strain on the corporation’s working capital.  
The stakeholder centric strategy also saw the BPC buying into a multi-year tariff adjustments 
(as opposed to steep and decisive adjustments). However, due to the affordability 
consideration, the adjustments consistently fell below the requisite levels, with a 
compounding effect on the cost-tariff gap.  
Unfortunately, a defined stakeholder strategy only confirmed the downside of the 
stakeholder theory, that is, a pursuit of divergent stakeholder interests has a negative impact 
on firm performance (Shirley 2008). A weak credit control framework, increased scope for 
political interference and socio-political orientated financial planning practices among others 
are key components of the BPC defined stakeholder strategy, and these prove to be 
significant drivers of performance deterioration.     
Whilst from a stakeholder perspective the BPC identified the government as a key 
stakeholder with whom relations had to be improved, the public choice connotations 
attached to government ownership were not sufficiently addressed. The fundamental issue 
of the separation of ownership rights from matters of regulation (for example: setting of tariffs 
and decisions on investments) were not explicitly built into the Turnaround Strategy. Thus, 
the political leadership continued to exercise ownership powers to cater for broader societal 
interests, but with unintended consequences on the corporation’s performance patterns.      
Whilst the stewards and the board of the BPC had identified a telecommunications business 
as a potential revenue generator, given the excess optic fibre capacity the corporation 
owned, the political leadership, acting in the interest of the rural area based stakeholders, 
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directed that the corporation venture into an unprofitable, but worthy business of providing 
solar-based heating and lighting solutions. The viability of this entity was in doubt right from 
inception, with a 100% impairment provision against its value on the BPC books on its first 
year of operation (BPC Annual Report, 2011).  
Ultimately, management intentions were not fully realised mainly as a result of pronounced 
political interference and the related insistence on socio- economic aspirations at the 
expense of sustainability. Once again, more resources were lost (including key skills), and 
too few could be attracted and created. Thus, the implementation of the turnaround strategy 
was in itself flawed as key drivers of success were lacking, these being adequate resources 
owned and controlled, skilled workforce, minimised political interference as well as a 
targeted approach to pursuing stakeholder interests.    
Fundamental issues arise from the post-turnaround era of the BPC, being the lack of clarity 
of the SOE objectives, relationships between the SOE and the government, the balancing 
of stakeholder interests and the regulation of political interference and influence. It is a fair 
assumption that these are the critical issues upon which the success of this strategy relied.  
From an agency theory perspective, agents and the board would have delivered well on 
their objectives, provided corporate goals were clear. A balanced and well thought-out 
approach to stakeholder interests would have provided better guidance on how to service 
the different societal segments. From a public choice perspective, the discord between 
political directives and corporate performance would have been avoided by a combination 
of two factors: 1) clear SOE objectives; and 2) a regulated framework of relations between 
the government and the SOE.    
5.6. Conclusions and policy implications 
 
This essay presents a new perspective on how various organisational theories combine and 
compete to influence the performance of an SOE. The perspective is drawn from analysing 
qualitative and quantitative data from the BPC over a 15-year-period. The analysis discerns 
and explains fundamental performance drivers in the context of some popular organisational 
theories.  
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It reveals that the resource-based, agency and stewardship theories combine well to explain 
the positive performance of the BPC. An uncoordinated focus on the stakeholder theory 
connotations contributed to poor enterprise performance. On the other hand, an excessively 
narrow focus potentially clashes with the public choice theory. This calls for a careful choice 
of stakeholder interests to cater for in the normal course of business. Nonetheless, the public 
choice theory predominates others, with a potential for undermining the performance if the 
SOE-government relations are not governed in a well-articulated framework that regulates 
political interference and influence.  
This case reveals that an SOE’s opportunity for enhanced performance is realised when its 
relations with the government are clearly defined, with regulatory matters separated from 
ownership rights. Different stakeholders’ rights need to be approached with different models, 
for example, through service contracts between the state and the SOE.   
Given the expansive nature of the objectives of SOEs, the analysis supports a case for a 
broadened view of the agency theory to reconcile traditional shareholder-centric interests 
with those of the wider society. Such a societal-shareholder approach to the governance 
and administration of SOEs would further contribute to the crafting of a balanced approach 
to the stakeholder engagement. Similarly, the narrow self-interest view of the public choice 
theory is challenged as the case demonstrates a residual societal benefit arising from 
political intervention, beyond the much publicised self-serving nature of politicians.  
Formal remuneration perks of SOE managers are often linked to public sector salaries. 
There exist various ranges of other fringe benefits such managers enjoy, and these are 
often industry-specific and in most cases informal. Given the proven ability of strong reward 
systems in resolving the agency problem, a unique opportunity exists to formalise the 
otherwise informal perks and make up for the depressed managerial reward schemes in 
SOEs. Such a practice would enhance the position of SOEs in attracting high quality human 
resources from the labour markets to run successful SOEs in an environment of 
performance contracts and suitable reward schemes.    
The non-economic objectives of SOEs are often too important to be overlooked, but they 
are in most cases responsible for the collapse of SOEs. A solution lies in subjecting SOE 
investments and operational initiatives to a sustainability hurdle, below which the state has 
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to contract and bear the costs of sub-economic but crucial investments on an arm’s length 
basis.  
Similarly, separating state politics from SOEs has proven to be almost exclusively a 
theoretical undertaking with no practical reality. Political influence on SOEs, typically 
through the government is not necessarily undesirable, but is a phenomenon that needs to 
be regularised through an appropriate regulatory framework monitored through supervisory 
boards. The state influence has to be limited to matters of policy, whilst independent boards 
hire competent senior managers to drive the operational strategies of SOEs in a sustainable 
manner. SOE objectives, once clearly defined and contracted to by the state and boards, 
through appropriate performance contracts should guide effective resource allocation in 
relation to an order or priority.  
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CHAPTER SIX: PERFORMANCE OF SOEs: EVIDENCE ON THE 
BOTSWANA TELECOMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION26 
 
6.1. Introduction 
  
This essay uses an African case study to examine drivers of State Owned Enterprises 
performance. SOEs continue to maintain a strong presence in Africa, particularly in the sub- 
Saharan Africa where they operate virtually in all sectors (Kikeri and Kolo, 2006). SOEs 
dominate infrastructural sectors in which heavy capital requirements serve as a disincentive 
                                                          
26 Accepted for publication and forthcoming in the International Journal of Social Economics 
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for private investors in the less developed world (Bozec et al., 2002), it is therefore not 
surprising that their relevance and importance remain largely uncontested (Boko and 
Yuanjan, 2011).    
Despite this, the poor performance of SOEs is a widely publicised subject (Villalonga, 2000; 
Fudanga and Mwaba, 2006; Mwaura, 2007). Such a chequered history of performance has 
sparked wide-ranging debates which in turn have informed variations to the SOE business 
model that governments continue to explore and implement, notably privatisation which has 
become the most popular alternative over the past decades (Bozec et al., 2002). 
Unfortunately, a number of studies have not been conclusive on the effectiveness of such 
alternatives as a solution to poor SOE performance (Villalonga, 2000).  On the contrary, 
more conclusive studies have shown that SOEs can improve performance without 
necessarily changing ownership structures (Aivazian et al., 2005; Etukudo, 1997; Bozec et 
al., 2002; Moushibahou, 2010). This then questions the validity of the generalised view that 
there is something inherently wrong with the SOE business model.  Rather, an emerging 
view could be that SOEs do perform well if adequate attention is given to the right variables 
of good performance. However, there is insufficient understanding of what combination of 
variables could positively influence the performance of SOEs and this essay seeks to 
contribute to an enhanced understanding in this respect. This work takes an SOE specific 
focus in identifying a combination of factors (amongst these are the governance related, 
political involvement, resource availability and stakeholder disposition), each considered in 
the context of organisational theories that need to be an area of focus if SOE performance 
is to be improved without an element of privatisation.    
Organisational performance is often analysed and predicted in the context of certain popular 
organisational theories. Still, a direct application of such theories to the unique case of SOEs 
in a quest to explain their often meagre performance has not yielded much consensus. The 
unique case of SOEs calls for special attention to be given to how these theories combine 
with each other to ultimately determine a performance trend.  
 
Various organisational factors have been relied on in explaining and predicting 
organisational performance including: the agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Eisenhardt, 1989) through effective boards, the resource-based theory (Wernerfelt, 1984) 
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wherein organisations own and control strategic resources, the stakeholder theory 
(Freeman, 1994) through stakeholder-centric board appointments and also the public choice 
theory (Niskanen, 1971; Tullock, 1976; Krueger 1990) through undue political interference.  
However, the extent to which such theoretical underpinnings can aid the understanding of 
firm performance in the context of SOEs remains an unexplored area (Bozec et al., 2002). 
In addition, the interplay of the various theories in explaining the performance of SOEs is a 
unique phenomenon often overlooked in research, and consequently, most studies have 
relied on single theories in interrogating organisational performance. However, the 
complexity of SOEs demands a broader based approach; by their nature they are often 
uniquely modelled around political cycles. Restrained political involvement and a good 
aptitude of the boards have been identified as key enablers for enhanced performance 
amongst hundreds of Chinese SOEs (Xu et al., 2001), while more recent studies have 
identified slack as a critical success factor for SOEs (Stan, 2013; Liu et al., 2013; Li, Peng 
and Macaulay, 2013).   
SOEs by their nature operate in a distinctive setting often characterised by political 
influence, competing but legitimate stakeholder interests and flawed governance structures. 
This setting tends to imply a tension between some popular organisational theories such as 
the public choice, stakeholder and the agency theories. Although performance contracts are 
widely recognised for their positive influence on organisational performance, the empirical 
evidence on their effectiveness in SOEs is inconclusive. A study analysing the effects of 
performance contracts on productivity and financial performance of monopolistic SOEs in 
Ghana, Senegal, India, Mexico, South Korea and the Philippines found no positive 
correlation (Shirley, 2008). Perhaps this is not surprising: the success of performance 
contracts invariably hinges on a supportive governance framework, typical of the pro-agency 
theory where effectiveness is diluted with heightened political interference and the pressure 
to maximise these social benefits often associated with SOEs (Mwaura, 2007).     
Most of the studies (Nayyar, 1990; Putterman, 1993; Xu et al., 2001; Stan et al., 2013; 
Mwaura, 2007; Shirley, 2013) and many others have analysed SOE performance factors in 
isolation. None of these studies adequately addresses the issue of SOE performance from 
a perspective of combined several factors. A similar deficiency is observed in studies that 
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review the performance of African SOEs, with quite a number focusing on the effects of 
privatisation pressures and commercialisation (Godana and Hlatshwayo, 1998; Nellis, 2005; 
Nellis, 2005b; Adeyemo and Salami, 2008).  Similarly, poor governance in African SOEs is 
a widely researched area, for which many studies blame this for poor performance (Mwaura, 
2007; Edoun, 2015; Balbuena, 2014).  
 While all these studies contribute immensely to the debate on SOE reforms, they do not 
offer much in terms of improving SOE performance without necessarily altering ownership 
structures of SOEs, yet this remains an important dimension, given that the positive effects 
of privatisation itself are yet to be proven by empirical evidence (Shirley, 2008).   
 This essay takes a holistic approach in analysing SOE performance. The approach involves 
identifying a combination of the notable organisational factors which are public choice, 
stakeholder, resource-based and the agency theories which together assist in the 
explanation of SOE performance.     
The sub-Saharan Africa telecommunications sector presents an interesting picture to study. 
The sector has experienced an unprecedented growth over the last decade, mainly fuelled 
by rapidly changing technology, deregulation and convergence. Annual telecommunications 
infrastructure investments have surged from USD 2.7 billion in 2000 to USD 12 billion a 
decade later (Moshi et al., 2013).  Despite the promising picture, investment outcomes into 
the sector in Africa have been sub-optimal (Esselaar et al., 2007) particularly those 
managed by SOEs (Moshi et al., 2013). Nonetheless, two classes of SOEs emerge from 
this picture: SOEs that have performed very well and those that have not performed so well. 
This essay choses a case of good performance to investigate the factors underlying such a 
result. 
This study selects a country of relative political and economic stability for its case. Botswana 
has gradually effected progressive and exemplary telecommunications policy reforms 
during the last two decades (Esselaar et al., 2007; Monnane, 2003; ITU, 2014). The 
country’s largest telecommunications operator, the Botswana Telecommunications 
Corporation (BTC) remains an SOE. Partly reacting to industrial reforms, the corporation 
has over the past two decades gone through different dimensions in terms of strategy, 
structures, and business focus, thus making it a good case for this study.  
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The rest of this essay is organised as follows: Section two presents a literature review 
followed by an overview of the Botswana telecommunications sector in section three. 
Section four covers methodology followed by the analysis and conclusion in sections five 
and six respectively. References are listed in section seven. 
6.2. Literature review 
 
Nayyar (1990) and Putterman (1993) suggest three aspects that influence SOE 
performance. These are corporate incentives, efficiency in monitoring mechanisms and the 
economy-wide free rider problem. Faced with two distinctive dimensions of performance, 
i.e.  financial and social (Aharoni, 1981), SOEs in theory are owned by, and report to a wide 
spectrum of stakeholders without a unifying corporate governance mechanism which 
monitors their performance (Stan et al., 2013). This does not only create a gap in their 
performance drivers, but also results in undue political exposure (Cuervo-Cazurra and Dau, 
2009).  Resources are also identified as potential drivers of firm performance if these are 
applied to adapt to business imperatives (Bourgeois, 1981; Tan and Peng, 2003), although 
this proposition is challenged in the SOE sector, as critical resources are often diverted to 
pet projects (Stan et al., 2013).   
Although the majority of the existing literature has outlined the inefficiencies prevalent in 
SOEs, the empirical evidence from the success story of Chinese SOEs has suggested the 
following factors as contributing to their successful turnaround: good internal governance 
structures (Aivazian et al., 2005), availability and implementation of effective performance 
monitoring devices (Kole and Mulherin ,1997); and minimised political intervention (Xu et 
al., 2001).  
 
Broader policy issues have also been frequently referred to in explaining good SOE 
performance, typically privatisation and commercialisation (Bozec et al., 2002 and 
Villalonga, 2000). Quite interestingly though, there is still no empirical evidence to support 
conclusively the much publicised positive effects of privatisation (Shirley, 2008), but rather 
SOEs have shown noticeable improvements in performance in periods leading to 
privatisation and not necessarily thereafter (Aivazian et al., 2005; Etukudo, 1997; Bozec et 
al., 2002; Moushibahou, 2010). Such an ability of the privatisation pressure to influence 
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good performance in turn supports the views of Villalonga, (2000) that good SOE 
performance can be achieved, given a focus on the right factors.  
 
The preceding discussion reveals the relevance of the following organisational theories to 
the debates on SOE performance; the agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Eisenhardt, 1989), the stakeholder theory popularised by (Freeman, 1994), the public 
choice theory (Niskanen, 1971; Tullock, 1976 and Krueger 1990) and the resource-based 
theory (Wernerfelt, 1984). 
The existence of the agency problem is widely acknowledged (Jensen and Meckling,1976; 
Haugen and Senbet, 1981; Etukudo, 1997; Toninelli and Levy, 2001). The problem 
emanates from an agent-principal based context, where principals engage agents to run 
enterprises, only for the latter to pursue self-interests which often conflict with he 
performance goals of the principals (Ross, 1973). Consequently, entities that effectively deal 
with this problem stand to perform better than those which do not. The literature has 
suggested a number of mechanisms to achieve this, including: the appointment of effective 
independent boards, managerial performance incentives and awarding ownership stakes to 
management (Rosenstein and Wayatt, 1990; Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Shirley, 1998; 
Heath, 2009; Raelin and Bondy, 2013). Still, corporate governance literature does not 
adequately address the uniqueness of SOEs from the perspective of resolving the agency 
problem (Toninelli, 2000); which involves problems with identification of the principal (Li and 
Xia, 2007), inadequacy of managerial incentives (Bolton, 1995), vague performance goals 
(Toninelli, 2000), and governance structures which are tied to political cycles (Toninelli, 
2000).  
 
Perhaps a deficient aspect in the agency theory is that it over-emphasises internal 
behavioural aspects of the firm, and ignores pertinent issues in the outside environment. As 
a result, the, external influences exerted by various interest groups are passed over whereas 
in reality, the management and administration of SOEs is largely exposed to a myriad of 
stakeholder demands (Agguilera and Jackson, 2003).   
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The issue of stakeholders and their interests in enterprises is addressed under the 
stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1994). According to this theory, better organisational 
outcomes are achieved if the legitimate interests of all stakeholder groups are considered 
when crafting business and operational strategies (Freeman, 1984; Wood and Jones, 1995; 
Armah et al., 2009). However, SOEs often have to deal with a wide range of stakeholder 
groups with conflicting interests almost impossible to reconcile (Heath, 2004). Seemingly 
homogenous stakeholder groups are often made up of heterogeneous subjects (Carney et 
al., 2011) with divergent but legitimate interests. Several authors such as Donaldson and 
Preston, (1995) and Wicaksono, (2009)   have accepted that, contrary to the generic 
fundamentals of the stakeholder theory, good performance of SOEs is eroded in chasing 
too many conflicting stakeholder interests.  
The public choice theory on the other hand projects politicians as self-serving individuals 
who thrive on the weaknesses of mechanisms meant to monitor their performance (Shaw, 
2008). The theory is premised on the homo-oeconomicus assumption that politicians are 
social rent seekers acting collectively to exploit a system (Hill, 1999). In an enterprise 
context, the dominance of the public choice theory connotations has been found to be 
dependent on how well organisational systems and structures permit or prevent the 
realisation of individual preferences at the expense of corporate performance (Hill, 1999).  
SOE governance and management structures are often exposed to political processes, 
typically boards and CEOs who are appointed through political offices. This then creates 
doubt as to their ability to deal effectively with political manipulation, and reflects the 
importance of political will in minimising interference (Xu et al., 2001; Bortolotti and Pinotti, 
2008).  Market liberation and independent industry regulation are often important steps in 
demonstrating such a will (Bortolotti; Pinotti, 2008). However, politicians have been blamed 
for a catallactic approach to industry regulation (Hill, 1999) under which the motive is to craft 
legislation that favours and further political interests, although doubt has been expressed as 
to the extent to which such an approach is achievable (Hertog, 2010).  
From a resource-based view, good organisational performance results from a good 
combination of high quality resources and internal innovative capacities (Wernerfelt, 1984). 
Thus, resources include tangible capital assets as well as those skills and managerial 
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competencies that a firm acquires over time (Hoskisson et al., 2000).  Two key pre-
conditions are necessary for leveraging on resources for better performance and these are 
sustainability of, and control over those resources (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998; Raza, 
2012). An SOE’s ability to control resources and apply them in a sustainable manner is a 
matter often exposed to political determination (Bortolotti and Pinotti, 2008), as the very 
same resources are often abused for political expediency (Mwaura, 2007).  
In the ultimate analysis, the agency theory provides a cornerstone conceptual framework 
on which firm governance is based. Thus, the quest for effective boards and willingness of 
principals to incur monitoring costs has been perceived to ensure agents pursue the owner’s 
interest. Such interests in SOE context remain less clear due to the wide ranging and often 
ambiguous corporate goals and this often impacts negatively on available resources. Most 
importantly, SOEs operate in a politically exposed environment, and as such, their 
governance models and their resources are often at the mercy of politicians, who at least 
from a public choice theoretical view point, may push for seemingly counterproductive 
agendas.   
6.2.1. An overview of the Botswana telecommunications sector and BTC 
 
6.2.1.1. The Botswana Telecommunications Sector in brief 
 
Historically the telecommunications industry was operated and regulated through the public 
sector until the formation of a specialised SOE (BTC) in 1980, which took over all the 
aspects of operations. BTC operated as a monopoly offering mainly fixed line telephony, but 
with a limited range of other services which included switchboard technologies and fax-
based services.   
 
A telecommunications policy was introduced in 1995 to address ‘a growing unsatisfied 
demand for telecommunications services in both urban and rural areas and among 
businesses as well as households’27. Three national goals influenced the architecture of the 
telecommunications policy, namely:  universal service, efficient services and regional 
                                                          
27 The Telecommunications Policy for Botswana, December 1995. Ministry of Work, Transport and 
Communications 
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balance. At the nucleus of the policy were the modalities of liberalising the 
telecommunications industry on the basis of efficiency induced competition, transparency, 
fair regulation and separated powers for industry operation and policy formulation. Following 
the adoption of the telecommunications policy, parliament28 passed a Telecommunications 
Act in 1996 29  establishing a telecommunications regulatory authority, the Botswana 
Telecommunications Authority (BTA) 30 . Its functions included 31  overseeing market 
competition, tariff setting, the safeguarding of customer interests and sector supervision. 
BTA was to be led by a board of five members appointed by, or with the consent of, the 
government through the ministers responsible for telecommunications, finance and trade32. 
The initial capital for the authority was provided by the government, whilst subsequent 
operational costs were funded through licence fees payable by telecommunications 
operators. 
Due to a need to broaden the scope of telecommunications regulation in the country, the 
1996 Telecommunications Act was replaced with a Communications Regulatory Act33 in 
2012. Under the new Act34, the BTA changed its name to the Botswana Communications 
Regulatory Authority (BOCRA) with an expanded mandate over the regulation of 
telecommunications. The size of the board of the new regulatory body was expanded from 
five to seven and powers to appoint members were restricted to the minister responsible for 
communications35.   
 
6.2.2.1. An overview of BTC 
 
BTC was established as a monopoly in 1980 through an act of parliament36 to ‘provide, 
develop, operate and manage Botswana’s national and international telecommunications 
                                                          
28 Under Botswana laws, the Parliament, which is made up of elected members of the National Assembly 
(each representing a constituency) is the law-making body 
29 Telecommunications Act, No. 15 of 1996 
30 Section 3, Telecommunications Act, No. 15 of 1996 
31 Section 17, Telecommunications Act, No. 15 of 1996 
32 Section 4, Telecommunications Act, No. 15 of 1996 
33 Communications Regulatory Act No.19 of 2012 
34 Section 95, Communications Regulatory Act No.19 of 2012 
35 The new act omits the definition of the minister; it is not clear if this is by error. 
36 Botswana Telecommunications Act No.3 of 1980 
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services’. As a result of the 1996 market liberalization, BTC faced indirect competition as 
from 1998 when two mobile operators were issued licences to operate. These were Mascom 
Wireless (Pty) Ltd and Vista Cellular (now Orange Botswana (Pty) Ltd). The two operators 
however relied on transmission links provided exclusively by BTC which still remained in the 
fixed line telephony as the sole provider. 
 
In 2004 a further market liberalisation lifted the restriction on the provision of Voice Over 
Internet Protocol (VoIP) and permitted mobile operators to self-provide transmission links. 
This led to a marginal loss of revenue to BTC. In 2007 BTC was issued a Public 
Telecommunications Operator (PTO) license thus permitting it to enter into the mobile 
telephone market, which it successfully completed in 2008, with the launch of a 100% owned 
mobile network operator, Be mobile (Pty) Ltd.  
 
BTC is governed by a board of directors appointed on a merit basis by the minister 
responsible for communications. The five to seven member board is led by a chairperson 
appointed by the minister, who also appoints a Chief Executive Officer. There is a provision 
for three sub-committees of the board, namely Finance and Audit, Human Resources and 
Tender committees, made up of members of the main board, but with an option to co-opt 
independent members.  Under the current management structures, the corporation has five 
executives.  
 
The corporation has over the years operated under dynamic structures and strategies which 
have evolved with time in response to the dynamics of the industry itself. To date BTC 
remains one of the few SOEs in Botswana that have sustained long periods of good 
performance (Botswana Budget Speeches, 2005, 2007, 2010, 2014, 2015), and has 
achieved significant growth over time. Below is a summary of selected statistics of the 
corporation as at the end of its 2012 financial year (31st March 2012): 
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Table 6.1: BTC Selected Statistics as at 31st March 2012 
Statistic Value 
Number of employees 1,246 
Total Access lines 142,000 
Asset size in USD’000 0.27 billion 
Annual Turnover (USD’000) 0.13 billion 
Source: BTC 2012 Annual Report 
 
BTC fares comparatively well against its privately owned competitors in terms of a number 
of indicators including billing errors, network reliability, superior financial performance and 
competitive pricing and product packaging. However, BTC marginally lags behind in fault 
response times and slow bandwidth connectivity, while it remains at par with competition on 
call set-up success and network availability rates, averaging 95% and 99% respectively37.  
 
6.3. Methodology 
 
Gaining an in-depth understanding of how several variables combine to influence an SOE’s 
performance needs to be examined within an ontological context. A case study approach 
presents an advantage of cutting through the complexities of each case (Johansson, 2003) 
whilst maintaining originality and testability (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
This essay adopts a descriptive approach in analysing a variety of factors that have 
combined to determine fundamental patterns of performance at the BTC. The analysis is 
primarily based on the data obtained from publicly available audited financial statements, 
annual reports, relevant statutes and policy documents. However, this was supplemented 
by questionnaire based interviews with senior officials in the finance and strategy divisions, 
mainly to validate the views formulated from secondary sources of data. The interviews were 
conducted during a time of collating and conducting an initial analysis on data collected from 
secondary sources.  
                                                          
37 Source: Botswana Telecommunications Authority (BTA) Annual Reports. BTA is the telecommunications industry regulator 
formed in 1996. In 2013 it changed its name to the Botswana Communications Regulatory Authority (BOCRA) following an 
enactment of a 2012 act of parliament which broadened its scope. 
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The study considers an 18-year period spanning from 1995 to 2012. The year 1995 marked 
the beginning of extensive changes in the telecommunications industry, prompting gradual 
but comprehensive organisational transformation within the BTC, lasting until 2012 when 
the corporation was ushered in for a privatisation initially scheduled for 2013. This makes 
the period 1995 to 2012 an interesting one for the study.     
6.3.1. Performance measurement variables 
 
The concept of firm performance has attracted a variety of views in the field of organisational 
science. A broad consensus, though, has been that a more reflective approach is one which 
incorporates both financial and operational measures (Ketchen and Bergh, 2005; 
Venkatraman and Ramanujan,1986). As a result of universality and precision revenues, 
profitability and a range of business ratios (including the return based) have emerged as 
very popular financial measures across various studies (Carton and Hofer, 2006; Richard 
et al., 2009). On the other hand, there is a potentially valid argument that operational 
performance is an antecedent of financial performance (Cameron, 1986b). For this reason, 
operational performance measurers need to be specific to the industry and firm.     
 
Given the broad nature of factors outlined as influencing SOE performance, studies in this 
subject have adopted a wider spectrum of performance measurers, and in line with the 
literature, these often incorporate both financial and non-financial aspects (e.g. Aivazian, et 
al., 2005; Bozec, et al., 2002; Li and Xia, 2007). This essay adopts broad performance 
measurers covering financial (revenue and profitability) and non-financial outcomes (access 
lines per employee and staff development). The selection of non-financial measures in 
particular is influenced by the non-financial performance goals of SOEs.  
 
Specifically, the study selects the following measures: 
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Table 6.2: Performance Measurers 
Performance Measure Description 
Revenue  Total income from core operations 
Profitability Net income before Interest38 
Revenue per employee Total income from core operations/average number of 
employees 
Assess lines Average number of customer lines  
Access lines per employee Average number of access lines/ average number of employees 
Revenue per asset Total income from core operations/average assets (in Pula 
amounts) 
Key business ratios Earnings per share, Return on Equity,  
 
 
Since the study considers a continuous 18-year period, the analysis is based on year on 
year trends. The qualitative data collected is used to explain theoretical underpinnings as 
follows: 
 
 
Table 6.3: Variables and underpinning theory 
Theory Factors considered  
Agency  Board effectiveness, relationship between board and management, 
Experience, qualifications and attendance record of board members 
 Performance management and measurement mechanisms in place 
(including management contracts) 
 Reward schemes in place 
Resource-based  Liquidity, asset base, strategic licenses (and other intangible resources) 
Stakeholder  Extent of stakeholder diversity in boards 
 Stakeholder focus in crafting business and operational strategies 
 Nature of non-economic transactions 
Public choice  The link between political choices and corporate goals 
 The legal and regulatory environment 
 Extent of political directives in company operations 
 Level and nature of consultation with Ministry authorities in resource 
allocation and price setting 
 Nature of non-economic transactions 
 
 
 
                                                          
38 BTC is a tax exempt enterprise.   
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6.4. Analysis 
 
6.4.1. Enterprise performance 
 
Examination of the BTC case, is aimed at determining which theoretical postulations best 
explain the good performance that the corporation has been able to sustain over time. In 
doing so, the study extends the analysis beyond BTC operations to consider salient issues 
which came with the 1995 telecommunications policy and its resultant industrial regulations 
which started in 1996.  
Figures 6.1 to 6.9 are presented below, depicting broad based performance trends of BTC 
over the period on 1995–2012. 
 
Financial indicators 
 
 
 
 
Productivity indicators and key ratios 
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Figure 6.2: Profitability
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Figure 6.4: Access lines per employee
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Investment in resources 
 
 
 
For the 18-year period covered by the study, BTC registered overall impressive results 
measured in terms of revenues and profitability (see Figures 6.1 and 6.2), whilst employee 
and asset productivity have been consistently maintained at rising levels (see Figures 6.3 
to 6.5). The corporation was also doing well in a number of business indicators (see Figure 
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Figure  6.7: Net cash inflows and capital investments
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6.6). This relatively good performance of BTC was realised at a time when other key SOEs 
within Botswana were not consistent in their performance39.  
 
However, a temporary decline was experienced between 2000 and 2003 (see Figures 6.1, 
6.2 and 6.6). Among others, sentiments expressed by interviewees over the declining 
performance were that the enterprise was not timely in responding to new market dynamics. 
This is also evident in a 2007 Botswana Telecommunications sector review which cites 
isolated cases of inefficiencies as a contributory factor in the periods prior to 200440. A poorly 
implemented billing system in 2000 resulted in high scale errors which in turn led to a rift 
between BTC and a large number of its customers. This occurred at a time when two new 
market entrants41 (mobile phone operators) were stabilising their operations and competing 
for the same customer base as BTC, with a corresponding effect on the corporation’s 
revenues (see Figure 6.1). 
 
However, the corporation was able to return to good performance, and below there is an 
analysis of key performance drivers.   
A good resource base was a major contributing factor in driving the good performance at 
the BTC, and there is an observed resource-based theory influence on management’s 
approach to crafting and rolling out business strategies and responding to the temporary 
decline (see Peteraf, 1993; Majumdar, 1996; Raza, 2010; Hoskisson et al., 2000). This is 
discernable from the incremental investments the corporation made in various aspects of its 
resource base, including human capabilities, monetary and capital. This is depicted in 
Figures 6.7 to 6.9.  
First, the regulatory changes that came into effect in 1996 invariably influenced the way BTC 
operated, notably through the introduction of competition. Part of the BTC’s response was 
demonstrated through a marked growth in the total asset base between 1996 and 2002 
averaging at 63% (see Figures 6.7 and 6.9). This was accompanied by a growth in staff 
                                                          
39 Annual Reports of Botswana Power Corporation, Air Botswana, Botswana Post, Botswana Meat 
Commission, Botswana Railways and later the Water Utilities Corporation.  
40 Botswana Telecommunications Sector Performance Review: a supply side analysis of policy outcomes 
(2007).  
41 Mobile operators Vista Cellular (now Orange Botswana) and Mascom Wireless were licensed to operate to 
enter the telecommunications industry in Botswana in 1998 
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development (see Figure 6.8). Resource acquisition entailed new technologies and the 
development of human capabilities in order to cope with a new operational and business 
environment, all which were necessary to face competition.  
 
By 2004 the BTC had emerged from the temporary decline after a range of initiatives (some 
of these are discussed in detail from an agency theory perspective below). By that time, a 
growing demand for its services presented scope for additional revenues. However, some 
of the demand came from geographically dispersed areas for which costs of service were 
prohibitive. The corporation selectively chose areas and market segments which it could 
service profitably (this is reviewed from a stakeholder perspective below), whilst investing 
in low cost-high coverage satellite technologies that ensured the achievement of internal 
efficiencies. These investments were funded and supported from internal resources. 
Resulting in part from these investments, a corresponding increase in productivity as 
measured by revenue and access lines per employee was realised, improving by up to 73% 
and 59% respectively (see Figures 6.3 and 6.4), again, a case of resources driving good 
business performance.   
 
Beyond those tangible resources that the corporation was able to sustain, a unique asset 
was awarded to the BTC in 2007, that being a Public Telecommunications Operator (PTO) 
license. This license gave the BTC access to the lucrative mobile market. A successful 
exploitation of the PTO license required resources, and the corporation’s commitment to 
strengthen its resource base is discernable from among other things a spike in staff 
development and capital investments observed as from the 2006 financial year (see Figures 
6.6 and 6.7). Capital investments were in optic fibre capacity, advanced billing systems, 
integrated customer solution platforms and cellular technologies, among others. The key 
outcome of these investments was a mobile telephone operator subsidiary, be Mobile (Pty) 
Ltd which was registered as a private company and launched in 2008. The mobile operator 
was established entirely from internal resources (capital and human), successfully within 
time and budget. To date, mobile telephone revenue contribution to the BTC group has 
continued to grow significantly.  
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 The BTC’s good performance can, however, not be adequately explained in terms of the 
resource-based theory alone. There are elements of well-rooted agency theory issues which 
can be discerned as well. For instance, the founding legislation prescribes the existence of 
an independent board of directors. The legislation also prescribes the manner in which such 
boards are to be constituted, giving priority to merit and skill diversity. This limits the scope 
for appointing individuals to the board purely on the basis of political connections, a 
prevalent scenario within other African SOEs, which has been linked to the poor 
performance of SOEs (Mwaura, 2007).  
 
BTC has traditionally been governed by boards constituted from independent persons with 
diverse experience. At any given point in time, various skills have been observed within the 
board, typically finance, legal, information technology and business management and, at 
least up to the early 2000s, the successive boards have proven effective and capable of 
coping with the prevailing business environment.   
 
In rolling out a turnaround strategy to deal with the declining performance, the board of 
directors that had existed as at the beginning of the period of declining performance was 
entirely replaced. The CEO was replaced initially through an interim appointment of an 
external consultant (with a substantial appointment being made after 3 years). A broad staff 
rationalisation programme was embarked upon, with up to 600 jobs (35% of the workforce) 
being shed during 2003. A cross-cutting job re-grading exercise resulted in new job profiles 
and requirements for all positions. All middle to executive management positions were 
converted from ‘permanent and pensionable’ basis to three-year fixed term contracts with 
renewal possibilities linked to the achievement of set objectives. A ‘more efficient’ 
performance management system was introduced, characterised by among other things 
mid-year and end of year score-based staff performance appraisals. A new performance 
incentive scheme was introduced under which performance linked bonuses were paid out 
to management and staff.   
These changes, which were supported by government are symbolic of a focus on the 
agency problem as a means of dealing with a declining enterprise performance. The 
replacement of the board could imply different things to different people, in the view of this 
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researcher, based on the case, the old board and the structures they installed were no 
longer sufficiently coping with a changing business landscape. The removal of the board 
and the CEO as a mechanism to deal with declining performance is supported by earlier 
research work by Weisbach (1988) and Daily and Dalton (1995) which established improved 
performance as a consequence. A historically effective board may eventually fail in their 
governance role due to a number of factors including complacency, a lack of appreciation 
of new business dynamics and excessive tenures (Hwang and Kim, 2009; Fracassi and 
Tate, 2012).   Beyond simply guarding against the agency problem, effective boards are 
known to bring to an enterprise strategic direction which in turn enhances the scope for 
better performance (John and Senbet, 1998).  
In addition to boards, the literature is rich with a variety of mechanisms to deal with the 
agency problem, focusing on the agents themselves. Such initiatives include those adopted 
by BPC: the introduction of management contracting, managerial incentives, performance 
management and measurement and also job enrichment (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; 
Bonazzi and Islam, 2006; Letting et al., 2012)  
The political willingness to allow BTC to be governed through efficient structures overseen 
by competent boards desires special mention. Studies have credited such political 
willingness for successful turnaround programmes in SOEs, for example in China where Xu 
et al., (2001) credited the success of the SOE corporatisation programme to have depended 
on the political commitment. Although the fundamentals of the public choice theory taints it 
with ‘bad’ political interference, analysis of the BTC case reflects a departure from such a 
norm. The political interference aimed at saving the BTC from the 2002 decline in 
performance cannot be seen as having been motivated by selfish interests, but rather 
informed by the ideals of the agency theory, of course, with a supportive regulatory and 
policy framework. 
 
By 2004 enterprise performance was beginning to turn around; employee and asset 
productivity began to improve (Figures 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5), with an enhanced efficiency 
(Figures 5) thus improving financial and business performance (see Figure 6.1, 6.2 and 6.6).  
Beyond 2004 further efforts can be observed to keep the board effective and relevant at a 
time when the BTC was preparing for competition in the mobile telephone market, which 
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was seen by many as the future of the corporation. Five of the nine board members were 
replaced during 2006 and 2007 with a new chairman being appointed ahead of BTC’s entry 
into the mobile market in 2008. Additional appointments included individuals with a wealth 
of experience from the private sector coming with legal, telecommunications and information 
technology skills. The need to strengthen SOE boards with independent individuals from the 
private sector has been advocated by earlier writers on the subject of the agency theory 
(Rosenstein and Wayatt, 1990 and John and Senbet, 1998). 
 
So far the essay has established the power of resources to drive performance, supported 
by adequate governance structures modelled around the agency theory. It has further 
revealed a very positive political interference seemingly departing from the basic 
fundamentals of the public choice theory. An important dimension still remains, and that is 
the one of stakeholders. 
 
The BTC has traditionally faced a plethora of heterogeneous stakeholder groups with varied 
interests, and there is always a danger in to trying to satisfy all such interests indiscriminately 
as good performance is compromised (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). However, SOEs are 
public corporations and as such divergent interests are expected and legitimate. This 
scenario has been blamed for stretching enterprise resources, clouding priority objectives 
and ultimately undermining good SOE performance (Worch et al., 2013; Spiller, 2010 and 
Lavie, 2006). Three main inter-related factors are identified as having aided BTC to escape 
this problem, and these were: 1) the legal framework which permitted BTC to selectively 
pursue shareholder interests whilst striking a balance with corporate sustainability; 2) an 
enabling regulatory framework; and finally 3) political support. The political willingness was 
clearly demonstrated when government ceded its regulatory functions to an independent 
regulatory body. This regulatory organ was entrusted with the responsibility of overseeing 
all industry decision processes concerning the supply and pricing of services, which were 
made transparent. An interesting aspect is that the board of the industry regulator itself was 
stakeholder diverse, with the founding legislation dictating representation from the business 
community, domestic users (rural and urban) and the public sector. 
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However, the non-commercially viable stakeholder interests were not completely ignored, 
but the policy specifically directed how these were to be served without placing the burden 
on the BTC. Government still retained the overall policy function and associated legal 
frameworks as well as the power to intervene in market forces where they were lacking. 
Such a policy stance, which was informed by research and stakeholder analysis, has been 
popularly prescribed due to its ability to take into consideration the full impact of a changing 
regulatory landscape (Murdock, 2004). The wider and often conflicting stakeholder interests 
were captured through market regulation, notably through government’s ability to 
manipulate industry conditions to supplement market forces (Hertog, 1999). Industry 
regulation itself, both structural and conduct is not completely devolved from the political 
legislative process, and hence a significant overlap between the public choice theory and 
the economic theory of regulation (Levine and Forrence, 1990; Mueller, 1989). Such an 
overlap becomes a leverage factor when the political will is decisively demonstrated through 
positive interference, as has been the case with the BTC.  
The analysis of this case reveals interesting public choice and stakeholder dimensions. 
Departing from the widely held public choice theoretical implications that political 
interference undermines governance and performance (Hill, 1999; Mwaura, 2007; Shaw, 
2008, Hertog, 2010), the political leadership benefited from the ideals of the agency and 
resource-based theories in constructing appropriate governance structures.  
The public choice in its own right is a widely researched subject and the outcomes have 
almost always implied that political interference stems from selfish interests which often 
impair performance (Hill, 1999).  However, from a property rights perspective, such political 
interference in SOEs is justified, and with this case, there emerges a complementarity 
between the public choice, the agency theory and the stakeholder theories. A legal and 
regulatory framework supporting a selective approach to stakeholder needs is in line with 
postulations by some critics of the stakeholder theory (Donaldson and Preston, 1995; 
Agguilera and Jackson, 2003; Heath, 2004; Wicaksono, 2009; Carney et al., 2011), hence 
not surprising. Thus, a positive public choice perspective can rely on the agency and 
resource-based theories to drive good performance, provided a nuanced approach is taken 
with respect to the stakeholder theory.   
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6.5. Conclusions  
 
This essay pursued an inquiry into how various and seemingly competing organisational 
theories combine to explain organisational performance in the context of SOEs. The essay 
interrogated a number of factors that have fundamentally aided BTC to sustain long periods 
of good performance, including driving the SOE back to profitability after a temporary 
decline.  
A good resource base, accompanied by a dynamic culture of good governance drove the 
success story of the BTC. There was a punctual and positive political interference on the 
basis of established political willingness to see the BTC become a successful enterprise. 
Such a political will greatly influenced the outcome of an enterprising environment in which 
the method of catering for varying stakeholder interests was dependent upon the 
sustainability of such interests.     
The dominance of the public choice theory over others is evident, however the popular view 
that political influence and interference are premised on selfish interests cannot remain 
unchallenged. A concept of positive public choice, under which such interference and 
influence is driven by stakeholder interests and sustainability emerges from the case of BTC. 
This presents scope for finding congruence between the seemingly contending theories, 
given the pace at which democracies have been emerging, with an ever increasing demand 
for good governance in State Owned Enterprises.  
 
Based on the research findings, a framework unifying political intervention with stakeholder 
interests needs to be developed and formalised with a link to SOE objectives. The 
framework would have clear performance measures linked to it, adequately monitored under 
a governance structure constituted from well incentivised boards and managers with 
appropriate strategic corporate resources under their control. 
This study has revealed real possibilities of improving SOE performance through a policy 
alternative to privatisation. At the center of such an alternative, the state’s rights as a 
shareholder must be well defined and governed by signed-off shareholder agreements. 
Beyond shareholder rights, the state involvement in SOE affairs should be limited to matters 
of policy. The shareholder rights, on the other hand, must be safeguarded through a model 
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governance structure which recognises merit (skill and relevant expertise) as being the 
primary consideration when constituting SOE boards, and this should still guide the criteria 
of selecting representatives from various stakeholder subsets. 
Whilst SOEs are known to fail in attracting and retaining high quality managers due to less 
competitive managerial remuneration, it is important to formalise and factor in non-monetary 
incentives to managers, which in most cases informally exist as ‘self-awarded’, thus often 
causing tensions between agents and principals. Managers should be given the autonomy 
to allocate resources in line with priority objectives which are set as the basis for monitoring 
performance.  
Although stakeholder interests are diverse and conflicting, they remain legitimate, but SOE 
sustainability is at stake. In serving all stakeholder interests, each SOE must have a 
sustainability hurdle, below which any initiative pursued for the benefit of a stakeholder 
group would be funded through the national budget, with the state contracting the SOE on 
an arm’s length basis.   
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSIONS 
 
7.1. Summary of findings 
 
SOEs operate in unique environments often characterised by vague objectives, political 
interference, resource constraints and a wide array of conflicting yet legitimate stakeholder 
interests. Consequently, their organisational performance outcomes are a product of an 
interaction between numbers of variables. SOEs with higher levels of owned and controlled 
resources (tangible and intangible), in addition to strong boards of directors, display better 
performance results, but only to the extent that performance objectives are clear in terms of 
what stakeholder interests are being pursued. On the other hand, SOEs heavily disposed 
towards favouring divergent stakeholder interests and higher levels of political influence 
reveal depressed performance outcomes.  
The study examined SOE performance in selected Sub-Saharan African countries. In doing 
so it had the following objectives and their respective research questions: 
a. to analyse the performance of SOEs in sub-Saharan Africa;   
b. to examine factors driving SOE performance 
c. to test what combination of variables, taken in the context of organisational 
theories, combine to influence SOE performance; and  
d. to propose a governance framework specific to SOEs.   
The specific research questions were:  
a. What are performance trends of SOEs in sub-Saharan Africa? 
b. What are the significant performance drivers of SOE performance? 
c. Which combination of competing theories of organisational performance best 
explains SOE performance?  
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The study results show the following outcomes: In pursuing the first objective of the study, 
which was to analyse the performance of SOEs in sub-Saharan Africa, Chapter Three 
outlines historical performance of representative enterprises. The outcome showed that 
SOEs in sub- Saharan Africa generally depicts a depressed performance profile. SOEs in 
the telecommunications sector emerge as above average performers compared to those in 
other industries in the sample. This is consistently so across both models of performance 
adopted in the study. Conversely, SOEs in the power sector come out as below average 
performers under both performance models.  
The second objective of the study (To examine factors driving SOE performance) was 
addressed in Chapters four, five and six.  Chapter four analysis such factors through 
econometric modelling, and results show that SOE performance is driven by: board 
strength, resource availability, less political influence as well as a well-balanced stakeholder 
disposition.  Chapters Five and Six present a detailed qualitative perspective of these 
factors, and validate each of them based on in- depth case analysis of two varying SOEs.  
Chapters Five and Six also address the third objective, being: ‘to determine what 
combination of variables, taken in the context of organisational theories, combine to 
influence SOE performance’.  In both these chapters, factors determined to be drivers of 
SOE performance are examined in the context of organisational theories through the 
application of proxy variables in detailed qualitative analysis. It is concluded that the agency, 
stewardship and resource based theories combine to explain good SOE performance, whilst 
the public choice theory explains much of the sub-optimal performance in SOEs. An 
interesting outcome from the chapters is that the stakeholder theory is one not to be taken 
at face value, but rather with careful consideration in order to attain a good balance in 
managing the interest of heterogeneous groups. 
Variables such as firm age, firm size and market competition tend to influence performance 
differently, depending on the performance measure being used. Typically, size is negatively 
correlated with enterprise productivity and profitability, whilst being positively correlated with 
efficiency.  In terms of age, older firms display better performance from a productivity 
perspective, but depressed performance in terms of efficiency and financial performance. 
SOEs exposed to market competition display better productivity and financial performance.   
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The fourth and last objective of the study was to propose an SOE specific governance 
framework, and this is outlines in Section 7.3 below.  
 
7.2. Summary conclusion 
 
This thesis has sought to analyse historical SOE performance in sub-Saharan Africa, and 
to investigate and explain factors that combine to influence SOE performance with the aim 
of proposing an SOE specific administrative framework. The study adopted a broad and 
phased approach, first analysing SOE performance and explaining patterns from the 
perspective of organisational theories. This was followed by an empirical enquiry into what 
variables combine to influence SOE performance in a certain direction. These variables 
were set as proxies of organisational theories so as to explain their interaction from an 
organisational theory perspective. The empirical enquiry was conducted at two levels, the 
first concentrating on a range of SOEs operating in different industries and countries, 
followed by a narrowed enquiry which focused on a single industry, but still with different 
SOEs from different countries. The study then conducted two separate in-depth analyses 
based on two different SOEs operating in the same country, but dealing with different 
industries, and the case analyses phase was to provide an opportunity of validating 
empirical findings.  
 
Across all phases of the study, it is apparent that good SOE performance could be explained 
by the agency and resource- based theories whilst, unlike the case of a private sector 
situation, a nuanced approach to the stakeholder theory is required for an SOE context in 
order to balance the desire to satisfy diversified stakeholder interests, whilst maintaining 
enterprise sustainability. Irrespective of strong boards and the availability of high value 
resources, the public choice theory has a predominant effect over others, with political 
control having the ability to dilute board effectiveness, divert resources and direct the pursuit 
of unsustainable stakeholder interests.         
Given the two-pronged nature of the SOE objectives, i.e. economic and social perspectives, 
the study supports a case for a broadened view of the agency theory to reconcile traditional 
shareholder-centric interests with those of the wider society. Such a societal-shareholder 
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approach to the governance and administration of SOEs would further contribute to the 
crafting of a balanced approach to the stakeholder engagement. Interestingly, the study 
challenges the narrow ‘self-interest view’ attached to the public choice theory, as it reveals 
the residual societal benefit accruing from direct political actions. However, such societal 
benefits are mostly aligned to a non-discriminative adoption of the stakeholder view which 
the study demonstrates to be detrimental to good firm performance. Thus, the study 
concludes that performance improvement in SOEs is realised when relations with the 
government, as a shareholder, are clearly defined and regulated. Different stakeholders’ 
rights need to be approached with different models, for example, through service contracts 
between the state and the SOE.   
7.3. Summary of contributions 
 
The present study does not challenge the importance of SOEs, particularly in the case of 
sub-Saharan Africa. However, it emphasises the need to pay increased attention to the 
operational motives and the governance framework of SOEs. 
 SOEs should continue to exist, but profit maximization cannot be the primary motive given 
the peculiar mandate they have to deliver on, in fulfilling socio-economic aspirations of 
nations. Profit maximisation is in itself a market driven undertaking often with little focus on 
operations that bring minimal to no profits. This is detrimental in the case of SOEs, which 
face objectives aimed at satisfying interests of a wide spectrum of stakeholders, some with 
limited potential to contribute meaningfully to profitability. Ultimately, a significantly profitable 
SOE may still be regarded a poor performer if it dismally fails to satisfy other non-commercial 
objectives.    
On the other hand, however, SOEs cannot exist purely to satisfy social objectives with no 
economic and commercial aspirations as this is not sustainable. The focus therefore, should 
be on ensuring that costs associated with operations of SOEs are recovered principally from 
such operations, with a scope for a return to ensure self-sustenance.  
In the balance, therefore, SOEs should continue to pursue their mandate through 
commercial operations. Such operations should not be driven by a desire to make profits, 
but rather an intention to realise returns that are adequate to sustain the current and future 
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operations and obligations.  By their nature, not all stakeholder aspirations will bring profits 
to SOE’s operations, even those that does so, the level of profits archived will vary but a 
good operation will be the one that achieves a legitimate cross-subsidisation to ensure that 
aggregated results make a commercial sense.    
The study proposes a new framework aimed at unifying political intervention with 
stakeholder interests and needs. The framework directly supports and unifies clear SOE 
objectives with sustainability through the sound governance and administration of state 
enterprises.  Clear performance measures are also introduced into the proposed framework. 
This in itself requires a supportive environment comprising, among other factors, an 
effective performance measurement and monitoring mechanism, effective boards, 
competent management, and a total reward-based approach to manager remuneration. The 
proposed framework is summarised below.      
Table 7.1: The proposed SOE governance framework 
Perspective Attributes 
Agency  Clear objectives signed off. 
 Merit (relevant skill and expertise) to be a 
primary consideration when constituting 
boards, and this should guide the 
selection from various stakeholder sub-
sets.  
 Formalise non-monetary perks into 
managerial rewards to augment lower 
salaries. 
Relations with the shareholder (Political 
leadership) 
 The state’s property rights as a 
shareholder should be governed by 
signed-off shareholder agreements. 
 State interventions should be limited to 
policy matters and should also be formally 
regulated. 
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Relations with the stakeholders 
(multiple) 
 Stakeholder interests should be subjected 
to a sustainability hurdle. 
 The state should contract SOEs, through 
the national budget, to implement 
desirable but commercially non-feasible 
development projects on an arm’s length 
basis. 
Resource-based view  SOEs should own and control the 
resources they need for business 
operations. 
 SOE operations should generate and 
acquire sustainable resources over time.  
 Resource application should be linked to 
strategic objectives and subjected to 
governance scrutiny by competitive and 
balanced boards. 
 
At the center of what is being proposed in Table 7.1 is the need for the shareholder, 
(represented by a clearly identified ministry/department within government) to set clear and 
measurable set of objectives. When outlining the noncommercial objectives, the 
shareholder needs to state two aspects clearly; 1) how will these be funded? and 2) Which 
stakeholders are being targeted? Naturally these have to be contained in an enforceable 
legislative instrument, which also needs to clearly outline the process and criteria to be 
adopted in appointing and removing individuals from the board. These criteria should be 
centered around merit and skill, but have the scope to achieve stakeholder representation, 
but still based on merit.  
The head of the ministry/department representing the shareholder should be a public 
servant holding the office, as opposed to a politician and the relationship between this office 
and the SOEs board, represented by the chairperson, should be governed by a clear and 
concise shareholder compact. This compact should outline measurable targets (derived 
from the legislated objectives) for each period, and should also outline responsibilities and 
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reporting lines, at the very minimum. The compact also needs to set a flexible enough 
framework for board remuneration, reward and retention. This arrangement should then be 
cascaded down from the board to senior management, represented by the SOE head (e.g. 
CEO or MD) through performance contracts containing measurable performance objectives, 
provided there is a distinction between commercial and noncommercial objectives, with a 
clear indication of how the noncommercial objectives are to be achieved, and a clear 
criterion on how to prioritise when the two sets compete. The annual performance objectives 
set for SOEs, and later repeated in senior management performance contracts, should be 
the basis for budget allocations.  
   
The study findings also provide some key insights into the management and administration 
of SOEs. The issue of political interference emerges as one which SOE managers need to 
balance with, and perhaps distinguish from due political influence through government 
policy-orientated actions. Government actions impose an obligation on SOE managers to 
get the stakeholder mapping right, with a clear understanding of what the social (and other 
non-commercial) objectives of SOEs are, otherwise a seemingly profitable SOE might as 
well be the poorest performer in the broader context of the two-pronged SOE objectives, 
that is, the commercial and non-commercial mandates of SOEs. Such a complexity in the 
management of SOEs calls for an adjusted view to the traditional agency theoretical 
implications, as the SOE owners are far from wealth maximisers, but rather, are prepared 
to attain lower returns for the purposes of achieving a wider set of objectives. Ultimately, the 
performance management framework for SOEs should be set to capture financial and non-
financial objectives, and SOE strategies should have some linkages to national priorities.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 167 
 
7.4. Study limitations 
 
This study was not without limitations. The major limitation was the availability of complete 
data for a number of SOEs in other African countries The inclusion of SOEs from other non-
English speaking countries would have possibly added great insights into the study, 
particularly with respect to political and stakeholder dimensions, given their distinct historical 
differences from the Anglophone countries. On the basis of such a limitation, the extent to 
which the findings can be generalised to other territories becomes somewhat restricted. This 
limitation, however, has not materially compromised the novelty and rigour of the current 
study, although a future research could clearly benefit from capturing a wider span of the 
continent.    
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